THE ELITE CANADIAN PRINT MEDIA CONSTRUCTION OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1956-1962

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ABSTRACT

The Elite Canadian Print Media Construction of the Cuban Revolution, 1956-1962

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This study examines the elite national print media reaction to, and coverage of, the Cuban Revolution, between 1956 and 1962. It finds that media, equally alienated by both Fidel Castro and the United States, progressively pursued an independent narrative predicated on an homage to Cuban sovereignty. Specifically, media uniformly adopted veteran *New York Times*' reporter Herbert L. Matthews' conflation between Cuban postcolonial independence and the Revolution following his exclusive interview with Fidel Castro in February 1957. Media maintained it until 1962 as it remained the only consistent, defensible theme amid Castro's apparent failure to meet expectations and the United States' cautious indifference to a revolution in kind and abject disregard for Cuban sovereignty. Research is based on an exhaustive review of eleven carefully selected elite broadsheets and three national magazines. Overall, this study offers an important counterpoint to the broader body of Canada-Cuba-U.S. postwar historiography that almost exclusively addresses foreign policy.

to

Andrew MacFarlane, Marie Moreau,
and all the other unsung Canadian correspondents —
first responders,
in time

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Dundas West, Toronto, June 2014

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INTRODUCTION

> *This is the first sure news that Fidel Castro is alive and still in Cuba. No one connected with the outside world, let alone with the press, has seen Señor Castro except this writer. No one in Havana, not even at the United States Embassy with all its resources for getting information will know until this report is published that Fidel Castro is really in the Sierra Maestra. This account, among other things, will break the tightest censorship in the history of the Cuban Republic.*
>
> — from the preface to Matthews' exclusive interview[1]

International media construction of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution formally began with the publication of his improbable interview with Herbert L. Matthews of the *New York Times* on Sunday 24 February 1957. Matthews' exclusive embarrassed the dictatorial regime of Fulgencio Batista and established Castro as the leader of the broader dissident movement in Cuba. Matthews' sympathetic portrait of Castro, as Anthony DePalma chronicles in *The Man Who Invented Fidel* (2006), also set the preliminary tone for the majority of the subsequent press coverage in North America and around the world. Mainstream identification with Castro's struggle legitimized the populist claims of his "July 26th Movement" (or M-26-7) and, in turn, exposed the United States to criticism for supporting Batista militarily.[2]

This study builds upon research into the construction of the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro (which remain virtually synonymous) by DePalma and others. It aims to

further the historiography of Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations by exploring the role of elite Canadian print media in constructing the Cuban Revolution for Canadians, from 1956 to 1962. As Robert Wright demonstrates in *Three Nights in Havana* (2007), American and Canadian representations of the Cuban Revolution began to diverge shortly after Batista fled the island on New Years' Day 1959. The U.S. press began actively working to turn the American public against Castro which, in turn, legitimized Washington's increasingly aggressive anti-Castro foreign policy. In Canada, by contrast, national media were almost uniformly critical of American Cuba policy between 1959 and 1962. This had the effect of engendering popular support for Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker's "nationalist" policies, including his refusal to follow the U.S. lead and suspend Canadian trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba.[3]

This study ultimately finds that elite Canadian print media adopted Matthews' underlying connection between the Revolution and Cuban postcolonial independence (as something of a latent surrogate for Canadian postwar independence). As Castro repeatedly failed to meet Matthews' established expectations and America's cautious indifference to a revolution in kind turned to open hostility, media retreated back to the idea of deliverance for Cuba (from within as much as without) as an indivisible core theme. Of course, media eventually entertained what Matthews could not: that such deliverance required emancipation from Castro himself. In so doing, media cultivated an independent narrative predicated on strict homage to Cuban sovereignty above all else. This abridged argument is supported by a thorough exposition over what follows,

beginning with a prefatory qualification of Matthews' influence using mass media critic Tom Engelhardt's examination of "victory narratives" in his book, *The End of Victory Culture* (1995), which this study takes as its frame.

In *The End of Victory Culture*, Engelhardt contended that America has been immersed in a "culture of victory" from its inception. This "exceptional" or "triumphalist" spirit shaped the origin story of public imagination, from the American Revolution right through to the end of World War II. This, he observed, is the unifying force behind the Monroe Doctrine and other policies. Engelhardt argued that this founding "victory narrative" fractured after the war, resulting in confusion, disillusionment, and insecurity — even while America ascended to the height of its global reach and influence. Between 1945 and 1962, he suggested, the old narrative gave way to one informed by a nostalgic and romantic longing for the past. Such nostalgia collided with a new paranoia, informed by America's global fight against communism. It is precisely this atmosphere in which Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution debuted to the American public (at the world in general) through Matthews in 1957.[4]

While Engelhardt's cultural study is nuanced and addresses a much broader timeline, it is possible (especially for express theoretical purposes) to extrapolate two specific and opposing victory narratives: prewar glory and postwar nostalgia. When Matthews delivered Castro to the world he did so through a *prewar* victory narrative. His account, generally considered to be a largely unfounded fantasy contrived after a chance three-hour conversation with a young, idealistic dissident in the middle of the Cuban

wilderness by a seasoned journalist more comfortable with the prewar era, found Cuba (like pre-revolutionary America) in need of deliverance from tyranny and identified Fidel Castro as the means of that deliverance. Matthews' account went largely unchallenged by the U.S. press until Castro began to drift from it almost immediately after consolidating his hold on power in January 1959.

Castro's apparent failure to live up to expectations stemmed less from Matthews' own idealism (which remains a separate issue, as DePalma demonstrates) than Castro's methodical control over his own image. This methodical control has fuelled outright and glaring contradiction and fuelled an overlapping academic and journalistic debate about his core ideology and personal mythos for more than half a century. The contemporary effect of this shifting, ambiguous image was to undermine all opinion save that which assumed the worst. In other words, Castro's one-sided media savvy — pursuing every opportunity to exploit international media but failing to circumvent contradiction and counteract bias (largely, as Wright and others have noted, due to his refusal to speak English) — left him perpetually on but perpetually off-message.

In the U.S., Matthews' prewar (glory) narrative was quickly deposed by the broader postwar (nostalgic) narrative. Scholarly consensus identifies Castro's Agrarian Reform Law of June 1959 as serving as the catalyst for the formal end of U.S. patience, and the official break in Cuba-U.S. relations more generally, but fractures were evident as early mid-January. The rapid disintegration of Matthews' narrative only amplified American emotions about Cuba and fed an increasing sense of betrayal. With Matthews'

views deposed and rejected, the postwar narrative concluded that Castro was either a communist sympathizer or a fool — an oversimplification that the U.S. found Castro to have retroactively validated upon declaring himself a Marxist-Leninist in late 1961.

In sum, Matthews portrayed Castro as a revolutionary in the spirit of the American Founding Fathers. He did so largely by invoking the previous era's "victory narrative" — a projection he not only believed in but a zeitgeist in which he felt more comfortable. For the rest of the world, of course, Matthews' portrait bolstered sympathy for Castro and made following the abrupt American turn against him difficult — mostly, because it was a fundamentally *un-American* reaction to a revolution with an expressly American theme. This is the atmosphere in which Canadians received the publication of Matthews' interview and it informs the comprehensive argument of this study which is as follows.

Canada's relative historical disinterest in Cuba, and Latin American affairs in general, prevented wide circulation or even broad discussion of Matthews' series. This, however, did not stop media from implicitly adopting his prewar victory narrative about Cuba needing (or at least deserving) revolutionary deliverance from tyranny. Matthews not only retold a story Canadians were familiar with but one that made geographic sense given Cuba's proximity to, and long relationship with, America. Matthews' influence primarily manifested throughout the limited but growing body of coverage leading up to 1959 in the form of an implicit consensus that Cuba was suffering under repression for which Batista (despite U.S. military aid) was exclusively responsible. Media stopped just

short of portraying Castro as the *single* means of deliverance, deviating slightly from Matthews, despite similarly favourable depictions of Castro and the rest of M-26-7 to outright celebration following the triumph of the Revolution.

The Revolution provoked unprecedented Canadian interest in Cuba and fed a growing conversation about Canadian involvement in Latin America that was largely framed by an inter-governmental debate as to whether or not Canada should oblige the U.S. and join the Organization of American States (OAS). Naturally, this debate was mirrored by the elite press. When Castro repeatedly failed to meet expectations and American opinion began to shift, elite media maintained the heart of Matthews' narrative. Castro was not beyond criticism, certainly, but his legitimacy was recognized — even conflated with Cuban sovereignty — and the earnestness with which he proceeded to enact his perceived mandate throughout 1959 was given the benefit of the doubt. This was gradually rescinded in early 1960, with a sharp increase in criticism, but did not incite mass calls for him to be deposed or removed (especially given the lack of a clear successor and his continued popularity among Cubans). What calls for Castro "to go" ventured by some broadsheets never rose above more than a handful of isolated articles or opinion pieces which, in sum, failed to amount to a broader trend. Media, in other words, bridged Matthews' narrative with categorical respect for sovereignty by collectively resigning itself to the fact that Castro was good enough for Cuba until Cubans (and only Cubans) said otherwise.

Moreover, media never seriously entertained the growing impression in the U.S. that Castro was a communist. Even his declaration of ideological fealty in late 1961 was dismissed as opportunistic at the very least or attributed as a direct result of U.S. policy blundering at the most. For media, American assumptions about Castro or Castro's apparent opportunism made Cuba no less deserving of deliverance from tyranny (within as much as without). With Castro and the U.S. trapped in a mutually hostile, terminal trajectory, media cultivated an independent narrative, directly informed by Matthews' original core theme of deliverance for Cuba and underscored by palpable anxiety about American hostility to such a close, integrated neighbour. This position was joined by an emphasis on continued dialogue in early 1961, an obvious nod to concurrent Canadian trade policy, believed to be a superior deterrent to further Cuban reliance on the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) than the American preference for isolationism.

It is important to note that media sympathy for Castro did not proceed from anti-Americanism. The vast majority of criticism manifested as strategic concern regarding broad U.S. policy changes in response to Cuba and the direct implications for Canada-U.S. relations, NATO, the OAS, and Cold War politics in general. At worst, it could be said that media occasionally adopted Castro as a vicarious means of living out a fantasy of standing up to American influence in Canadian affairs. Still, this never amounted to more than a casual editorial indulgence and is asymptomatic of coverage in general. In fact, media support for Matthews' prewar (glory) narrative is actually indicative of an

implicitly pro-American position, especially given the indelible association between Castro and liberal values.[5]

More directly, the moment Castro constituted a clear and present threat to hemispheric security, media abandoned any residual sympathy for Castro (which had decreased considerably during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis). Interestingly, this did not translate into a call to violate Cuban sovereignty: however uncomfortable media were with Castro's role in helping the USSR establish a missile base ninety miles off the coast of the continental U.S. (and it made media *extremely* uncomfortable) this discomfort was checked by the likelihood of a showdown ending with a full-scale invasion and possible occupation of the island. Overall, media homage to Cuban sovereignty not only survived the Cuban Missile Crisis but also did not come at the direct expense of the United States.

In sum, this study concludes that media cultivated an independent narrative predicated on a strict homage to Cuban sovereignty above all else. This independent narrative proceeded from an implicit affirmation of Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative, which later evolved into a more explicit call for Cuban independence from tyranny within as much as without. Castro's apparent failure to meet expectations or pursue a more prudent course (despite editorial counsel and willingness to grade his first year on something of a curve), as well as U.S. hostility and unilateral action (which violated the spirit of engagement and NATO's collective security calculus, only until the very last minute), eventually left media estranged from both Castro and the U.S. As such, media fell back to the core theme of deliverance for Cuba (practically expressed as an homage

to Cuban sovereignty), which it adopted after Matthews' series. Perhaps most importantly, especially for historians, media did so not as a careless or calculated act of anti-Americanism but because endorsing punitive U.S. policy toward Cuba would have meant accepting a *de facto* compromise of Canadian sovereignty as well.

This study explores the elite Canadian print media construction of the Cuban Revolution, from 1956 to 1962, in four chapters following a lengthy digression on print media research methods (see "Methodology"). "Chapter One: Historiographical Review" examines the two compartmentalized but related bodies of scholarship and investigative journalism in a selective review. The first body is comprised of scholarship regarding Cuba-U.S. relations and Canada-Cuba relations from the wider historiography of Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations. The second body is comprised of the most enduring profiles of Castro and Revolution, which have remained virtually synonymous from their indelible association in January 1959. This compartmentalized approach to a review facilitates a wider reading of primary material upon which this study is almost exclusively based (see "Methodology" below). After all, Castro has courted the attention and confidence of reporters from all over the world throughout his long and controversial tenure and this body of literature is not only pervasive but a formidable resource.

"Chapter Two: Distant, Fragmented Impressions" examines coverage of Castro leading up to the Revolution, from 2 December 1956 to 31 December 1959. It finds media interest in Cuba, from Castro's landing to the final days of Batista's regime, lacking and generally reflective of Canada's historical disinterest in the island and Latin

American affairs overall. While media only produced an informal and fragmented profile of Castro and the rest of M-26-7 leading up to 1959, it nevertheless adopted Matthews' prewar victory narrative. In turn, media came to identify Batista as an oppressor while calling for an end to his rule for the good of all Cubans.

"Chapter Three: The Benefit of the Doubt" examines the first year of the Revolution and Castro's first phase of governance throughout 1959. It finds media willing to overlook Castro's ongoing series of miscalculations in order to grant him the benefit of the doubt for virtuous intentions and efforts to make the best of a difficult situation. While media grew increasingly disappointed with Castro's decisions throughout the year it also, in turn, began to nurture growing suspicion the U.S. narrative following a critical shift against Castro in June 1959. This set up a measured calculus for criticism in 1960 that fed the development of an independent narrative characterized by equal frustration with both Castro and the U.S.

"Chapter Four: An Untenable Course" examines 1960 through 31 April 1961, which includes the immediate aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. It finds media increasingly displeased with Castro's deliberate provocation of the U.S. and equally frustrated with the American reaction and their turn toward an isolationist policy more generally. As reconciliation with either of their respective narratives became impossible, media retreated to the core theme derived from Matthews in 1957 by formally and confidently advocating an independent narrative predicated on a strict homage to Cuban sovereignty.

"Chapter Five: Terminal Brinksmanship" examines the remainder of 1961 and all of 1962, including the Cuban Missile Crisis. It finds that media perpetuated an independent narrative with increased confidence as Castro and the U.S. grew more and more estranged (feeding a mutual commitment to terminal brinksmanship). Continued homage to Cuban sovereignty bled into a concurrent push for maintaining dialogue with Castro, which emerged as a catch-all platform for defending Canadian trade policy, luring Castro away from further alignment with the USSR, and critiquing American impatience with Cuba.

This study's underlying historiographical objective is to specifically 'check the math' of the well-established research into the development of Canadian Cuban policy. It follows from the findings here that this pervading view is essentially correct. U.S. policy and Castro's own actions made Canadians equally uncomfortable. Media adopted Matthews' narrative while Ottawa pursued its own economic and political interests. In the end, they converged to represent the same general sensibility — what John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna aptly refer to as "the other good neighbour policy" in their study of the same name — despite proceeding from separate spheres or *estates*, as it were. Whether or not Canada's significant media interest and presence in Cuba following the Revolution had any influence on Ottawa through gradual editorial erosion or through lesser known backchannel interaction between journalist, diplomat, and politician, remains an interesting while ultimately less pressing question.[6]

METHODOLOGY

> *Canadianists have remained largely ignorant of the impact the two newspaper databases in particular have had on our profession. We are witnessing the application of commercial optical character recognition (OCR) technology to our work, a process that takes an image, recognizes shapes that are in the form of letters, and writes the output in plain text. These algorithms were originally and primarily designed for the efficient digitization of reams of corporate and legal documents, conventionally formatted. Applying these tools, initially designed for specific commercial applications, to historical documents yields mixed results.*
>
> — Ian Milligan, "Illusionary Order: Online Databases, Optical Character Recognition, and Canadian History, 1997-2010," *Canadian Historical Review*, 94.4 (2013): 540-569[7]

Canadian historians began to develop a modest body of work on domestic mass media during the 1970s. This literature is generally encumbered by themes within mass media theory (from Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan onward) and almost exclusively presented as cultural history. Broader interest in the study of culture amid greater monopolistic concentration, ongoing market disruption and fragmentation, technological advances and greater public awareness about personal and private data collection, storage and archival organization, along with attendant practical and moral questions about the use of such technology (generally reduced to a divisive tension between so-called *old* and *new* media), have given historians considerable opportunity to expand and transform this modest niche. Whether or not such a transformation occurs as a subtle shift or a more

purposeful reorientation is ultimately less relevant than noting that interest in media (as such) can only increase exponentially and pervasively.[8]

Recent studies have built on this trend, producing so-called "media history" that is distinct from the media studies or communications field and also less preoccupied with interdisciplinary media theory and cultural history. Such studies invariably proceed from mass media historian Paul Rutherford's foundational review of Canadian television between 1952 and 1967, *When Television Was Young* (1990), which remains the single-most comprehensive examination of any one mass media platform by a Canadian historian to date. Rutherford's broad timeline is populated by a progressive, chronological "episodical" analysis. The use of these episodes (an implicit organizational schema) support the overall scope of his study, in building to a broader conclusion, but also emphasizing the gradual development of history from one specific event (or small group of events) to the next. This specific approach, however, is generally less popular elsewhere, as most media studies pursue a much smaller scale and lean toward more traditional cultural history (which tends to stress wider connection to themes and theories). It also stands in contrast to the somewhat non-linear or thematic, even surgical, review of select content that Valerie J. Korinek employs in her formidable study of *Chatelaine* magazine in *Roughing It in the Suburbs* (2000).[9]

Rutherford's approach is clearly more relevant to the aims of this study, especially since observing the *development* of elite Canadian print media's construction of the Revolution is critical to understanding the constituent parts of that construction. In

practice, this study is more interested in the progressive development (i.e. construction) of media's collective response to the Revolution than the few major episodes emphasized by the broader historiography. Accordingly, this study takes *When Television Was Young* as its organizational model and pursues a similar episodical structure and focus — one, nevertheless, anchored in the analytical aims specifically outlined in the Introduction. What follows from here is a comprehensive methodological foundation, which qualifies the scope of this project and addresses a number of structural challenges inherent to the study of print media throughout this period.

This study examines Canada's most established, influential broadsheets: *Financial Post*, *Globe and Mail*, *La Presse*, *Le Devoir*, *Montreal Gazette*, *Ottawa Citizen*, *Toronto Star*, and the *Winnipeg Free Press*. These eight core newspapers are jointed by the *Toronto Telegram* and *Vancouver Sun*, which distinguished themselves from the broader pool of print media in Canada by their unique coverage of the Cuban Revolution: the *Telegram* sent the first staff reporter, the capable Andrew MacFarlane, to cover the rebels in February 1958 and carried the very first domestic reports about the Revolution after MacFarlane happened to be in Havana in the earliest hours of 1959; while *Sun* staff reporter Marie Moreau began a detailed series in late January 1959 that established her paper as a leading authority on Cuba. The eleventh and final broadsheet included in this study is the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, a comparatively modest venture, but also the largest Atlantic paper and therefore the most qualified to speak to the oldest aspect of Canada's trade relationship with Cuba. *Canadian Business*, *Macleans*, and *Saturday*

Night are also included in this body, for their national reach, circulation, feature reporting, and periodic engagement with the above broadsheets.[10]

Whereas the breadth of elite Canadian print media coverage of Cuba between 1956 and 1962 included a wide array of reports regarding everything from sporting events to the export balance of fruit harvests, this study pursues a *selective taxonomy* comprised of domestic reportage, editorial content, supplementary features, and foreign syndicated content. This taxonomy has been populated by a thorough and exhaustive review of all relevant items in each of the eleven broadsheets and three magazines listed above. Together, these four categories build a critical construction of media's perspective on the Revolution. These categories comprise the constituent parts of each episode throughout every chapter, beginning with Chapter Three. In short, this study investigates the elite-most content in Canada's elite-most print media. Additionally, Chapter Three is unique in including select wire material as a surrogate for domestic reportage given that Canada's interest in Cuba prior to the Revolution was much lower than it was between the start of the Revolution and the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

There are two disclaimers that accompany this selective taxonomy. The first is the fact that these four categories are not truly indicative of the sheer volume of material reviewed for this study in order to populate the "elite" perspective of each respective broadsheet. It is simply not practical to list anything but the most relevant and specific articles in the accompanying notes. The second is the fact that "media" is difficult to speak to in any unified or homogenous capacity. As such, certain generalizations are

required for narrative coherency but only amount to a subtle "rounding up" or attempt to identify commonalities from a wide array of different, though not necessarily opposing, perspectives and opinions. Efforts to observe specific differences and nuances occur in the notes and supplementary commentary. These disclaimers informed the construction of this study's narrative and are intended to aid the reader's understanding of its progression and presentation.

The examination of the four categories follows a strict structuralist approach and eschews content analysis. As Rutherford describes in the recent collection, *Communication in Canada's Past* (2009), content analysis is "...enormously time-consuming and usually sterile because it misses the complexities of meaning." Instead, this study places the wide reading of primary material within the greater narrative that highlights the role of policy and public opinion, as it pertains to the divergent approaches taken by Canada and the U.S., but stops short of a complete review of such policy. This greater narrative is referenced throughout each episode but plays an important role in the conclusion of each chapter, as the disclaimers above suggest.[11]

As noted, media include a variety of syndicated content from both foreign and domestic affiliates during this period. This generally proceeded from the political situation in Cuba — specifically, Castro's unpredictable tendency to grant access at his own convenience and for his own (and undeclared) express purposes. Most syndicated content was derived from *Associated Press* (AP), *Canadian Press* (CP), and *United Press International* (UPI), but others followed from specific partnerships with more established

American and British organizations. While the respective editorial boards of Canadian news organizations did not enjoy the same resources of their counterparts (or even each other), selective decisions to expose the Canadian public to such content nevertheless constitutes a form of endorsement. The use of syndicated content, however, did not therefore imply an absence of Canadian opinion and, in fact, often went on to provoke spirited rebuttal. In effect, this study interprets all syndicated material, regardless of origin, as a form of platform editorializing. This is particularly relevant to analysis on a structural level.[12]

Considerable effort has been made to navigate the flaws in the user interface of digital collections during the acquisition of all data. As historian Ian Milligan observes in a recent article (from which the opening quotation is derived), Canadianists and other scholars have grossly overestimated the keyword competency of archival search engines and their optical character recognition (OCR) software. This has led to incomplete or partial results and poor execution as well as a fragmentation of professional methods and approaches more generally. Of the eleven broadsheets and three magazines used in this study, the *Globe,* the *Star*, and the *Press*, were collected using OCR databases. As such, specific efforts were made to offset platform neglect for any key material through a diverse body of keywords and by triangulating specific searches using topical concentration from the other papers in aggregate. All other material was collected via microfilm digitization, a relatively new and stable collection process if particularly time consuming. Of course, even the most comprehensive search and collection methods have

flaws and errors (the author of this study accepts full responsibility for any material that may have been overlooked), especially given the sheer number of *individual* items that eleven broadsheets and three magazines over a six year range amount to in total, as explained above.[13]

1 — HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

Castro knows how to play his adversaries and his allies. He has been negotiating some form of settlement with the United States on and off for over a quarter-century, and he has been feuding openly and privately with the Soviet Union for just as long. Paradoxically, the United States cannot afford to settle with Castro because it might mean full-fledged acceptance of him, and the Soviet Union cannot afford to break with him because it would mean an awesome defeat in the contest with the United States and China for influence in the Third World.

— Tad Szulc, *Fidel*[14]

Chapter One provides a selective historiographical review of the two compartmentalized but related bodies of literature relevant to this study: Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations and what might be broadly referred to as the enduring journalistic and scholarly biographical fascination with Fidel Castro. As noted in the Introduction, Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution remain virtually synonymous with one another. It is possible to distinguish the broader aim of Castro's Revolution from the man himself, especially as media deferred to Cuban sovereignty after Castro's actions were perceived to be more and more difficult to overlook, but this was rarely done. With good reason, perhaps: an isolated study of the Revolution might prove too wooden for readers whereas reference to Castro courts interest and controversy. However unrelated these respective bodies of literature appear, they nevertheless share a common obsession with Castro and perpetuate the theme of his conflation with the Revolution. Both are critical to

understanding how media constructed the Revolution for Canadians. Accordingly, the following review is divided into two sections, one for Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations and another for this biographical fascination with Castro. The entire review is based on a core selection of works within each respective body of research. It is not intended to be, nor presented as, an exhaustive or complete historiographical review.

Canada-Cuba-U.S. Relations

Emphasis on Canada and the United States' divergent response to the Cuban Revolution tends to overstate underlying similarities in their respective relationship with the island. While both nations began relations with Cuba through trade under European colonialism, Cuba-U.S. relations are obviously more complex and extensive than Canada-Cuba relations. As the following observes, American relations with Cuba were rooted in longstanding geographic claustrophobia, economic and military aggression, and a shared community across a porous border; Canadian relations with Cuba, by contrast, were rooted in persistent but disproportionate trade across the North American axis, the relatively recent establishment of formal diplomatic relations, and a palpable comparative recognition of American influence.

Research regarding Cuba-U.S. relations and Canada-Cuba relations incorporates these broad themes but also reflects this asymmetry. Moreover, Canadian scholars have only recently started to document their nation's relationship with Cuba in earnest,

whereas their American counterparts have already produced a considerable body of work. The following explores these overlapping categories concurrently through a tour of select works. The review of Cuba-U.S. relations proceeds from a more recent group of studies published after the end of the Cold War, while the review of Canada-Cuba relations begins with the earliest comprehensive review published during the same period.

Louis A. Pérez Jr., the so-called "dean" of Cuba historians, has provided a formidable place to begin a selective review of Cuba-U.S. relations with *Cuba and the United States* (1990). The book offers a bridge between the leading trends and the historiographical recalibration that followed the end of the Cold War. Pérez examined Cuba-U.S. relations from colonialism through to the end of the 1980s with rare emphasis on the development and effect of policies over the role of individuals. Pérez ultimately reinforced the consensus that has identified American intervention as the principal determinant of relations.[15]

According to Pérez, American intervention has primarily proceeded from two interdependent factors. The first factor was the American refusal to entertain third-party acquisition of Cuba in light of their repeated failure to acquire the island after Louisiana and Florida. This strategy initially manifested through support for the Spanish claim to the island but later evolved, following independence and the absence of a foreign claim or threat, into a refusal to entertain third-party acquisition of the island *from within*. The Platt Amendment enshrined this as formal policy in 1901 and effectively normalized intervention. This, as Pérez observed, "fixed" Cuba-U.S. relations for a "collision" that

ultimately transpired with the Revolution (but was not necessarily contingent on the Revolution specifically). This underlying policy manifested as a persistent effort to isolate Cuba from the rest of the world following the end of formal relations with Castro in early 1961.[16]

The second factor was that such attempts to formally acquire Cuba coincided with the island's progressive integration into the U.S. market which, in turn, hastened the decline of Spanish influence. Alignment with a more convenient and lucrative market was generally welcomed by Cubans, particularly as a means to bolster sugar exports and increase opportunities to diversify the economy away from colonial monoculture. It ultimately led, however, to increased American investment, continued reliance on monoculture, and a technical dependence on corporations. This, in turn, augmented US involvement, expanded US assets, and propped up a Cuban elite who increasingly identified with their American business partners over their fellow Cubans.[17]

The most significant contribution of *Cuba and the United States* was perhaps Pérez's effort to identify Cuban agency. Cuban policy toward the U.S. prior to the Revolution, Pérez observed, has primarily been an effort to manipulate American policy. At the extremes of the Cuban political spectrum, this typically involved exaggerating threats against U.S. assets for the enfranchised elite and actual damage to U.S. interests for Martí nationalists. Following the Platt Amendment, both sides effectively observed the rule that "...a regime in Havana enjoyed U.S. support in direct proportion to its capacity to protect American property." This situation continued through to Batista and

framed Washington's stern response to Castro's seizure of U.S. assets shortly after Castro's government began exercising its new power.[18]

Thomas G. Paterson's *Contesting Castro* (1994) assumed the inverse of *Cuba and the United States* by examining Cuba-U.S. relations through the actions of individuals. Paterson's analysis proceeded from a comparison between the "bitter anti-Americanism of Castro" and the "acrid American anti-Castroism" in bilateral relations prior to, and following, Batista's fall. Paterson positioned his study as an effort to ascertain why a superior state would abide the loss of a "dependent" client. He concluded that the U.S. response to Castro was not more aggressive because senior policymakers did not consider an end to Cuban dependence possible.[19]

Paterson essentially chronicled U.S. failure to enforce longstanding policy by replacing Batista after he broke the rule highlighted by Pérez above. While the lack of a viable "third force" alternative to Castro has been widely identified as the crux of this failure (particularly in retrospect), Paterson specifically pointed to competing constructions of Batista from Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith (favourable) and intelligence reports (unfavourable). The resultant "two-faced" policy, transparently evident to Cubans, was compounded by a series of missteps in U.S. policy: the inability to resume military support without undermining Batista's rule, overt negotiations with M-26-7 following an altercation in July 1958, and reliance on Batista to facilitate a transition into late 1958. Paterson argued that the eventual decision to oppose Castro not only arrived too late but primed Cuba-U.S. relations for conflict following the Revolution.[20]

Paterson's arguably unrivalled research provided something of a bully-pulpit. He directly challenged the popular "communist conspiracy" thesis, which contended that Castro had formal ties to communism *prior* to the Revolution, and dismissed the similarly troublesome "pushed into communism" thesis, which oversimplified Castro's pivot from dependence on the U.S. to the USSR (quotes imposed by the author of this study). Paterson also admonished other scholars for not identifying the anti-imperialist position of the M-26-7 as implicitly anti-American, given the correlation between the two in nationalist movements in Latin America. Paterson was not the first to challenge these popular themes but his efforts provided a considerable counterweight.[21]

John Kirk and Peter McKenna's *The Other Good Neighbor Policy* (1997) is the earliest comprehensive review of Canada-Cuba relations and the primary point of departure for most subsequent studies. Kirk and McKenna began with the roots of bilateral trade, the basis for formal relations in the 1950s, before charting the "evolution" of relations from Diefenbaker through to the 1990s. They asserted that Diefenbaker's personal "aversion" to President John F. Kennedy (JFK) influenced his refusal to break relations with Cuba. This, in turn, inaugurated a policy which has been upheld by every subsequent prime minister. Canada and Cuba have thus developed a favourable relationship, in the shadow of America's isolationist "waiting for an old man to die" policy, which is primarily characterized by "engagement, civility, and respect" amid a mutual "concern" for the Monroe Doctrine.[22]

Kirk and McKenna concluded that this did not constitute a "special relationship" and is, instead, the direct result of a long commitment to engagement over isolation. At the same time, they also suggested, Canada-Cuba relations have often been underscored by "mutual suspicion" informed by Cuba's preference for abrupt changes of course and Canada's terminal susceptibility to U.S. pressure. Canada-Cuba relations were further shaped by a substantial trade imbalance in Canada's favour, and the fact that Canadian interest in Cuba has been generally led by private business ventures. Perhaps most importantly, Kirk and McKenna arrived at conclusions well within the bounds of Pérez and Paterson's much broader analyses.[23]

Jutta Weldes' narrow analysis of Cuba-U.S. relations during the Cuban Missile Crisis in *Constructing National Interests* (1999), complimented Pérez's efforts to identify Cuban agency and upheld Paterson's firm injunction. She observed that the U.S. exploited the Crisis to "...generate widespread legitimacy for U.S. policy" toward Cuba and the Cold War in general. JFK's early emphasis on the "offensive" nature of the missiles became the reigning narrative, largely because it drew on familiar themes, and bolstered an overt revisionist effort to "blame" the break in relations on the Revolution. Weldes achieved a counter-narrative that framed Cuba's missile pact with the USSR as an expression of sovereignty, one that both the U.S. and the USSR eventually violated, in turn. This counter-narrative provided a useful counterpoint to the neglect for Cuban agency in contemporary reportage and current historiography in general.[24]

Jamie Glazov's *Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev's Soviet Union* (2002) offered a similarly narrow *de facto* analysis of Canada-Cuba relations through a critical review of foreign policy under Diefenbaker. He asserted that Diefenbaker initially departed the "moderate" policy he inherited by being too anti-communist, only to "alienate" the U.S. on hemispheric security by maintaining relations with Cuba, and then eroded any coherency in his preliminary position by resuming the anti-communist line in order to appeal to both nationalist sentiment and public approval of JFK during the Crisis. He upheld Kirk and McKenna's emphasis on Diefenbaker's personal animosity toward JFK but did not implicitly concur with Weldes' counter-narrative regarding Cuban sovereignty. In effect, Glazov reduced the perpetuation of Diefenbaker's Cuba policy to a permanent aberration in Canadian Cold War foreign policy and an unfortunate departure from "quiet diplomacy" with the U.S.[25]

Morris Morley and Chris McGillion's edited collection, *Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World* (2005), approached Cuba-U.S. relations through the "...diverse international reaction to [U.S.] policy..." toward Cuba from the Revolution to the early 2000s. They introduced the collection with the observation that, following the Cold War, U.S. Cuba policy not only became more strict but contradicted their push for greater international trade. Elsewhere, William LeoGrande suggested that this was imposed despite the end of any "security concerns" that informed earlier policy and within an overall realignment toward promoting democracy (and human rights) abroad. McGillion and Kirk and McKenna (co-authors again) each explored European and

Canadian opposition to U.S. policy (particularly the Helms-Burton Act of 1996) in favour of respective forms of engagement. Morley also cited Latin America's preference for engagement, following the Cold War, but noted that Cuba's recurrent currency crises has been (and remains) a leading factor in its isolation, despite U.S. pressure. Overall, the collection furthered Pérez's emphasis on Cuban agency and Paterson's dismissal of sensationalist themes. It also located continuity throughout the U.S. policy of isolation (maintained by each successive president) but observed that recent attempts to isolate Cuba even further have continued to backfire and isolate Washington.[26]

Robert Wright's *Three Nights in Havana* (2007) provided the most significant review of Canada-Cuba relations since *The Other Good Neighbor Policy.* Wright used Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's amiable visit to Cuba in 1967 as the anchor for a broader analysis of Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations and Cold War tensions. He asserted that Trudeau's improbable friendship with Castro and subsequent disagreement over Angola represented "[b]oth the high and low points of Canada's relationship with Revolutionary Cuba..." and has best represented the commitment to engagement in Canada-Cuba postwar relations. However, Wright also upholds Kirk and McKenna's broader conclusion that Canada-Cuba relations are not based on a special relationship.[27]

While *Three Nights in Havana* emphasized Castro and Trudeau's relationship it also made a considerable effort to rein in certain trends. This proceeded from a basic refutation of the popular theses identified by Paterson (important for a Canadian study) and transitioned into a reconstruction of the genesis of Diefenbaker's Cuba policy. Wright

asserted that Diefenbaker's initial response to the Revolution did not derive from his personal feelings about JFK but, rather, his "sensitivity" to the "U.S. position" under his predecessor. Wright supported this by citing recently declassified documents that revealed "...the [U.S.] secretly urged Diefenbaker to maintain normal relations because it was thought that Canada would be well positioned to gather intelligence on the island." He concluded by noting that Diefenbaker's apparent dithering during the Crisis was not the grandstanding it appeared "in retrospect" but, rather, an attempt to satisfy Canada, its allies, and global stability. This wider account of Diefenbaker's Cuba policy departed from Kirk and McKenna's preliminary conclusion and challenged Glazov.[28]

Wright's edited collection with Lana Wylie, *Our Place in the Sun* (2009), pushed for renewed interest in Canada-Cuba relations by uniting some of its more experienced voices. Three contributions in particular, among the collection's discursive analysis, are immediately relevant this study. Dennis Molinaro departed from established reviews of Diefenbaker's Cuba policy, discussed above, to assert that the prime minister was primarily moved by "optics" (over Cuban interests) and responded to JFK less out of personal animosity than the president's over-reaching policy. Don Munton and David Vogt reviewed the outgoing reports from Canada's embassy in Havana, from 1953 to 1963, and found ambassadorial perceptions of Castro dismissive and susceptible to rumour (not unlike their U.S. counterparts). While Cynthia Wright found expressions of solidarity in Canada and the U.S. for the Revolution, through the "Fair Play for Cuba

Committee" movement, at the forefront of encouraging dialogue and inciting a broader debate in the press (particularly in Canada).[29]

Our Place in the Sun's broader historiographical connections included Hal Klepak and Mark Entwhistle's respective agreement with Kirk and McKenna that Canadian investment has generally preceded other forms of interest. Klepak specifically noted the implicit assumption that Canada has used Cuba as a metric for broader relations in Latin America and has leveraged its Cuba policy against criticism of following U.S. foreign policy too closely. Robert Wright located Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's failure to replicate Trudeau's unique experience in Cuba against the broader failure of "constructive engagement" over general engagement. While Lana Wylie adopted a perspective on Cuban agency (reminiscent of Pérez), in a review of Cuban biotechnology and prospective inroads for Canada-Cuba cooperation.[30]

Lars Shoultz has written the most recent and comprehensive review of Cuba-U.S. relations, and perhaps the most extensive study to date, in *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic* (2009). Shoultz proceeds directly from Pérez and Paterson but implicitly challenged their respective conclusions. He cited the maxim that the powerful will dominate the weak before observing that every U.S. president after JFK has isolated Cuba "on the cheap" because resources are not limitless. What typified U.S. domination of Cuba, for Shoultz, was an indulgent "civilizing mission" (or "uplifting" in President George W. Bush's polarizing vernacular) to which the Cuban Revolution represents a categorical rejection. He concluded by noting that the most striking facet of U.S. Cuba

policy after the Revolution was the inability to understand why a state might not appreciate such an uplifting.[31]

While Shoultz began with an assessment of U.S. Cuba policy before and after the Revolution, he dedicated the breadth of his study to comparing successive presidential designs on Cuba to actual policy.[32] Apart from this and the main thrust above, Shoultz made three core points specifically of interest to this study. First, Rebel Air Commander Pedro Diáz's defection in July 1959 cemented the "communist conspiracy" thesis in the U.S. following Castro's seizure of select assets in June. Second, Shoultz asserted that the failure of the Bay of Pigs could have been rigged to force JFK into deploying troops. Third and finally, Shoultz concurred with Weldes' view that Cuban participation in the Missile Crisis has generally been overstated but stopped just short of reiterating her emphasis on the "defensive" nature of the missiles.[33]

Lana Wylie has written the most recent review of Canada-Cuba relations in *Canadian and American Policies in Comparative Perspective* (2010). Wylie addressed the comparative emphasis on Cuba-U.S. relations in most Canadian-centric studies by examining the "role of perception" through confidential interviews with senior officials from both countries. She found that their divergent approaches toward Cuba have primarily proceeded from "...different perceptions that ultimately have roots in their different self-identities." In effect, U.S. officials have viewed Cuba "as a failure" that must be rectified, whereas Canadian officials have viewed Cuba as a "hands off" situation. The U.S. self-perception has been informed by an exceptionalism which, Wylie

observed, "others" Cuba over its fundamental "challenge" to core American values (or a rejection of uplifting, in Shoultz parsing). Of course, this "other[ing]" has been further complicated by an overall regard for the island as "family" under the Monroe Doctrine. Canada's self-perception, by contrast, has been informed by the postwar imperative to be a "good international citizen" who emphasizes "mediation" in foreign policy (of which dialogue is certainly indicative).[34]

Both self-perceptions, Wylie noted, not only influenced the development of policy but have ultimately worked to reinforce it. Her comparative review presented an interesting challenge to "traditional explanations" of foreign policy, including some of the more supportive reviews of U.S. policy toward Castro's Cuba but also Canadian-centric studies that have approached Canada's divergent policy from a wide range of assumptions. Such studies have generally overstated both American and Canadian influence on Cuba through engagement and isolation in kind. They have also observed the fact that Cubans themselves have fundamentally changed Cuba of their own accord regardless of external pressures.[35]

Canada-Cuba and Cuba-U.S. relations are likely to experience renewed interest following the continued declassification of critical documents, the recent fiftieth anniversaries of both the Revolution and the Crisis and, as always, the ever-looming, long-foretold prospect of normalized Cuba-U.S. relations. Forthcoming studies will likely reflect a more developed sense of Cuban agency, particularly following new reforms under new President Raúl Castro and the gradual emergence of the next generation of

leaders who have already set roots despite Cuba's relative reluctance to broadcast its internal political affairs. From here, future studies will hopefully resist pursuing a sensationalist course, such as the one more endemic to biographical studies of Castro addressed below. However, this will likely depend on whether or not the status quo of mutual isolation between Cuba and the U.S. continues.[36]

Castro as the Revolution

The essence of Fidel Castro's apparent immortality has been an enduring iconography. Apart from Ernesto "Che" Guevara's countercultural cachet and broader appeal as the revolutionary everyman, Castro became the "movie star dictator" during the latter half of the Cold War: still too anti-American for comfort but ultimately too marginal to merit more than tired, compulsory platitudes. Castro has often been lampooned in American popular culture but almost endearingly so. Amid continued provocation and routine denunciation of American affairs, Castro gradually acquired a begrudging indifference that has not been granted to his equally divisive, and atomically-inclined, comrades-cum-confrères.[37]

Attempts to decipher Castro's longevity and doggedness have fuelled a major mass market publishing craze ever since the arrival of the first books about the ascendant Cuban leader in early 1959. A formidable cast of biographers, diplomats, scholars, journalists, contemporaries, friends, and admirers and enemies alike have contributed to a

vast catalogue and prolific discourse about his image and persona (and therefore also of the Revolution shaped by it). Their efforts have manifested in a range of periodic to rigorous profiles and political histories. Perhaps most importantly, these profiles have fed other bodies of literature, including Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations, for their connection to contemporary perspective as well as rich historical anecdotes. The following examines this biographical fascination with Castro, his image, and their continued conflation with the Revolution.[38]

Jules Dubois, longtime Latin America correspondent for the *Chicago Tribune*, published the first English-language book about the newly empowered Castro in early April 1959. *Fidel Castro — Liberator or Dictator?* fractured the mass media monopoly of Castro coverage, still largely deferential to Matthews' original characterization (or at least shaded by it), by offering the American public the very first comprehensive story about the Cuban leader and his rise to power. Dubois drew upon his previous contact with Castro (beginning in 1947) and his considerable knowledge of the region to produce a biography set against the popular history of the young Revolution. *Fidel Castro* (unlike its namesake) would go on to enjoy only a brief best before date.[39]

Still, Dubois was responsible for establishing a seemingly pedestrian but ultimately enduring two-part approach to Castro analysis. First, he emphasized a correlation between Castro's personal history and his political career that subsequent writers have overwhelmingly embraced. Castro's profilers tend to revel in a wide array of biographical material first manifest in Dubois' own meandering narrative. Second, he

indulged in autobiographical asides about his own personal experiences within Cuba, especially his conversations with Castro and members of his coterie. These asides have deep roots in a broader tradition of contemporary war correspondence but Dubois' use of them in a more expansive platform established an enviable trope for successive profilers. More specifically, such asides proved what Matthews formally developed and might be referred to as the Matthews' model: that reporting in Castro's Cuba (even from early 1957) was, as a rule, almost exclusively dependent on individual estimation. In other words, the narrative of preference became one that traded on an author's personal access to Castro and his inner circle. In turn, personal asides from subsequent profilers have openly trafficked in biographical tangents about Castro himself.[40]

Elsewhere, Dubois proffered two important historiographical contributions in his introductory role. First, Dubois appealed for a nuanced understanding of the underlying tension within Cuba-U.S. relations upon Castro's assumption of power.[41] While such a plea received less and less consideration in the months that followed publication, it nevertheless aligned Dubois with the more reflective analyses that emerged in the 1980s. Second, Dubois put forward an analytical imperative, posed in the book's subtitle, which allowed for (but ultimately failed to resolve) the internal inconsistency of Castro's political persona. Successive attempts to come to terms with this imperative, and to ultimately resolve it, have shaped virtually all works since, beginning with Matthews' first expansive Castro profile. While Dubois' foundational role has been generally

eclipsed by broader studies, his contributions prefigured the most mainstream and enduring trends that followed.[42]

Matthews chased Dubois' lead in his own book-length profile of Castro and the Cuban Revolution in 1961. *The Cuban Story* arrived a journalistic postmortem of Matthews' "accidental" role in boosting Castro's otherwise staid propaganda efforts which, of course, hastened his ascendancy over other dissident groups. It built on this by slowly transitioning into a broader, contemporary rumination on strained Cuba-U.S. relations in the first two years of the Cuban Revolution. Matthews played at taking responsibility for the unprecedented impact of his story but failed to identify any specific error on his part. This stemmed from his refusal to reconcile sympathy for Castro in theory with distress for Castro in practice. The product is a rigid, set-the-record-straight narrative punctuated by awkward repetition — literally Matthews' chapter-by-chapter effort to weld these opposing forces together — and diffident entreaties to historians of the future.[43]

Matthews returned from the Sierra Maestra in 1957 as a "true believer" in the idealism of the Cuban Revolution.[44] This lingered long after both the movement and its architect had drifted unrecognizably, after Matthews was sanctioned and then unceremoniously dismissed from the *Times* for his insubordinate ruminations about Castro, and right through to death in self-imposed exile. The roots of Matthews' persistence were twofold and feature prominently in his later works.[45] First, Matthews was unable to conceal his *embarrassment* at his own government's refusal to engage

Castro, mostly, as he argued, because the U.S. failed to appreciate the underlying conditions that led to the Revolution. Second, while Matthews was critical of Castro's more controversial actions after 1959, he graded on a curve that attempted to account for the predetermined U.S. attitude toward him — fed, in part, by his peers' increasingly biased coverage. Specifically, as Matthews wrote: "[Castro] found that he could either have democracy or revolution, not both. He found that he could be independent of the United States without becoming dependent on the Soviet bloc."[46]

These points both factor into major trends. The latter echoes a fragmented body of "pushed into communism" arguments later subsumed by more methodical postcolonial studies (closer to what Matthews aimed to articulate). Additionally, it paralleled the academic focus on engagement and "constructive engagement" adopted by Canada and Europe more generally in contrast to the U.S. While the former prefigured the call for a new U.S. Cuba policy in the aftermath of the Cold War, from the late 1990s that has since been compounded by both Castro's apparent retirement and the score of fiftieth anniversaries just passed.

Overall, Matthews' views placed him outside mainstream American opinion and much closer to international views; indeed, Matthews was intent on the production of an *alternative* American perspective. His failure, however, to evolve his views in step with Castro's own gradual transformation progressively eroded not only his position but his authority. Conversely, Matthews' personal struggle with Dubois' imperative and his Castro-dichotomy were perhaps his most significant contributions.[47]

As a personal exegesis, Matthews' approach in *The Cuban Story* was introverted and isolated from most other trends save the major themes discussed above. Its interaction with existing trends, excluding the modest number of studies that have since focused specifically on Matthews, was limited to two noteworthy items. First, Matthews employed the autobiographical / biographical approach cemented by Dubois. Matthews arguably provided something of a template with his first contact with Castro as rebel, but Dubois' prior contact with Castro allowed him to make the most of the inaugural opportunity to define the longer format. Second, Matthews casually endorsed the notion that Castro's brother Raúl and Ché were responsible for his gradual turn to communism. Such speculation has lived on and is still featured in studies that have focused on the roots and extent of Castro's communist sympathies.[48]

Ruby Hart Phillips, the *New York Times*' foreign correspondent and de facto Havana bureau chief from 1937 to 1961, was widely considered the counterpoint to Matthews' sympathetic coverage. Her fourth and final book about Cuba, *The Cuban Dilemma* (1962), was a rushed, inelegant eyewitness account of what she described as the communist takeover and transformation of Cuba, beginning with Castro's first decrees and ending with his declaration of official alignment with the Marxism-Leninism on 2 December 1961.[49]

Phillips rejected the Castro-centric approach preferred by Dubois and Matthews in favour of a broader cultural, economic, and social account of Cuba under Castro. She supported this with a firm command of statistics and a firsthand knowledge of life on the

island that predated even Batista's presidency. As such, Phillips started a minor trend that has since been championed by those less interested in Castro than in specific policies and the Revolution's broader plan of economic experimentation. When she did reference Castro, however, she nevertheless employed the same Dubois-Matthews biographical asides and autobiographical digressions.[50]

Phillips concluded on a somewhat transparent imperialistic tone, taking a hardline stance against the spectre of a communist foothold in Latin America, observing that the result of the Bay of Pigs was a politically unacceptable "loss of prestige" for the U.S. and its international interests, and by calling for the end of Castro's regime. Her tone was critical to understanding her contrast to Matthews. Far more than simply eschewing Matthews' apparent "enthusiasm" for Castro and the Revolution, Phillips refuted the "pushed into communism" thesis. Alternatively, she submitted that Castro embarked upon a methodical campaign to sabotage relations with the U.S. While such a view was not original or solely advocated by her, it certainly reflected mainstream American opinion. Perhaps more importantly, her decisive articulation of these views prefigured the particularly hostile tone of many anti-Castro narratives that have since followed.[51]

Dubois, Matthews, and Phillips represented the most prominent voices within the earliest journalistic and even diplomatic construction of Castro during the 1960s. A construction that included considerable contributions from Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) cameraman Robert Taber and sociologist C. Wright Mills. Subsequent narratives naturally turned toward more comprehensive analyses, perpetuating many of

the same trends, while providing subtle variations on the Dubois-Matthews approach informed by an even more resolute Castro. Where American interest in Cuba reached new heights during the 1960s it bottomed out into disinterest during the 1970s. The first customary efforts by historians to assess the undigested events of roughly twenty years prior began in earnest during the 1980s. These and a successive wave of more popular profiles partly coaxed a vindictive superpower out of an implicit disregard for Cuba on a national scale (amid other national crises and the Cold War).[52]

Historian Richard E. Welch Jr.'s *Response to Revolution* (1985) was among the earliest and most methodical of these efforts. He departed from the more conventional approach to Cuba-U.S. relations, addressed previously, in favour of a more narrow "summary chronicle" of Cuba's rapid political transformation between 1959 and 1961 in three phases: the "polarization" within Castro's movement incurred by his measured embrace of radicals over the moderates (January to October 1959), the "socialization" of the economy (November 1959 to December 1960), and the unique "establishment" of state communism (January 1961 to June 1962). Welch's well-scaled, practical approach facilitated his efforts to rein in three pernicious myths perpetuated by sensationalist narratives and even Castro himself.[53]

The first of these was the perception that *only* Castro could have been Batista's ouster; whereas, the regime's tenuous grasp of authority left it vulnerable to collapse under internal pressure let alone *any* united front. The second of these held that Castro was a direct *response* to Batista; whereas, Castro's political awakening in university and

his underlying antipathy toward Cuban *dependence* in general was well documented. The third and most pernicious of these was the widely held theory that Castro obfuscated his communist roots to avoid arousing suspicion; whereas, any identification with communism prior to 1961 is inconclusive, his low estimation by party officials well known, and his gradual use of ideology entirely pragmatic. Recent scholarship has upheld Welch but not, as observed in the following, necessarily through the same means.[54]

Welch's emphasis on the word *socialism*, qualified through a layered description of Castro as a "political opportunist" who exploited "his lack of doctrine ideology" toward the broader pursuit of "Cuban sovereignty" through an "amorphous set of reformist goals", facilitated the succinct review and dismissal of these myths. More directly, it established a countercurrent against impressionistic trends set in motion by the first journalistic efforts to construct Castro in the 1960s in two parts. First, it offered a work-around to both the "communist conspiracy" and the "pushed into communism" theses endorsed, refuted, and poorly parsed by other profilers. Second, it demonstrated the futility of attempting to resolve or even address Dubois' imperative. In sum, Welch achieved the *alternative* American construction of Castro that Matthews theorized but could not expressly manifest himself and which elite Canadian media largely achieved (albeit unintentionally) with their independent narrative.[55]

Where *Response to Revolution* began by establishing an operative understanding of Castro's construction of himself, it closed with a partitioned aggregate of the American diplomatic, political, and mass media response to Castro. Welch positioned Castro's mid-

June 1959 agrarian reforms, or *confiscation without compensation* as it might be rendered in American Constitutional parlance, as the beginning of the end of official relations and the rapid conversion of the press and general public against Castro. The press adopted this new policy in short order, building on (and reexamining) an existing pool of criticism by conservatives with little in response from a fragmented left — reduced to either contrived critical overcompensation or a Matthews-like perpetual differentiation.[56]

Welch's inspection of America's immediate response to Castro in aggregate was unrivalled. However, his precise calculus has not gained much currency beyond select historians and other scholars, as profiles have continued to lean toward sensationalism and have fallen prey to revisionist accounts through variations on the Dubois-Matthews approach. Tad Szulc's *Fidel* (1986) offered the most striking methodological contrast to Welch, despite arriving at similar conclusions, in an uninhibited tour of existing trends without the same effort to adjudicate or prioritize.[57]

Fidel was built around a series of candid conversations with Castro between 1959 and 1985 that embraced "honesty" over "objectivity" in a prolific attempt to provide an "unofficial portrait" in the absence of any "serious" biography during the twenty-five years since the Cuban leader's rise to power. In keeping with the Dubois-Matthews approach, this served as a platform for the *Times* reporter to establish a journalistic franchise independent of the more controversial constructions proffered by his senior *Times* colleagues. To support this, Szulc plotted an atypical course away from sensationalism toward a more historical narrative. His almost singular pursuit of the

question of whether the Cuban Revolution was "...logically dictated by Cuban history or represent[ed] an extraordinary political aberration primarily instigated by [Castro's] overwhelming personality" served as a critical frame. Szulc ultimately provided no clear conclusion, in a direct departure from the anxiety of Dubois and Matthews' respective narratives, and proceeded from his broader observation that Castro's "contradiction and paradox" has blurred even the most graceful attempts to capture his pragmatism.[58]

Szulc's substantial narrative offered three contributions relevant to the American construction of Castro's image in sum and of particular interest to subsequent narratives. First, Szulc implicitly endorsed Welch's rejection of popular Castro myths. Szulc dismissed the "communist conspiracy" thesis by correlating Castro's right for a "sweeping" revolution with his affinity for Cuba's national hero, José Martí. As a result, Szulc positioned Castro's gradual embrace of communism as less of an ideological epiphany than a means to end the "democratic-bourgeois" structure from which Cuba's colonial dependency proceeded.[59]

Second, Szulc relocated the focus from Castro's *personal* ideology (susceptible to foreign hearsay and domestic opportunistic revision) toward the more material negotiations between M-26-7 and the other ideological factions. Szulc expended considerable effort to chart Castro's progressive "exploitation" of the "old Communists" — the only opposition group with practical experience and an intimate understanding of Cuba's bureaucratic infrastructure — from exploratory discussions in 1958 through to their absorption into a "hidden government" in waiting during the first few weeks of

1959. Critically, Szulc's description of this inter-factional brokering was perhaps his most sensational indulgence: it subverted, in part, his broader efforts to correct misperceptions about Castro's affiliations with communism elsewhere. Still, it led Szulc to his most cogent and insightful observation: that "Castro insisted from the outset that the 'old' communist party be incorporated into a new one under his leadership, thus requiring the actual delivery of the party to him, an unprecedented act in Communist history."[60]

Third and lastly, Szulc examined Castro's client relationship with the USSR and speculated over Castro's broader domestic legacy. Regarding the former, Szulc inverted the "pushed into communism" thesis by arguing that not only did Castro have to "sell the Soviets" on closer ties, he *pushed them* into collusion with *him* — earlier, more rapidly, and more firmly than the USSR would have perhaps preferred. With the later, he described Castro's less-assessed domestic campaign against "underdevelopment" as only moderately successful but pivotal to the establishment of a "new sense of Cuban pride". Both points prefigured themes which grew into major trends with post-USSR economic experimentation and enduring waves of speculation about what will come from a post-Castro Cuba.[61]

William E. Ratliff's collection, *The Selling of Fidel Castro* (1987), was the next explicit media analysis following *Response to Revolution*. Unfortunately, the absence of a shared thesis or general approach, more emphatic than a common theme, impaired individual efforts to examine the American construction of Castro's image. Despite this

fragmentation, articles by John P. Wallach, Daniel Johnson, and Ratliff himself posited several relevant points.[62]

Ratliff's article offered a close-reading of *Times* coverage and editorialization of Castro which comported to Welch's own conclusions. Despite a widespread loss of enthusiasm for Castro by mid-1959, Ratliff found that *Times* articles (in aggregate) generally admonished U.S. policies. He accepted the well-established criticism of Matthews but located his romanticism within a broader effort by Castro to beguile reporters (something of an indictment of the Dubois-Matthews model). Wallach drew upon the Dubois-Matthews approach, as a journalist, for an examination of Castro's media manipulation. He identified a feedback loop at the heart of most American coverage: that media often projected expectations on Castro which he then exploited. Despite Wallach's implicit endorsement of the "communist conspiracy" thesis, he cited Castro's and Matthews' "mutual dependency" as the original model for this feedback loop (another indictment of the Dubois-Matthews model). Johnson's analysis of European coverage found "self-deception" and casual anti-Americanism at the heart of its construction of Castro. While Johnson's conclusions had more to do with a broader review of European-U.S. relations, he spoke to the American impression of Canada's own divergent construction of Castro.[63]

Syndicated columnist Georgie Anne Geyer positioned her biography, *Guerrilla Prince* (1991), as the first "definitive" work about Castro. This clear response to Szulc employed a variation of the Dubois-Matthews model that revolved less around a single

point of access by drawing on a fundamentally different cast of courses than older, more conventional profiles. Geyer paired this by approaching Castro as the subject of a psychological diagnosis in absentia. For the most part, this psychological preoccupation reached too far beyond simply framing the testimony of Castro's contemporaries (enemies and friends alike) into a strange, amateur 'pathology of the dictator' obsession that encouraged needless hyperbole.[64]

Apart from joining the chorus of stern and sensationalist reductions of Castro, Geyer expounded on two trends championed by Welch and Szulc in their analogous but distinct conclusions. First, Geyer dismissed the "communist conspiracy" thesis as an "irrelevant" obsession. To Geyer, Castro's Machiavellian qualities far outweighed any stated or perceived ideological association. She allowed for his nationalistic identification with Martí but asserted that his construction of himself was based on a need for absolute privacy. Almost "no one" knew anything about Castro she wrote, including Cubans, and what they did know had been carefully curated for internal and external digestion.[65]

Second, Geyer rejected Szulc's "hidden government" premise on this basis, asserting that inter-factional negotiations could only have occurred in purely Machiavellian terms, with Castro, the most Machiavellian operator of all, winning out. In other words, Castro's use of communists, latter identification with communism, and entreaty to the Communist Bloc occurred almost entirely on his own, uncompromising terms. Geyer's articulation of Castro's unprecedented assimilation of communists matched Szulc almost verbatim but was broadly coached by her greater emphasis on

Castro's anti-Americanism. This, and the unwieldy depiction of Castro as a pathological dictator, made *Guerrilla Prince* one of the more mainstream, concrete, and explicitly anti-Castro profiles.[66]

The Castro-centric approach rejected by Phillips was taken to fruition, in part, by Susan Eva Eckstein's *Back from the Future* (1994). Eckstein presented an economic profile of Castro's Cuba, charting the earliest socialist reforms, through to experimentation with more doctrinaire communism, and the incremental "retreat back to socialism" that reached its apex between 1991 to 1994. She argued that the perception of Castro's singular control over all aspects of Cuban life has been an illusion, whereas Cuba's single staple economy has, in fact, been the ultimate determinant in all matters foreign and domestic. Her rehabilitation of the otherwise neglected "single staple" thesis (quotes added by the author) provided a significant counterpoint to the wider body of Castro profiles which have corroborated the myth of Castro's omnipotence. Eckstein's *indirect* construction of Castro was particularly relevant given the North American fixation with Cuba's economy and economic alignment.[67]

The Dark Side of Camelot (1998), by Seymour Hersh, took a similarly indirect approach and proceeded from the same journalistic movement as Szulc. Hersh's serious account of the "presidential obsession" with Castro was also at the forefront of a collection of profiles built around the earliest declassified files. *The Dark Side of Camelot* was also among the best crossover narratives to bridge the thematically-related but otherwise respective groups of profiles about JFK and Castro: Hersh's description of the

careful curation of JFK's image mirrored the consensus about Castro's own, just as JFK's hostility toward Castro emulated Castro's own antipathy toward the U.S. Overall, Hersh offered a respectable reconstruction of the "plot" against Castro, from JFK's exploitation of the "Cuban issue" during the 1960 presidential campaign to each successive effort to eliminate the Cuban leader. Apart from this, Hersh perpetuated the "pushed into communism" thesis but pushed back against a minor but persistent trend of "counter assassination" (quotes added by the author) conspiracy speculation perpetuated by many researchers in endorsing the findings of the Warren Commission.[68]

Walter C. Sonderlund's collection, *Media Definitions of a Cold War Reality* (2001), included two articles directly relevant to the construction of Castro's image. Sonderlund's own article located a tension between the favourable view of "Castro the person" and the unfavourable view of "Castro the politician". This echoed Matthews' original dichotomy and loosely comported to Ratliff's own *Times* analysis. The other article, edited by Sonderlund and others "conform[ed]" with the breadth of Canada-Cuba-U.S. historiography discussed previously, finding Canadian televisual treatment of Cuba an occasional "nationalistic" indulgence. Ultimately, the use of content analysis by both articles precluded consideration of all but their broad conclusions.[69]

Louis A. Pérez Jr.'s article, "Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba" (2002), was another crossover narrative that bridged the more scholarly examination of Cuba-U.S. relations with the more diverse collection of Castro profiles. Where Hersh almost exclusively examined the JFK Administration's *personal*

construction of Castro, Pérez described the broader diplomatic core's *impersonal* construction of Castro as a conceptual challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. Like Welch, Pérez considered Castro's *confiscation without compensation* a fundamental affront to "U.S. sensibilities" which formally terminated any remaining optimism about Castro. Ultimately, that the overall diplomatic response to Castro became so personal had less to do with JFK's clandestine operations and more to do with the fact that the traditional means of reinforcing the Monroe Doctrine almost certainly involved high casualties and a prolonged military deployment. The Bay of Pigs only reinforced this and left interdepartmental factions, on a variety of levels, with the option of attempting to foment internal discord — which, in the end, only bolstered support for Castro. Similar to Hersh's endorsement of the Warren Commission, Pérez's examination of the broader diplomatic core offers an alternative diplomatic construction of Castro.[70]

The latest round of Castro profiles began in the early 2000s. These were primarily shaped by a reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy, incurred by the formal end to the Cold War paradigm following the reorientation toward a focus on stateless terrorism, and continued declassification of documents. Whereas the second wave of profiles from the mid-1980s took a reflective approach, this latest turn assumed a clear reconstructive approach toward a more concerted effort to supplant older attitudes and trends with newer material and a more rooted historical treatment.

Julia Sweig's narrow reconstruction of the roots of the Cuban Revolution in, *Inside the Revolution* (2002), was the among the first of these profiles. She exploited her

exclusive access to Cuban archives to challenge three closely associated myths. First, she located the roots of the revolutionary fervor that Castro drew upon in a wave of Martí nationalism from the 1930s. Second, she dismissed the idea that Castro and his *guerrillas* singularly orchestrated the insurgency. Instead, she argued that Castro's primary group was isolated in the Sierra Maestra and could only keep abreast of, and participate in, inter-factional negotiations through their "urban underground" partners. Third, she located the origins of the obfuscation of the second point and the more entrenched "founding fathers" myth in Che's firsthand accounts, which had been assumed accurate by an earlier generation of profilers.[71]

Sweig's examination primarily updated Welch's efforts to locate America's construction of Castro outside of such sensationalist myths. It also raised questions about the *Times*' original characterization of Castro, and, if anything, suggested that Matthews' exclusive may actually be *more* influential than previously considered. Lastly, *Inside the Revolution* almost entirely supplanted Szulc's own effort to plot the evolution of the Cuban Revolution and definitively refuted his "hidden government" thesis.

Ann Louise Bardach's *Cuba Confidential* (2002) drew upon the same indirect approach as Eckstein and Hersh in her survey of the "broken family" relationship between Castro's Cuba and the Miami exile community. She methodically targeted a number of significant trends, beginning with her characterization of Castro as the "movie star dictator", a playful metaphor that spoke to some of the more moderate efforts to consolidate 1960s perceptions with his ever-evolving legacy. Bardach rendered a better

variation of Geyer's argument, that Castro has remained a "riddle" to all (including his own people) absent unwieldy psychological methodology. Lastly, she corroborated the descriptions of Castro as an pragmatist, dismissing the "communist conspiracy" thesis and more sensationalist portraits by emphatically locating Castro's political inclinations and broader legacy within Martí nationalism.[72]

Leychester Coltman, British Ambassador to Cuba from 1991 to 1994, composed a more traditional, "topical" biography of Castro that doubled as a diplomatic memoir just before his death in 2002. *The Real Fidel Castro* (2003) provided an intriguing construction of Castro by a third-party which, above all, emphasized Castro's legitimacy and impunity to defend Cuba's national interests. Like Geyer and Bardach, Coltman described Castro as exceedingly private; like Hersh and Pérez, he noted the *personal* nature of his feud with the U.S. and underscored Castro's *American* qualities; like Eckstein (and Welch to a certain extent), he acknowledged the Revolution's truer alignment with *socialism* than communism; and, like Szulc, he suggested that Castro's relationship with the USSR was based more on entrapment than ideological parity. Despite this unusual inclusivity, *The Real Fidel Castro* was closest to Szulc's *Fidel*: Coltman dismissed the "communist conspiracy" thesis in favour of Martí nationalism while he concurred with Szulc's "hidden government" thesis and wider plot.[73]

Don Bohning's *The Castro Obsession* (2005), like Sweig's *Inside the Revolution*, fell within this more recent reconstruction trend. Bohning's "comprehensive chronology" of clandestine operations against Castro from 1959 to 1965 brought together, and bore

out, both Hersh's review of the *personal* construction of Castro by the JFK Administration and Pérez's review of the *impersonal* construction of Castro by the broader diplomatic core as a conceptual affront to the Monroe Doctrine. Bohning found the effort to kill Castro to be the "most expensive, sustained" campaign of its kind in the postwar period and one that would have been "impossible" even later in the decade due to the confluence of Vietnam and other events.[74]

Where Bohning's construction of Castro was essentially indirect, his reconstruction directly engaged a number of established trends. He endorsed the loose but wide consensus that considered Castro a "calculating opportunist" (or pragmatist) by refuting the "communist conspiracy" thesis. He discovered, in turn, that such a nuance was effectively lost on U.S. officials. He dismissed the sensationalist notion that the CIA strayed outside its mandate and observed that the veritable "alphabet soup" of exile groups tended to overstate their role. Most importantly, he argued that the failure of Operation Mongoose and its antecedents was rooted in the fact that "policy planners" did not consult the original intelligence assessment of the Cuba, which specifically dismissed the prospective success of any campaign aimed at an "internal revolt" or domestic discord. The fact that this became policy due, as Pérez noted, to the preclusion of direct military engagement worked to explain the diplomatic roots of Castro's singular construction as a communist.[75]

Anthony DePalma's *The Man Who Invented Fidel* (2006), discussed earlier, is another of these indirect constructions of Castro. DePalma examined the myth of

Matthews' defence of his *invention* within a hybrid journalistic biography of Matthews and a meta-analysis of *Times* coverage of Castro in general. Overall, DePalma attempted to mitigate criticism of Matthews by making the very concession that Matthews proved unable to articulate explicitly: "Matthews' most egregious error was not misidentifying Castro. Everyone did that. Rather, it was in persisting in his perception of Castro as an idealist long after he had transformed himself into a demagogue."[76]

Apart from this, DePalma's reconstruction made three principle contributions. First, he discovered that Phillips, not Matthews, was responsible for the original characterization of Castro at the *Times*. Matthews certainly imposed his own impression of Castro in his exclusive but generally fell in with the portrait Phillips shaped even before Matthews had been dispatched to Cuba (i.e. Phillips' impressions of Castro directly influenced Matthews' portrait). Second, DePalma upheld Ratliff's "mutual dependency" thesis, describing Matthews as a "conduit" for Castro and Castro as an opportunity for Matthews to relive his earlier exploits. Third, he corroborated the Castro-as-revisionist consensus by observing that even Matthews did not evade Castro's after-the-fact recollections. These points, and DePalma's underlying effort to identify and clarify Matthews' error, gave credence to the idea — assumed by Castro's more recent profilers — that Castro has had far more influence over his image than any single or periodic construction claims or intends.[77]

The biographical fascination with Castro and his image considered above identifies three main movements: the dominant journalistic push in the 1960s, the first

historical assessment incurred by the minimum requisite distance in the mid-1980s, and the more recent batch of reconstructive narratives that emerged in the early 2000s. Each of these movements was shaped by a pervasive undercurrent of sensationalism fed by both Castro's own gradual evolution (and successive revisionist accounts thereof) and the shared popular and scholarly obsession with definitively locating, identifying, and resolving Castro's ideological disposition — generally through the imperative first articulated by Dubois.

The broadest trends reflected efforts to either commandeer this for personal gain or to mitigate it, generally through the Dubois-Matthews approach: from Matthews' dichotomy and the officially supported "communist conspiracy" thesis in the U.S. to Welch's analytical breakdown and the counter-construction of Castro as a pragmatist. Lesser trends, of course, were more difficult to parse but overwhelmingly followed an indirect approach to Castro: from qualitative and quantitative studies of the *Times* and other media, to differing diplomatic and political constructions, and more micro-reviews of Cuba's economic difficulties and bellicose relations with the Miami exile community.

This biographical fascination will endure, especially with the score of fiftieth anniversaries just past — especially as it has similarly bolstered the fields of Canada-Cuba and Cuba-U.S. relations. Castro's death will, of course, immediately demarcate a divide between past and present profiles and trigger a veritable flood of commentary. Ann Louise Bardach's latest book, *Without Fidel* (2009), is an early attempt to outflank this publishing rush and has also attempted to instill a sense of order by emphasizing the

underwhelming nature of the transition that is likely to occur (given that Cuba's unique political structure is generally oversimplified). Elsewhere, Michael Casey's *Che's Afterlife* (2009) could mark the beginning of a disinterested, almost theoretical approach to Castro, as part of a *meta* layer of profiles-about-profiles. Overall, Castro's death can only impose a natural separation between himself and the broader legacy of the Revolution and this could very well be his most significant final act.[78]

Direct comparison between elite Canadian print media and these two compartmentalized yet related bodies of literature has the affect of minimizing the contemporary earnestness of media's pursuit of a narrative independent of Castro and the U.S. This is because media not only prefigured many of the arguments and trends noted above but took positions which are now largely validated and echoed in retrospect (see Andrew MacFarlane's quote in the "Conclusion"). In other words, broad journalistic and scholarly consensus about Castro and the Cuban Revolution have come to reflect the general position of the elite Canadian print media between 1956 and 1962.

For example, media emphasized Cuban agency above all (again, an obvious surrogate for Canadian postwar insecurity, which has remained a significant historiographical theme elsewhere), understood the critical difference between socialism and communism by allowing for nuance, and overwhelmingly rejected the "communist conspiracy" thesis on the basis of Castro's pragmatism. Elsewhere, media drifted slightly from consensus in their endorsement of the "pushed into communism" thesis and only approximated Szulc's "hidden government" thesis (or the more moderate versions of it

espoused by others) from a lack of access or greater domestic presence on the island. While this study does not labour to produce a report card on media positions or engage in deliberate or even casual nationalistic cheerleading, it is critical to emphasize the proximity between contemporary media and historiography and the capacity for the latter to eclipse or oversimplify the former. In short, while it appears that media may have "got it right" about Castro and the Revolution *in general* (at least to present perceptions) it is far more important to examine how or why it may have done so than to simply and reductively conclude that it did. The disarming overlap between contemporary media conclusions and this present body of historiography merits an operative disclaimer.

2 — DISTANT, FRAGMENTED IMPRESSIONS (02/12/1956 to 31/12/1958)

Sugar is by far the country's major product. By burning it, Castro hopes to shake the government from its foundations. It doesn't take long to discover that he has strong support from the people of Oriente — the biggest province in the country. To many of the people here Castro is a god — the only salvation from what they regard as the cruel, tyrannical, corrupt rule of Batista. To most, he is a Robin Hood figure battling the hated police and army, paying for the supplies he takes in raids on villages in the interior, promising the country people a fairer share of Cuba's wealth.

— Andrew MacFarlane, "Sweet Cuba Smell Is Sugar Sabotage," *Toronto Telegram*, 19 Feb. 1958[79]

Chapter Two examines the proto-coverage of the Revolution from Castro's landing on 2 December 1956 to the final hours of Batista's government on 31 December 1958 as five episodes: landing (December 1956), Matthews (January and February 1957), domestic correspondence (March to December 1957), captured Canadians (January to July 1958), and countdown to Revolution (August to December 1958). It finds elite Canadian print media interest in Cuban affairs fragmented and lacking. This is not to suggest that the activities of Castro and M-26-7 were nationally panned — indeed, an informal and uneven profile of Castro emerged through piecemeal commentary and other reportage leading up to the Revolution. Moreover, media adopted Matthews' account of Castro and the victory narrative, increasingly identified Batista as an oppressor, and

called for peaceful resolution to the mounting conflict (one that would likely involve Castro but was not contingent upon it) for the good of all Cubans.

These distant, fragmented impressions present a fascinating point of contrast to coverage that emerged after the Revolution, given that Castro's triumph over Batista was never a fait accompli — a fact that is now generally taken for granted in retrospect. Accordingly, this chapter is structured differently from those that follow: it relies on an operative comparison between mainstream wire reporting and sporadic domestic opinion in order to triangulate (and then analyze) the events that provoked commentary from those which did not.

Castro's unceremonious return from exile, with the abrupt grounding of the storm-swept *Granma* off the coast of Playa Las Coloradas, was preceded by a score of inconclusive AP reports regarding a violent "civilian uprising" in Santiago de Cuba. Such reports generously anticipated a broader surge in disorder, an assumption perpetuated by ensuing accounts of a coastal incursion near the Sierra Maestra in the proceeding days, which ultimately failed to transpire. Castro (a "...30 year-old former Havana student...") was suspected as a likely instigator in these events but the extent of his involvement, or his precise whereabouts, would not be confirmed until the publication of the first installment of Matthews' three-part series on Sunday 24 February 1957. The handful of sporadic accounts of military skirmishing with insurgent forces following these initial reports in early December traced a similarly inconclusive arc in the remaining days of 1956 through to late February 1957.[80]

Prior to their sudden introduction to Castro's cause and politics — and, indeed, American interest in them — through Matthews, elite Canadian print media had yet to compose or borrow a profile of Castro or his movement. While historically removed interest in Cuba (and Latin America in general) left even the most resourceful national broadsheets with little cause to maintain a consistent presence on the island, let alone a diligent bureau with attendant staff, interest in Matthews' series was surprisingly marginal: only the *Globe and Mail* ran the entire series — publishing the first and second articles in the same issue on 25 February and running the third on 27 February — with slight editing but without any contextual or supplementary commentary. The *Montreal Gazette* ran an abridged version of the first article (also without commentary) on 25 February but did not carry the rest. The *Toronto Daily Star*, by contrast, ran a single-line wire report confirming the end of Batista's censorship a day after the series concluded in the *New York Times*. While domestic impressions of Castro would implicitly build from Matthews, and then supplant him toward the end of 1959 as national media set the roots of an independent narrative, Castro's official debut in elite Canadian print media occurred *without* domestic commentary other than select, national syndication of Matthews' series. This was, to be clear, entirely consistent with Canadian interest in Cuba but important to the development of Matthews' influence.[81]

Whereas the personal perspective that underscores Matthews' construction of Castro and was addressed previously, it is pertinent to briefly review the series' thematic vocabulary in order to assess the influence of his *prewar* victory narrative on media: the

first piece positioned Castro as the charismatic face of a populist "revolutionary movement" with American values, poised to serve as the delivery system for a "new deal" for Cuba (read: socialism, si!; communism, no!); the second piece underscored the legitimacy of Castro's cause, dismissing Batista as a lame-duck strongman while elevating M-26-7 above the fragmented dissident movement in Cuba (awash with communists) that would inevitably prevail against current order; the third piece reinforced the previous two by emphasizing the palpable revolutionary fervour in contemporary Cuban life: economic prosperity stifled by extensive corruption, widespread contempt for state officials supported (and armed) by Washington.[82]

Precisely what the respective editorial boards of Canada's elite broadsheets thought of this sympathetic appraisal, and the cavalier means by which it was acquired, is not chronicled. While such disinterest certainly stemmed from Canada's comparatively underdeveloped relationship with the island, as noted, the absence of any immediate domestic commentary following the series is critical to observing the development of an independent narrative and assessing the influence of Matthews more generally. Even the lack of a conventional reflection on the challenges facing *any* insurgency absent an apparent blessing from Washington, which were eventually ventured closer to 1959, was curious. Overall, neglecting an opportunity to digest the series for Canadians effectively deferred any formal domestic construction of Castro until the Revolution. Still, as observed earlier, an informal and uneven construction did emerge during this period and

it is extremely important to the broader history of media's construction of the Revolution.[83]

Intermittent wire reports of insurgent activity continued after Matthews' series: an attack by university students on the presidential palace in Havana during March, a failed effort by insurgent groups to instigate a general strike in July, Batista's suspension of constitutional guarantees followed by a fierce engagement in Cienfuegos in early August, and symbolic targeting of sugar crop by M-26-7 in September. Rebel acts were neither applauded or denounced. However, implicit perpetuation of the themes in Matthews' portrait, with Castro depicted as something of a "Robin Hood" figure, was pervasive. Apart from these general wire reports, Larry Allen's CP byline constituted the only domestic correspondence during these months. A late April report of his in the *Globe* dismissed the notion of an underlying revolutionary fervour (without explicit reference to Matthews) gripping the island, citing high morale amid buoyant sugar prices, but acknowledged a clear strain of "political bitterness" against the regime. Alternatively, Allen submitted that any attempt to seize control of the army or eliminate Batista would be far more likely than outright revolution — an opinion, he noted, that was also held by diplomats. Allen's own specific references to Castro were consistently reserved but uncritical.[84]

Editorials were equally sparse over the same period but contained some insight as to what opinion-makers *may* have thought of Matthews. A *Gazette* follow-up to the student attack in March built from Matthews' broader conclusions except to emphasize

Castro's force as one among many, noting their shared dissatisfaction with Batista, but questioned "...what value a new regime would have" should the rebels prevail. The *Winnipeg Free Press*, by contrast, appeared not only indifferent to Matthews but Castro as well: a piece in late March lamented the end of Cuba as a safe tourist haven while a follow-up to the violence in early August emphasized the apparent strain on Batista's relationship with Washington. The *Ottawa Citizen* offered a summary of Cuban affairs in early September which doubled as a pessimistic critique of Batista but openly acknowledged and upheld Matthews' perspective. Syndicated foreign content ran with equal scarcity; only Ruby Hart Phillips commanded any sense of authority.[85]

Wire reports increased significantly during the first half of 1958 across a greater body of papers. A series of suspenseful events captured attention between late February and the first half of April: the stunt abduction (and subsequent release) of Argentinian world champion racer Juan Manuel Fangio in February; escalating exchanges between Batista and critics over the suspension of freedoms, deployment of military personnel, and the deferral of the election from June to November raged throughout March; Castro's declaration of "total war" against Batista, failed general strike, and the consolidation of his forces to M-26-7's illusive mountain stronghold after a failed skirmish in Santiago rounded out coverage through to early April. General reportage adhered to standard journalistic conventions without betraying any of Matthews' prognostication, despite continued deference to his "Robin Hood" comparison.[86]

Larry Allen remained the only regular correspondent in Cuba but ceased to be the only named domestic voice. His CP byline continued to run in the *Globe*, as before, but also to a diminishing extent in the *Citizen*, *Gazette*, and *Le Devoir*. Allen found a discernible escalation in insurgent activity (despite also finding the level of rebel activity overstated) but observed that little traction was gained by either camp despite much posturing and preparations. The lack of any clear ground gained by either Batista or the insurgency was uncannily similar to the previous year, an observation which Allen appended to his latter reports. On this, he refused to speculate and maintained his reserved but uncritical tone. Allen found life Cuba business as usual, overall, despite something of a subversive and irregular referendum on the current government playing out in violent exchanges.[87]

In early February, Andrew MacFarlane of the *Toronto Telegram* broke ground as the first domestic staff reporter dispatched to the island with designs on profiling the rebels and chancing a Matthews-like encounter with Castro himself. MacFarlane was immediately interdicted by Batista's security forces and departed at the end of the month after filing only a partial series. Even so, MacFarlane's impressions constituted the first domestic investigation of the insurgency above standard wire coverage. MacFarlane settled somewhere between Allen and Matthews: he went further than Allen's refusal to read any change in the status quo into the escalation of violence but stopped short of presenting Castro as the heir apparent to Batista despite his evident popularity and obvious charisma. However, as the quotation which opens this chapter observes,

MacFarlane understood the insurgency as an economic argument in favour of a more egalitarian, prosperous Cuba. In other words, MacFarlane did not challenge Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative but he did not labour to dismiss it either. MacFarlane's role as the first self-conscious domestic narrator made his impressions especially significant and influential.[88]

Allen and MacFarlane's reportage was complimented by two features: an interview between Batista and *Star* reporter Lloyd Lockhart in early February and a short historical reflection by one John Harbron (head of *Business Week*'s Canadian Bureau) in the *Globe* in late April. Lockhart found Batista "[a]ffable" and hardworking but did not use the exclusive as a platform for a broader investigation of the regime or political strife in Cuba. It was, in other words, almost divorced of context. Harbron offered the first substantial rumination about Castro. He stopped just shy of an endorsement but praised Castro for his pledge to abstain from office should he succeed in ousting Batista. Harbron also emphasized Cuba's strong tradition of American values without necessarily positioning Castro or his methods as the key to their restoration. He, too, upheld Matthews.[89]

Editorials did not keep pace with the concurrent surge in wire reports. In late March, the *Citizen* took exception to Batista's attempt to blame "[c]ommunists" for the increase in civil disorder, boldly dismissing the dictator as an aberrant episode in Cuba's march to democracy. The *Press* ran a similar opinion in mid-March, shaming Batista for failing to heed widespread calls for his resignation, only to follow-up with rousing

endorsement of Castro and *his* general strike in early April. The piece, bullish on the end of the "Cuban struggle" which it partitioned into four phases and framed with unprecedented use of the word *revolution*, foresaw Batista's fall in short order. While such a prediction would take eight months to come to fruition, and seemed remarkably foolish just a few days later, it established the only explicit position in the elite press to date. In effect, it took a year and two months from the publication of Matthews' series for a single editorial board to comment explicitly, favourably or otherwise. Still, this transition from an implicit endorsement of Matthews' victory narrative to an explicit one was consistent, particularly in the theme of deliverance for Cuba.[90]

Syndicated foreign material paralleled domestic editorials. The *Press* chased their bold editorial in mid-April with a British perspective on Cuba's political situation emphasizing the irony in the American failure to support a seemingly populist uprising evidently dedicated to American values. American content was, itself, almost exclusively limited to the *Globe* as before. Homer Bigart's dispatches from behind insurgent lines overshadowed Phillips' regular reports. Bigart's mission to keep an unsympathetic eye on Castro (in lieu of Matthews and as an editorial hedge against him) and Phillips' growing disdain for her veteran colleague were not expressly apparent to contemporary readers but neither did they provide a significant counter to Matthews' narrative.[91]

The abduction of three Canadians working in Cuba — Edward Cannon, Harold Kristjanson, and Richard Sargent — and a score of Americans at the end of June put a sudden end to the dearth of news out of the island following the routed general strike.

Reports of the hostage-taking first appeared on 27 June and commanded elite attention through to Sargent's release on 11 July. M-26-7's transparent attempt to insulate Castro from blowback, by casting Raúl as the stubborn captor and Castro as the liberator was well-noted yet successful. Most importantly, regular assurances of the safety of the hostages along with their incremental release did not disrupt the positive orientation toward the insurgency were it reported otherwise. The episodes produced a spike in domestic interest in Cuba second only to the dramatic increase in violence just prior to the Revolution itself.[92]

Only the *Star* chronicled the release of Cannon, Kristjanson, and Sargent (in that order) through their correspondent, James Y. Nicol, from the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo. Nichol's interview with Cannon was largely co-opted as a delivery system for rebel propaganda through Cannon's exuberant praise for his erstwhile captors. Nicol played along, cheekily suggesting that kidnapping had been a boon for Castro's image, while qualifying their abduction within the rebel proclivity for refusing to distinguish between Americans and Canadians. Kristjanson, by contrast, refused to comment about either his captors or his time as a hostage. This confused Nicol but he did not pursue it. Sargent, who "...did not greatly object to being kidnapped..." given his residency in Cuba for the last forty years (as a sugar mill executive), cited the rebels' good intentions without effusive praise. The stoic indifference to being held by armed insurgents in a (mostly) foreign country exhibited by all three men offered little challenge to media

consensus (underdeveloped, as it was) — moreover, it may have even deterred further analysis by adding friendly and hospitable rebels to the list of the island's many charms.[93]

Nicol's third, fourth, and sixth dispatches respectively addressed his time among the rebels (at Raúl's personal invitation), his interview with an American hostage, and his overall thoughts on the Cuban conflict. His description of the rebels as farcical amateurs eerily prefigured many of the latter profiles of Castro — this, however, was limited to a few passing observations and did not amount to a substantive Matthews-like profile. Nicol relayed no objection to being fed obvious propaganda but he certainly revelled in the incongruity of actions and statements he saw; he noted, for example, that: "The Castros believe in revolution so strongly they kidnap peaceful neutrals, partly to give them a vision of new and freer Cuba" — which was perhaps more prescient and opinionated than he may have realized or intended. Nicol used his interview with the former American hostage, whose experience mirrored Cannon's own, to register American displeasure with such antics. American perceptions informed his final piece, as he laboured to parse the absurdity of a such comments with such a serious situation. Nicol did not luck into a Matthews-like profile but his series is the closest domestic approximation, with direct contact with M-26-7, prior to the Revolution. In fact, it may very well be the perfect microcosm for domestic coverage prior to the Revolution all on its own.[94]

Overall, the hostage episode betrayed media naivety about the broader objectives of M-26-7's purpose in harassing and detaining North Americans. As Peréz noted, Cuban

regimes have traditionally maintained power with support for Washington "…in direct proportion to their ability to protect American property." The insurgency that came to be personified by M-26-7 following Matthews' series lacked any means of affecting state policy directly, despite a run-on campaign of economic sabotage, and the capture of foreign nationals provided another form of leverage. More directly, in Shoulz's parsing, M-26-7 actually positioned the hostage taking (which included far more Americans than Canadians) as a direct comment on the American military presence at Guantanamo. Nicol was certainly aware of this, and did formidable job as a correspondent, but his lack of context was entirely indicative of Canada's relative disinterest in Cuba and distance from Cuba-U.S. relations more generally.

Editorialists also neglected an opportunity to contextualize Castro and his cause for Canadians. What commentary was published in response to the hostage affair was limited to three respective editorials from 3 June in the *Globe*, *La Presse*, and the *Toronto Telegram*. The *Globe* hardly took a position at all, preferring to draw parallels to 1898, and abruptly concluded by wondering how Castro's abduction of Americans would shape his relationship with Washington; the *Telegram* maintained the same interest in Washington but wrote off the entire affair as a major strategic blunder; while *La Presse* considered the stunt an act of desperation and took great exception to any limit imposed on the free and safe passage of citizens abroad in principle. The distant tone to these latter two pieces clearly stemmed from distance which, as with correspondence, was also likely responsible for the absence of any further commentary.[95]

Wire reports were steady throughout the remainder of 1958 but pooled around the troubled November election and the increasingly frequent and hostile engagements between insurgents and military forces in late December. Reportage held the moderate narrative, in the absence of any shift in Canadian perceptions or deluge in syndicated U.S. opinion following the hostage affair. The only discernible change in coverage occurred with the violence in December and stemmed from the declining accuracy of information during the final days of 1958.[96]

Allen retained his CP byline but ceased as the only Canadian correspondent in Cuba. His election coverage in the *Gazette* correctly predicted the outcome but parted with his earlier, moderate tone by referring to the conflict as a "civil war" (a comparatively early usage). His late December reports for the *Citizen* and *Telegram* struggled to navigate inconclusive information and generally attempted to estimate the potential impact of a rebel victory without undue speculation. Bill Bantey (*Gazette*) filed a remarkable three-part series in mid-December upon returning from Havana: the first cautioned Canadians about the palpable sense of fear and heightened security just beyond tourist zones; the second echoed continued criticism of Batista while adding that support for Castro was evident and included many military defections; the third systematically detailed the entire conflict, down to respective claims, strengths, and positions, as well as America's increasingly awkward position in the middle. Here, at last, Bantey provided Canadians with a contextual briefing on Cuba and attempted to solicit greater interest in Cuban affairs.[97]

Editorials remained sparse throughout the remainder of 1958. The election attracted the most attention: the *Globe* offered something expressly substantial (with respect to their influence) in a critique of Castro's "revolution by harassment", geared more toward trading public support for "a little peace" over any specific concessions from the government; the *Press* built from the same harassment theme, chasing their April editorial with a glib rejection of Batista's claim to having held a free and fair election while conceding that perhaps Castro's skills might be insufficient to his stated task; while the *Citizen* offered a summary that optimistically noted what good might come from Batista's departure but pessimistically noted the absence of any plan for peace from the president-elect. The *Globe* editorial was the lone critique of Castro ventured by the elite press prior to the Revolution and one that would remain valid through to the end of 1962. Still, it mostly pertained to his methods and implicitly invoked the expectations set by Matthews. Only the *Telegram* ventured an editorial during the late December violence on the last day of the year, cleverly hedging that history might be about to repeat itself with mass (and, more importantly, professional) support tilting toward Castro against a "corrupt" regime; a situation, the paper concluded, that was not unlike the one that suddenly brought Batista to power.[98]

The fragmentation of opinion could be taken as calculated avoidance given that media were generally ill-informed about Cuba and could not fashion an editorial position from confidence with respect to their international colleagues. However, this should be qualified by the pervasive and palpable influence of Canadian disinterest in Cuban

affairs. Reluctance to comment is a strategic position as much as any decision to publish select syndicated content. Again, perhaps Nicol's coverage is an exemplary microcosm for Canadian coverage prior to the Revolution: clear awareness of events, loose command of the issues involved, implicit adherence to Matthews' sensible theme of equating the insurgency with a struggle against tyranny, but a lack of unifying context to put it all together. The mass deployment of correspondents following Castro's victory changed this and fed a more comprehensive understanding of M-26-7 and Cuban affairs in general. This bolstered editorial confidence and, as scholars have noted of Canada-Cuba relations in general, provided a broader platform for a greater examination of Latin America.

Two features ran in December: a follow-up from Harbron in the *Globe* and an interview with a visiting Cuban Senator Jose Gonzalez Buente in the *Citizen* at the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa. Harbron's analysis of Castro's "creeping revolution" echoed the harassment theme in the *Globe* and *Press* editorials by attempting to identify the terminal point of economic damage that the island's economy could sustain. Harbron concluded that a sudden shift in support from Batista to Castro by the military would surely tip the balance. Of course, this sort of factual assessment was absent domestic reportage and editorial positions due to a lack of confidence with the subject and command of Cuban history — things that Harbron, by contrast, possessed from his direct and unique experience in Cuba. The *Citizen*, meanwhile, found Buente "eager" to address North American "misconceptions" which were mostly reduced to repeating rumours about Castro's ties to communism and, far more importantly, emphasizing Castro's selfish thirst

for power — a possibility not dismissed by Matthews and unexamined by media (without fault, given the fact that Castro had yet, if at all, to succeed in ousting Batista). Buente dismissed the *Citizen*'s repartee about the regime's failure to address the rebel situation (citing geography) and downplayed the seriousness of the conflict on what turned out to be quite literally the last day it was possible to do so.[99]

Syndicated foreign material actually declined over the latter half of 1958 and was also concentrated around the same events. Perhaps the most important item was a report from the *Times* from early December that ran in the *Globe* and suggested that an impending shift in U.S. policy, against Batista, was likely underway. General items in the *Globe* and *Gazette* in the final days of December marked a shift in focus from Batista to Castro — his movements, statements, and potential intentions.[100]

The elite Canadian print media proto-construction of the Revolution between December 1956 and December 1958 consisted of a series of distant, fragmented impressions that nevertheless set the foundation of the independent narrative that emerged subtly in late 1959 and began to flourish in 1960. The primary reason for this was the fact that no single event between late 1956 and the end of 1958 successfully upended Canada's historical disinterest in Cuba, at least in the overwhelming way that the Revolution did in early 1959. Media's unprecedented interest in Cuba following the Revolution, and the island's subsequent use as something of a platform for examining Latin American affairs in general (as Canadian scholars have noted), bears this out. The

potential for interest in Cuba was certainly present, however. There are other additional supporting factors to this calculation of course.

The two events that could have provoked significant coverage, detailed analysis, and an array of editorial commentary did not. Matthews' interview with Castro in February 1957 and the abduction of three Canadians in July 1958 by M-26-7 did not mobilize media interest and passed without much effort to contextualize the incidents for Canadians. Matthews' interview was received well around the world and, despite the criticism it received later, left no precedent for express scrutiny or facsimile. Similarly, the detention of all three Canadians was resolved satisfactorily without incident or even harsh words from any of the Canadian hostages. Both events would have made ideal platforms for developing a nuanced and complex view of Cuba, to say nothing of providing a pretext for examining Latin America in general. Again, the lack of investigation into the political motivations of M-26-7's interest in hostages as leverage said more about the naivety of media and a lack of expertise exhibited by all save Harbron, in particular.

Endorsement of Matthews' narrative collided with progressive identification of Batista as an oppressor that led to an underlying disdain for violence, in the insurgency's favour, for the good of all Cubans (an early, implicit defence of Cuban sovereignty). Media grew increasingly critical of Batista without much investigation apart from reflecting the general mood of the U.S. and international press. Of course, a detailed investigation of Batista would have revealed that he obviously reigned at the pleasure of

the U.S. The U.S. eventually wavered in support for Batista but it did not amount to a denunciation of his regime or an active campaign to replace him. Media's assumptions about Batista were the result of another assumption: that Matthews' victory narrative about deliverance for Cuba from tyranny was correct. The *Citizen* editorial from early September 1957, which openly acknowledged him and endorsed his account, was a firm indication of the orientation of their elite press in general.

None of the domestic correspondents who found themselves in a position to contradict Matthews' narrative did — neither did Lockhart or Harbron in their respective features, for that matter. Allen's reportage adhered to wire conventions and remained atypically reserved given enthusiasm for Castro elsewhere. MacFarlane failed to retrace Matthews' footsteps despite the fact that he concluded similarly, if slightly less enthusiastically. Nicol noted contradictions in the behaviour of M-26-7 firsthand without exploring the political context. While Bantey, the last to arrive, pushed for greater coverage and domestic attention.

The *Globe* stumbled on a train of thought that would come to haunt media right through to the end of 1962 and which has since received considerable historiographical attention by Geyer and others. The critique of Castro's "revolution by harassment" is a substantive and valid indictment, despite the fact that media were unacquainted with the founding manifesto of M-26-7 in the way they would be following the Revolution. As scholars and even contemporary journalists have observed in kind, Cuba's longstanding problems with corruption, history of electoral abuse, and each successive regime's

defence of U.S. assets in exchange for support and arms made a fight in purely rhetorical terms improbable. The *Globe*'s criticism arrived too early in the broader timeline of events to amount to anything more than a passing observation — soon eclipsed by the Revolution — but it did prefigure frustration with Castro's lack of ideological forthrightness or even any composite biographical knowledge of his beliefs. Naturally, this only reinforced the authority of Matthews' assessment of Castro and his overall narrative.

The lack of a comprehensive impression of Castro going into the Revolution was no impediment to future interest or even the development of an independent narrative. It was perfectly reasonable, in fact, given the fact that Castro's victory was never a foregone conclusion. As many scholars have observed, Castro's success was largely accidental and, despite his personal embellishments, not entirely of his own doing. Perhaps most importantly, media adopted Matthews' narrative without also adopting the emphasis on Castro's participation. This not only shaped the foundation of the independent narrative that media would pursue in earnest after 1959 but insured against any requisite retraction or more methodical revisionism in order to save face. It also clearly tempered eventual frustration with Castro away from a sense of betrayal and toward more calculated or balanced disappointment.

3 — THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT (01/01/1959 to 31/12/1959)

> *When Dr. Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba at the beginning of the year, he enjoyed wide international sympathy as the brave rebel who had overthrown a brutal tyranny. With every passing month, however, doubts about the man and his policies have grown.*
>
> — "'Stay, Fidel!'," *Globe and Mail*, 27 April 1959[101]

Fidel Castro garnered a wealth of international goodwill as M-26-7 consolidated its hold over Cuba in the earliest weeks of 1959. By the end of the year, he had squandered nearly all of it on a series of provocative actions that even patient international observers struggled to explain: the start of executions just days after Batista's flight, an unofficial visit to Washington and New York in late April that only emphasized growing estrangement, land reform legislation openly hostile to foreign investment in June, and a drawn-out cabinet shuffle between July and December that began with the transparently orchestrated dismissal of President Manuel Urrutia and raised questions about confidence within the new government.

Chapter Three examines the first year of the Cuban Revolution as three episodes: trial (January and February), tour (March to April), and governance (May to December). It finds that elite Canadian print media effectively overlooked the impetuous first year of a popular and promising young leader it considered capable of a more pragmatic and prudent course. That media proceeded so, amid the growing rift between Castro's actions

and official persona, and despite the end of American patience, set up a measured calculus for criticism that fed an independent narrative which would begin to flourish in 1960. In contrast to Chapter Two, the Revolution sparked a departure from national disinterest in Cuban affairs that lasted through to the Missile Crisis. This interest was framed by the eyewitness accounts of a handful of national correspondents who facilitated the development of more sophisticated opinion.

Reports in January and February dominated the front page but struggled with rumour as the collapse of the old guard bled into the provisional government bound by Castro and his extemporaneous style of delegation. The earliest narrative coalesced around Castro's slow march from Santiago to Havana and concurrent inter-factional brokering, only to pivot abruptly and evolve into a second narrative that addressed the drawn out execution of Batista loyalists. International reaction, and Castro's reaction to that reaction, led all subsequent coverage including his decision to hold official office despite foreswearing otherwise previously. In such an atmosphere, correspondents waved certain mores against first-person narration as getting the story often *became* the story (as per the Matthews-Dubois model).

Andrew MacFarlane (*Telegram*) continued to break ground as the first staff reporter to introduce the Revolution to Canadians *as such* and the only one to achieve a well-rounded series. He emphasized "...all shades of revolutionary opinion..." within M-26-7 as much as without. He not only continued to present Castro as one face within a broader populist movement but also prefigured elite conclusions at the end of the year.

MacFarlane found Castro inexperienced but capable, idealistic but popular — typical, in other words, but outside of the broader national trend which approached him indirectly and qualified his agency exclusively within Cuba-U.S. relations. Their first conversation stressed Castro's regard for Canada (at the expense of the U.S. and United Kingdom) while the second included a direct response to the *Telegram* that Castro was, indeed, willing to "lose friends" over the executions. Castro's quip about doing the "right thing" by carrying out the executions betrayed more about his character than either MacFarlane or his readers may have immediately realized. These, and a variety of encounters with M-26-7, led MacFarlane to dismiss any suggestion of untoward ideological sympathies. MacFarlane set the overall tone for media in general and it was indeed a favourable one.[102]

Philip Deane (*Globe*) began his series by dodging bullets but ended nearly as productive as MacFarlane. Deane reached similarly nuanced conclusions about purported ideological sympathies but grew increasingly apprehensive about Castro's ability to "control extremists" and reorganize a "...guerrilla movement into a stable democratic administration." Deane found Castro more evaluative — "sincer[e]", "long-winded", and "fatigued" — and, despite personifying hope, with more potential than literal power. In effect, Deane was willing to entertain a future where Castro, despite his best intentions or perhaps even himself, failed to deliver on the potential foisted upon him (which he did little to discourage). Deane predicted that Castro would sell sugar to communists (for

profit, above all) and, like most of his colleagues, noted that the success of the Revolution depended on whether Washington remained *neighbourly*.[103]

William Kinmond (*Star*) filed two days behind Deane and left just after the narrative turned. His neglect for the broader details of "...the strangest kind of revolution...", including a chance to investigate the executions when they began, was mitigated by a successive pair of interviews with Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos. Kinmond's interview with Castro (a day ahead of MacFarlane's) relayed critical details about the new government, including prospective land reform that would purportedly not amount to "confiscation". He went on to perfectly capture the nexus between Castro's extemporaneous leadership and willingness to contradict himself by effectively briefing Cienfuegos, isolated by assignment, on Castro's latest positions. Kinmond found Castro magisterial, affable, and also "fatigued" but absolutely not communist, particularly on given his Catholic roots. Kinmond's parting reports examined an apparent attempt on Castro's life but did not echo Deane's apprehension.[104]

Bruce West (*Globe*) landed with the narrative shift and stayed right through until the end of February despite being remarkably unproductive. While he mostly chased rumours, West managed to amalgamate the romanticism of the Revolution with that of Cuba's established reputation in such a way that would have appealed to a core audience of Canadian Cuba-watchers for its emphasis on the status of tourist accommodations and attractions. In parting, he offered a passing critique of Castro's executions as a poor substitute for democracy.[105]

Marie Moreau (*Sun*) filed a short series at the end of January that focused on the treatment of prisoners. Arguably the most resourceful correspondent of the group, Moreau exercised her uninhibited access by attending a trial in Santa Clara, speaking with prisoners in Havana before sneaking into an execution (the boldest move by any correspondent by far), and then interviewing Castro during a nostalgic tour of the Sierra Maestra. She found Cubans on an "emotional binge" and generally supportive of reprisals against Batista loyalists but wary of broader violence, noting that "plenty of people" welcomed Castro's demise. She found Castro precisely as advertised, if not slightly more worse for ware, and paralleled MacFarlane by approaching Castro directly. Her depiction — that "Cubans say he looks like a saint. I think he looks exactly what he is, a completely revolutionary leader" — echoed a broader sentiment in the elite press that held the Revolution as being atypical of the region due, in part, to its unique instigator (or, adjusting for scholarly qualification, spokesperson). Their mutually charming exchange glossed over Moreau's interest in the executions, ostensibly due to their emphasis in her previous dispatches, and relayed Castro's "respect" for Canadians in sincere, affable terms.[106]

Larry Allen maintained his CP byline (*Citizen*, *Gazette*, *Globe*, and *Star*) but, as with other wire correspondents deployed prior to January, struggled to compete with newly deployed colleagues. The end of Batista's regime and Castro's micromanagement conspired to advantage new correspondents over more established ones (i.e. not only did allen eschew the Matthews-Dubois model he was isolated from opportunities to embrace

it). Allen filed a concurrent profile of Castro the same day as MacFarlane but kept to the more removed tone prior to the Revolution despite excellent coverage of the executions. Such ambivalence was perhaps more indicative of an apprehension similar to what Deane, more at liberty, clearly articulated. In sum, Allen resisted the Matthews-Dubois' model while it reached a new height.[107]

In aggregate, this correspondence comprised the first comprehensive domestic portrait of Castro. While media certainly found Castro agreeable, the most pervasive theme was a uniform categorical rejection of any untoward ideological sympathies (i.e. he was not a communist!). This is clearly a direct response to rumours rampant in the U.S. press fed no less, as many scholars have since noted, by Castro's personal ambiguity. Overall, the most significant aspect of this portrait was the fact that Castro and the Revolution were not presented as exclusively synonymous. This subtle separation furthered the development of media's independent narrative. In effect, media upheld Matthews' narrative and certainly deferred to Castro as a revolutionary symbol but did not adopt Matthews' rigid emphasis on Castro either in February 1957 or upon further review in early 1959. Castro remained a unique and interesting character but media overwhelmingly gravitated to the end of a brutal tyranny as the more important story.

Editorialists were eager to contextualize the Revolution during the initial narrative despite confusion on the front page. The first wave of opinion embraced a fresh start for Cuba and dismissed ideological rumours. Most papers echoed the *Gazette*'s view that the Revolution's evident popularity made it atypical of the region but differed on the details:

the *Globe* considered it an "internal matter" while the *Sun* predicted regional reverberations. Castro was well-regarded but the extent of credit due was contested: the *Star* credited Castro with routing Batista while the *Citizen* cited the end of U.S. military support. Elsewhere, *La Presse* lauded Castro for not seeking office (encouraged by the *Star*) while the *Chronicle* decried the lack of specific information about Castro or his "purposes" (prefiguring Geyer and others). In the second wave, the *Globe* portrayed Castro's "ruthlessness" as a liability while the *Citizen* all-too forebodingly noted that "serious mistakes" in the near future could derail the Revolution.[108]

Opinion turned abruptly after it became apparent that isolated reports of a few executions were actually part of a more methodical campaign. That this occurred while editorialists asserted the legitimacy of the provisional government following recognition on 7 January from Washington and 8 January from Ottawa had the effect of diluting criticism. The range of earlier perspectives narrowed into a surprisingly uniform lament over such an flagrant waste of goodwill. On the cusp of the turn, the *Globe* asked whether such violence was specific to the Revolution or simply a byproduct of the fall of a dictatorship. Other broadsheets indirectly responded by exploring potential answers for the remainder of the month. They collectively ruled that Castro's handling of the executions made an unfortunate byproduct *worse* or, as the *Citizen* put it on 26 January: "Castro is being judged more severely than Batista precisely because he and his achievement are widely admired and better things are expected of him." Barely a month into power, Castro failed the (externally imposed) first test of good faith. However, elite

media were reluctant to let a lone incident (an understandable false start) serve as a final word on either Castro or the Revolution he evidently brought about and then reined in.[109]

Editorialists had little to say between the *Citizen* piece and Castro's controversial decision to assume office in mid-February — and even reaction to Castro's decision that was muted. The *Star* conceded that Castro effectively "arranged" to have himself appointed prime minister but reiterated earlier support for the move on the basis of populist acclimation that forthcoming elections would no doubt bear out. The *Gazette* ventured that such a transparent move could potentially backfire and have the opposite affect on his popularity; the *Globe* went further, arguing that it was duplicitous and another in a mounting series of indiscretions despite ruling any further.[110]

Andrew McNaughton's sensational confession that he smuggled arms for M-26-7 was by far the most significant feature of the episode. His four-part account ran in early January and was carried by the *Chronicle*, *Citizen*, and *Telegram*. It put a Canadian face on the Revolution and lent legitimacy to the young government, particularly through an endorsement of the transitional period leading into elections. Harbron evolved his profile of Castro in *Saturday Night* at the end of January by contextualizing popular support for executions within a regional response to corruption. He went on to map Castro's most immediate challenges, with reference to the island's socio-economic history, in more depth than most correspondents were able to venture in their shorter dispatches. Other personal perspectives, including an interview with CBC cameraman Erik Durschmied,

upheld the typical "Robin Hood" portrait of Castro while also dismissing the usual rumours.[111]

Persistent reference to these rumours proceeded from an implicit domestic fixation on tension in the U.S. press, best described in the pages of an elite broadsheet by Max Freedman of the *Chicago Daily News* (soon to be more formally phrased by Dubois) when he observed that "...the State Department does not know whether to classify [Castro] as a domestic leader or dictator...". While elite media made consistent reference to such rumours, typically to dismiss them on some specific basis, they demonstrated little interest in pursuing them to the same extent as their U.S. counterparts. This, combined with both the deployment of staff correspondents and an editorial prerogative to satiate a growing domestic appetite for all things Cuba, diminished the demand for (and the relevance of) syndicated foreign material during this episode. Matthews' eyewitness reports, which ran in the *Globe* as before, provided a perfect example: he leaned far too heavily on his already well-established profile and failed to offer anything markedly different from domestic correspondents. The core theme of Matthews' series in 1957 remained current for media but concurrent Matthews was overshadowed (by the fruits of his earlier work, no less).[112]

The comparatively muted reaction to Castro's appointment in mid-February inaugurated a wait-and-see holding pattern that held through to the beginning of his jaunt through North America in mid-April. There were two notable exceptions during this recess. The first, from the AP's Paul Saunders, foresaw land reform as Castro's next

move (after dismantling Batista's regime) in a review of his legislative priorities that surpassed Harbron's own analysis. The second, from Bruce West, argued that Castro's "highly emotional" nature served his romantic image but not his governance, in preface to a curious critique of U.S. neglect for Batista's actions. These views were, of course, more late additions to the first impressions of the Revolution (especially in West's case) than any deliberate assault on established conclusions and perspectives.[113]

Castro's tour of the U.S., as famous for his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 17 April (where he undermined the accuracy of Matthews' narrative by publicly humiliating him!) as his meeting with Vice President Nixon on 19 April, served as something of a preface for his arrival in Canada. Monroe Johnson (*Star*) observed that Castro mostly succeeded in convincing U.S. media of Batista's responsibility for the present situation (executions notwithstanding) but remained "cryptic" throughout his stay (partly due to refusal to speak English, as scholars have noted). Deane concluded similarly, noting a concurrent curb on rumours, while relaying Castro's rising popularity among American youth. Castro arrived in Montreal on Sunday 26 April and succeeded in charming as much as being charmed. Publication was delayed until Monday but was no less effusive (if somewhat local): Jean-Marc Leger (*Le Devoir*), Marie Bourbonnais (*La Presse*), and Bantey respectively found Canadians enchanted by Castro's accessibility, forays at both English and French, and willingness to concede mistakes (the lack of elections not the executions). Castro's relatively short stay did not

allow for more detailed interviews or profiles but certainly upheld and reinforced earlier impressions.[114]

Editorialists began assessing Castro's tour of the U.S. and impending arrival on 17 April. The *Press* dismissed the tour as a "public relations" push required by the executions, arguing that a governmental "cleaning" would be a more efficient means of reclaiming ill-spent sympathy. Before any official meeting was ruled out, the *Citizen* astutely noted that the real impact of Castro's visit would hinge on whether or not he made it to Ottawa. On a broader level than both of its peers, the *Star* took the opportunity to anchor their overall impressions of the Revolution thus far, concluding that "[i]t is too soon to pass judgement on Fidel Castro..." despite valid concerns. *La Presse* bridged the divide with an effusive welcome to Castro, asserting that he visited Canada as a "Latin among Latins" — just shy of an official endorsement. After Castro's departure, the *Gazette* was willing to grant "sound" relations on the basis of protected national interests and new signs of maturity. The *Citizen* updated their view by suggesting that Castro's visit succeeded in clarifying his objectives, namely his intention to end Cuba's dependency on sugar, which it considered good news for North Americans. In sum, the *Star*'s general observation might stand for elite opinion as a whole but for a score of lesser quips.[115]

Feature content was limited to a stand-alone piece by Knowlton Nash (*Sun*) that proclaimed Castro's tour a boon for his image and a handful of reviews of Dubois' well-timed if clearly rushed book. MacFarlane found common threads in Dubois' and his own

respective impressions while Mac Reynolds (*Sun*) decried the tension and drift between Dubois' questions and Castro's answers. Elmore Phillpot (*Sun*) also disliked the book but commended Dubois' work in exposing U.S. support for Batista, going on to use it as a platform for criticizing U.S. media for biased coverage — the only domestic piece to do so in such explicit terms.[116]

Syndicated foreign material maintained the same irregularity, this time, for the opposite reason. Freedman once again captured the tension of the U.S. media in the *Star*, observing that Castro at least succeeded in convincing them to reconsider the U.S. role in supporting Batista if nothing else. Elsewhere in the *Star*, a follow-up to Saunders pushed against rumours but echoed the *Tribune* by highlighting Castro's apparent vulnerability to communism (not unlike Deane, earlier). A detailed opinion from *Le Monde* in *Le Devoir* fixated on Cuba-U.S. relations by boldly declaring that Cuba could not "afford" to "neglect" Washington while Washington, conversely, could neglect Cuba. It added that where Castro betrayed no apparent fealty to the USSR, he could be pushed into it such an arrangement should Washington make some miscalculation, particularly over the sugar quota. This French view was corroborated by media but in less explicit terms.[117]

The U.S. narrative formally turned against Castro in June. Media not only resisted any pressure to follow suit but refrained from any discernible shift for the rest of 1959. Even more remarkably, they continued to entertain the possibility of a redemptive course correction within the spirit of Matthews' prewar victory narrative: Castro was not necessarily the single-means of deliverance for Cuba but that was not to say that he did

not still have time to rise to the challenge. This, of course, did not preclude criticism — indeed, much of this redemptive, encouraging tone was driven by criticism and a general air of well-intentioned disappointment.

Neither Bantey nor Bruce Phillips (*Citizen*), for example, were impressed with Castro's drawn-out resignation in mid-to-late July: they found that it re-legitimized Castro's domestic popularity (if, indeed, that was ever in doubt) but not in explicit electoral terms. In August, Leger and Deane respectively examined governmental action and rhetoric. Leger used the controversy over appropriation under the Agrarian Reform Law to illustrate the growing divide between well-intentioned reform and actual policy. Deane linked this controversy, and other domestic troubles, to the discernible rise in anti-American sentiments — alarming, particularly for those outside Cuba-U.S. relations, as it only fed American assumptions and rumour. In November, MacFarlane lamented the loss of Cienfuegos as an immense influence on Castro, especially domestic issues, as yet another setback for the increasingly troubled Revolution.[118]

Castro's Agrarian Reform Law was widely lauded for its intent but editorialists took issue with its practicality. The *Star* positioned land reform as the most significant regional issue but found Castro with an impossible choice to make: reform invariably targeted foreign interests while no reform fed the communist opposition (which, in turn, fed American anxieties). A follow-up piece took this further by observing America's similarly impossible choice: supporting Castro's land reform meant supporting Castro while opposing land reform played poorly in the region. The *Gazette* made an appeal for

scale, presenting Castro as only the latest in a series of leaders to attempt such reform, and called on him to start with realistic objectives over nationalist platitudes. The *Chronicle* echoed this in mid-July by arguing that "honorable" intentions were no substitute for measured governance, urging Castro to curb initial reforms lest a disorganized sugar harvest bleed Cuban marketshare into oblivion.[119]

Castro's resignation shook confidence and provoked considerable response. Initial reaction was dismissive: the *Telegram* reduced it to a transparent "political manoeuvre" which only called attention to the lack of elections, while the *Gazette* entertained a rumour that Castro might prefer to return as foreign minister (in light of the impending OAS conference) but conceded that, as the "only authority", his formal title was moot. Opinion became specifically critical closer to M-26-7's anniversary: the *Globe* blamed the messy cabinet shuffle on Castro's inexperience; the *Star* took exception to his "tactics"; the *Telegram* followed-up to commend Urrutia's "honorable exit" and call for elections; while the *Chronicle* noted the resignation's proximity to mounting internal resistance to land reform. On 25 July, the *Citizen* granted Castro the benefit of the doubt on the basis of his inexperience and rejected resurgent ideological rumours, when it concluded that "...it is too early to write off the Castro [R]evolution as just another adventure in dictatorship". The *Globe* concurred similarly on 26 July, in a piece that included the quotation from which the opening quotation derives, and called for a sign or gesture of good faith. The *Chronicle* took the last word on 29 July, observing that while

Castro had indeed returned by popular demand he did so without Urrutia or the middle-class he represented — two elements critical to his victory in January.[120]

Cuba's defensiveness at the OAS conference in Chile between 12 and 18 August clashed with the working perception of both Castro and the Revolution. The meeting effectively served as Castro's formal introduction to regional (if not international) relations given the casual nature of his selective jaunt through North and South America in April and May. Again, Castro failed to meet expectations — expectations set by others but still expectations which he certainly encouraged. Accused of attempting to foment revolution beyond its borders, the *Citizen* scolded Castro for attempting to spread democracy abroad before practicing it at home. A week later, it argued that Castro had unfairly accused the U.S. of supporting dictatorships, citing the Revolution, itself, as evidence. The paper went on to prefigure its peers at the *Globe*, *La Presse*, and the *Gazette* by endorsing regional non-intervention through the OAS and calling on Castro to cooperate with the regional body and its statutes.[121]

Dissident raids from Miami and the arrest of Matos conspired to produce something of an early year-in-review in late October. The *Chronicle* betrayed a near-complete loss of patience over the arrest of Matos. It argued that not only was Castro "...aspir[ing] to rule Cuba solely by his own word..." but his lack of tolerance for internal criticism represented failure in the face of his most significant challenge yet. The paper continued nearly a week later by likening Castro to Batista and entertaining the possibility that Cubans might be better off without him — but not, of course, the

Revolution itself. In response to the dissident raids, the *Gazette* sought to remind Castro that the West needed more than vague "anti-[c]ommunism" in order to assuage its insecurities over his ambiguous ideological alignment. *La Presse*, by contrast, took a broader view and argued that Castro was far too "overwhelmed" to achieve any of the reforms he promised (as any other leader in a similar position would have been) before calling on him to reach out for assistance in pursuing a more pragmatic or prudent course.[122]

Of course, the formal year-in-review began in mid-November. The *Citizen* took the first and last word. Their first piece found Cuba "more uncertain" than early January and argued that while Castro "...cannot escape responsibility for many of the things that have gone wrong..." he nevertheless retained support from around the world. Their second piece echoed the first and encouraged Castro to surround himself with "more cool-headed advisors" toward a more pragmatic course over the following year. The *Globe* demonstrated a loss of patience similar to the *Chronicle* in October by hedging that Castro was likely to become even more dictatorial, drawing parallels to Argentina's Juan Perón. The *Press* found it difficult to reach the same conclusion, echoing the broader sentiment throughout the year and argued that it was still too early to resolve Dubois' imperative. The *Chronicle* recovered enough patience to specify that Castro's "ambition" and "idealism" led him to focus on foreign issues at the expense of a pragmatic domestic transformation throughout the year. These views were critical but far from a denunciation of Castro himself or a break with Matthews' victory narrative.[123]

The immense interest during the first months of the year diminished the interest in features between May and December. In May, Eric Geiger (*Press*) examined the government firsthand and found Castro's extemporaneous leadership, first rendered by Kinmond, a key factor in disorganization and a major challenge in overcoming bureaucratic inertia inherited from Batista. In August, Harbron filed a superb review of regional politics which qualified M-26-7's socialist "bent" within a typical reaction to region's colonial history. In late November, Peter Churchill (*Telegram*) found Cuba exactly as it was described in January and February, echoing both MacFarlane and Moreau. Similar to Harbron, he suggested that Castro gave Cubans "personality" outside of colonialism but argued that the Revolution ultimately had more of a Russian flavour than an American one. In early December, the *Sun* published Matos' prison letter in which he denied the charge of treason and relayed his simple intention to resign from a government that he could no longer support. While the *Sun* was the only paper to publish the letter as a whole, Matos' arrest and trial were generally taken as an especially dark conclusion to the drawn-out cabinet shuffle and a rather inauspicious way to round a year that opened with an unprecedented outpouring of international goodwill.[124]

Syndicated foreign content rose with the souring of American opinion in June. The most significant U.S. coverage typically split between six month reviews or early year-in-reviews. The first began with Matthews in the *Globe*, who attributed Castro's difficulties to inexperience but reiterated his legitimacy on the basis of being able to convert populist sentiment into a formal electoral mandate. Tad Szulc, also in the *Globe,*

dismissed Castro's resignation as a ruse and rejected the legitimacy of his return through "democracy by acclamation". Frank Kelley of the *Tribune*, in the *Gazette* and the *Press*, echoed Szulc, and found Castro's blindness to Cold War tensions a considerable factor in the souring of Cuba-U.S. relations but appealed for U.S. restraint. Walter Lippmann in the *Gazette*, *La Presse*, and *Press*, and Freedman, in the *Star*, similarly appealed for restraint, while the former specifically and presciently warned against anything that might push Castro into collusion with the USSR.[125]

The second began in early November with the hauntingly precise critique by S.L.A Marshall, from the *Tribune* in the *Gazette*, where he checked rumours by asserting, that: "The real question is whether Castro is not so filled with personal villainy that he may be expected to embrace communism, nihilism or mugwupism if he thinks any of the three will keep him in power." Such a blunt personal critique not only went further than concurrent domestic profiles but also much further than any other U.S. view adopted by the elite press. In mid-November, Freedman once again spoke to the tension in the U.S. press by locating the narrative shift within a systematic change at the State Department and popular perceptions at the same time. Szulc ended the year by chiding Castro on his failure to safeguard against communist exploitation.[126]

J. Halcro Ferguson, from the *Observer*, offered the best indication of European opinion in a five-part series in mid-September in the *Press*. Newly returned from a tour of Cuba, he echoed domestic descriptions of the Revolution as atypical and Castro as unconventional but accessible. Ferguson's distinction between Castro as "dictator"

despite the lack of any "...outward trappings of a dictatorship..." implicitly echoed domestic conclusions, granting Castro leniency in something of a special office free of any immediate conclusions. His concluding anecdote (from a Nicaraguan opposition leader) — which held that there were only two types of communists, those who answered to the Kremlin and those manufactured by Washington — went further than elite media were willing despite touching on a shared anxiety about increasingly terse Cuba-U.S. relations.[127]

The elite Canadian print media construction of the Revolution in 1959 was characterized by a willingness to grant Castro the benefit of the doubt despite a series of provocative actions that progressively eroded the outpouring of international goodwill he earned and also alienated the U.S. mid-year. This collective position was informed by three factors. First, media retained Matthews' association between the Revolution and deliverance for Cuba, above all, following the Revolution. The end of Batista's regime brought challenges and even violence but this was ultimately preferable to the continuation of a brutal tyranny. Second, media did not actively reject the increasingly impatient U.S. narrative but they were certainly aware of its influence. Media used the U.S. perspective to measure their own response to Castro without necessarily following the same logic. Third, media were impressed with Castro and granted his synonymity with the Revolution but only up to a point. Castro was effectively positioned as the trustee of the Revolution but this was widely understood as an office that must be earned and maintained in good faith. In sum, these positions did not isolate media from either

Castro or the U.S., respectively; rather, they set up a measured calculus for more specific criticism in 1960 from which a formal independent narrative proceeded.

The development of this narrative throughout all three episodes in 1959 was particularly clear. In the first episode, editorialists and correspondents were equally impressed with Castro but were more effusive about the end of a brutal tyranny. The level of attention given to rumours perpetuated by the U.S. press was indicative of the fact that media took them seriously despite categorically rejecting them in persistent investigation. Editorialists were highly critical of Castro's handing of the executions, a position the *Citizen* described as a result of holding Castro to higher standards, but refused to use the incidents as a platform for wagering any broader conclusions or rendering a final verdict.

In the second episode, Castro's brief visit solidified initial impressions despite provoking a general lament over the missed opportunity for official reception in Ottawa. The *Star*'s declaration in April that it was too early to properly assess Castro's actions, despite many valid concerns, spoke to continued collective refusal to draw rushed conclusions. Syndicated media paralleled domestic concerns about the growing potential for a disruption in otherwise amiable Cuba-U.S. relations, especially given Castro's cool reception in the U.S. and an increasingly hostile mood in Washington.

Not only would final conclusions about Castro have been premature, as media consistently noted the fact that the difficulties inherited from Batista's regime required a lengthy transitional period, they were largely irrelevant given the lack of clear response or conclusive policy position from Washington. This, itself, was obviously not received

as a good sign given the pervasiveness of rumours in the U.S. press, but remained important all the same.

In the third episode, media resisted following the U.S. press as it pivoted from fragmented criticism to a comprehensive rebuke after Washington's swift response to Agrarian Reform (or *appropriation without compensation*). Media were critical of Castro but this proceeded from a place of disappointment informed by a collective view that there was still time for him to overcome challenges and pursue a more prudent course. The *Citizen* echoed the *Star* in July by insisting that it remained impossible to render any final conclusion about Castro. The favourable reception of Agrarian Reform can be attributed to media's appreciation for the difference between socialism and communism — a distinction entirely at odds with the nostalgic, *postwar* victory narrative in the U.S. — and the obvious fact that Canadian assets were not subject to confiscation. The internal discord that concluded with Cienfuegos' disappearance and Matos' arrest (as noted by MacFarlane) combined with the lack of any measure of good faith (as noted by Marshall) from Castro fractured the underlying logic behind collective commitment to extending Castro the benefit of the doubt as much as it dried the well of international goodwill going into 1960.

Overall, the lack of a comprehensive impression of Castro prior to the Revolution did not impede the development of the one that emerged in early 1959 and evolved throughout the year. In effect, media were patient with Castro, regardless of any expectations inherited from Matthews or projected by others. First of all, media never

considered his victory a foregone conclusion and did not develop any specific expectations of their own until after the Revolution (or at least any impressions they were not willing to revise or reexamine). Second, Castro's significant burden of restoring order and eliminating the culture and infrastructure of Batista's regime was acknowledged to be a formidable task for anyone, let alone a young and inexperienced rebel leader — one at the head of a loose coalition of dissidents, including communists. Third, media accepted Castro's legitimacy which proceeded from popular support. Uniform preference for official validation of this through a formal election was preferred but populist acclaim was accepted as a fair expression of Cuban sovereignty in the interim.

In turn, this tempered domestic frustration with Castro — in contrast to his increasingly negative portrayal in the U.S. — away from any sense of betrayal toward well-reasoned and measured disappointment. Such disappointment characterized the tone of media throughout 1960 but it also collided with increasing alienation from the U.S. perspective, which increased exponentially during the first four months of 1961 and peaked with the Bay of Pigs. The confluence of this produced a clear and formal retreat to the core theme first derived from Matthews in 1957.

4 — AN UNTENABLE COURSE (01/01/1960 to 30/04/1961)

Cuba is not yet a Communist satellite. The drive here is land reform and anti-Americanism. It is a land making its declaration of independence from the United States, and making it loud. Signs, banners, speeches tell of U.S. perfidy and Cuban defiance. Even those who hate Castro waste no love on the Americans.

— George Bryant, "Cubans Not Red, Only 'Wish To Shed U.S.'," *Toronto Star*, 8 Sept. 1960[128]

To the series of miscalculations that gradually eroded international goodwill over the course of 1959, Castro added a series of provocations which pushed the limits of U.S. patience to a breaking point: the visit of USSR Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan in February followed by resumed Cuba-USSR relations in May, the systematic seizure of U.S. oil refineries between late June and early July, the all-too genial photo-op with Khrushchev at the UN in mid-to-late September, and the final sweep of nationalization of U.S. assets in late October. To this, the U.S. countered with the equally provocative termination of Cuba's sugar quota in July, the imposition of a partial embargo in mid-September, the break of formal relations in January 1961, and the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April. Media found itself unable to identify with either of these mutual contributions to an untenable course or the respective narratives derived therefrom.

Chapter Four examines all of 1960 and the first four months of 1961 as four episodes: tilting ever-leftward (1 January to May 1960), appropriation without compensation (1 June to 18 September 1960), new relations, old relations (19 September to 31 December 1960), and the Bay of Pigs (1 January to 31 April 1961). It finds that the elite Canadian print media willingness to offer Castro the benefit of the doubt terminated in early 1960, despite continued defence of his legitimacy and adherence to Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative. As reconciliation with Castro's own narrative became increasingly impossible, media grew more and more critical; however, progressive hostility and disregard for Cuban sovereignty from the U.S., first rhetorically then materially, made reconciliation with the American narrative just as impossible. As such, media retreated to the core theme of deliverance for Cuba first derived from Matthews in 1957, practically expressed as an homage to Cuban sovereignty. The independent narrative set up between 1956 and 1958 and then outlined in 1959 now emerged formally and confidently.

The *Star* dispatched John Brehl to Cuba in January to set the tone of the new year. He found Castro indeed tilting ever-leftward (on the "...high road to socialism...") but all nuance lost to "caricature" stemming from his provocative behaviour. He found Cubans confident and supportive of "idealist" Castro, informed by a deep historical distrust of "democratic" structures. Pierre Laporte (*Le Devoir*) and Hugh Boyd (*Citizen*) reached similar impressions in their respective series, filed some months later, despite a more casual approach. Laporte found Cuba increasingly difficult to translate to North

Americans, specifically the distinction that "communist tendencies" did not necessarily imply a full tilt. Boyd, in turn, wagered that Cuba could flirt with aspects of communism without USSR sponsorship or affiliation. Castro's Cuba, they each attempted to impress upon Canadians, was in the process of embracing a different *sensibility* (as Pérez noted).[129]

Deane and Bantey rounded out domestic reportage with individual attempts to assess the temperature in Washington. Deane found moderates defecting to a growing "get tough" chorus in broad apprehension of any prospective Cuban alignment with the USSR. While Bantey eerily hinted that a conspiracy to oust Castro ("[w]ithin the shadow of the White House...") involving dissident groups in the United States and throughout Latin America was at hand. Bantey presented this as more of a whisper than fact and it did not go on to stir controversy elsewhere. Still, it made a fascinating anecdote that also demonstrated media's inclusiveness and the depth of its narrative. Overall, Deane and Bantey found the temperature in Washington dropping rapidly below the surface.[130]

Editorialists used January to recalibrate criticism they had begun to express in 1959 from disappointment to dissatisfaction: *La Presse* argued that Castro would not pursue peace as it meant forfeiting his scapegoat; the *Gazette* concurred, declaring his well of international goodwill officially dry; the *Citizen* found his public image "tarnished"; the *Globe* blamed his series of missteps during the previous year for souring relations with the U.S.; while the *Star*, much less critical than its peers, conceded that Castro was, indeed, in "trouble". Castro's attempt to conduct "international relations" (in

the *Globe*'s parsing) by way of a shouting match with Spain's ambassador on live television was uniformly denounced. The *Citizen* closed the month by summarizing collective sentiment on Cuba-U.S. relations in hedging that a "get-tough" policy would likely isolate the U.S. as much as the U.S. aimed to isolate Cuba. Practically, editorial recalibration not only marked the end of the benefit of the doubt for Castro but also a break with the bulk of Matthews' narrative which emphasized Castro as the single means of deliverance for Cuba. While media had never actually adopted this part of Matthews' narrative, such an explicit break was nevertheless significant.[131]

Mikoyan's visit in early February provoked considerable prognostication about the future of Cuba-U.S. and Cuba-USSR relations in kind. The *Star* captured the national mood early when it observed that Castro was clearly "....[p]lay[ing] one cold war giant against the other" to which the *Gazette* added that he appeared to be doing so rather successfully at that. The *Chronicle* dismissed the meeting as inconclusive but certainly described it as something akin to leading the witness. In an implicit nod to Cuban sovereignty, news of a deal between Cuba and the USSR over the following week was not met with any substantial criticism, even if Castro's pursuit of such a deal continued to be characterized as cheeky. In late February, the *Globe* took the opportunity to contextualize the deal within broader regional underdevelopment and international relations more generally, something both the USSR and China were looking to exploit at the direct expense of the U.S. In other words, media recognized Cuba's willingness to experiment with its economy but also qualified new trade relationships from an array of

incentives. This, of course, differed from the oversimplified view of the U.S. *postwar* victory narrative which interpreted any association with communism expressly as such.[132]

In March, the *Citizen* overshadowed the *Globe* and *Telegram* when it proclaimed the U.S. in a bind over Cuba (sanctions would bring about closer Cuban collusion with the USSR while military action would certainly damage American "moral stature" internationally) but described Castro's anti-American angst as a calculated attempt to move away from the tired, typical anti-colonialism of the region more than anything else. Editorial reaction to the sudden explosion of the French freighter *Le Coubre* in Havana harbour in early March provoked a variety of responses. In sum, Castro was admonished for exploiting the situation while the U.S. was commended for continued restraint in the face of provocation — but only up to a point. For example, the *Citizen* encouraged the U.S. to ensure exile activity did not retroactively legitimize Castro's exploitation of the situation.[133]

In April, Eisenhower's public suggestion that Castro had "betrayed" the ideals of the Revolution incited debate. The *Gazette* found the comment shortsighted and countered by arguing that the Revolution should be graded on a curve that included Castro's efforts to eliminate corruption (an endemic Cuban problem generally lost on North Americans) and popular reforms which, regardless of ideological categorization, nevertheless won him power by popular acclaim. The *Globe* disagreed, seeing the comment as conformation of a "hardening of U.S. policy" which Canada may very well wish to support in light of Castro's behaviour over the past year. On balance, the *Citizen*

noted that the comment was nevertheless interpreted as "interference" by Cuba and contributed to declining relations.[134]

In May, the *Press* took Castro to task for lauding the "democratic process" of elections despite clear "contempt" for them through inaction while also finding his continued effort to vilify the U.S. indefensible. The *Gazette* echoed its earlier editorial from February, on news that the USSR would reopen their embassy in Cuba, and observed that Castro's lack of communist fealty was not standing in the way of his efforts to take advantage or exploit the superpower. While the *Chronicle* hedged that Castro's growing "partiality" for the "[c]ommunist world" was becoming more apparent but still within the general appreciation of the nuance.[135]

Between January and May, editorialists continued to uphold Cuban sovereignty amid a marked increase in criticism. Calls for Castro's removal or brash denunciations of his administration were not ventured. Instead, media offered methodical critiques of Castro's missteps and implored him, with diminishing politeness, to assume a more prudent course. Praise for continued U.S. patience and restraint in the face of continued provocation was not indicative of an attempt at narrative synchronization, however, especially given the uniformly poor reception of Eisenhower's letter. Media implicitly acknowledged U.S. support for Batista and Castro's legitimate case against him as early as the publication of Matthews' series in 1957; however, the Revolution was assumed to be something of a fresh start and any rift in Cuba-U.S. relations was examined from January 1959 alone. While media granted Castro the benefit of the doubt throughout 1959

it also granted the U.S. policy prior to the Revolution the benefit of the doubt as well. In short, media did not explicitly connect celebration for Matthews' call for deliverance for Cuba with U.S. involvement in backing a brutal regime.

Features were few over the same period and confined to the first six weeks of the year. Leslie Dewart, writing in the *Star*, noted that Cubans had modest goals of "comfort" and craved "public order" above all, which Castro aimed to provide. In response to the media's shift in mood, Dewart argued that Castro's survival was "likely" but not "certain". While Harbron continued his long-running commentary by contextualizing Castro's TV spat as part of an endemic war with the "Old Order" of pure-blood colonial Spanish that revealed the depth of Castro's social changes better than any specific international statement. Here, again, Harbron's unique experience with Cuba proved insightful as media were not expressly qualified to comment on certain aspects of Cuban history, particularly Spanish colonialism.[136]

Syndicated foreign content was largely overshadowed by domestic perspectives. In the *Times* carried by the *Globe*, James Reston noted that the underlying policy objective was to ensure Cubans were not hurt in any shift, while Phillips found Cubans increasingly "critical" of shortages and delays. Walter Lippmann, in the *Press* and *Chronicle*, and Marquis Childs, in the *Sun*, each appealed for patience amid what their considerable respective experience clearly told them was an impending U.S. policy shift — another factor that media would not have been expressly qualified to observe on their

own, despite Deane and Bantey's considerable effort to capture the temperature in Washington.[137]

From Cuba, George Bryant (*Star*) followed Brehl in attempting to parse Cuba's new sensibility. In a series from which the opening quotation is derived, Bryant rejected the prevailing suggestion that Castro could be "pushed" by communists, foreign and domestic. He emphasized that sympathy with Cuba's perspective was critical to understanding the island's actions, and argued that: "One may criticize the methods but the objectives are understandable. Particularly to a Canadian." In Washington, Deane traced a similar thread in identifying Castro's increasing reliance on the "old" communists as critical concern. He doubted whether Eisenhower would significantly adjust policy before finishing his term, however. Leger concluded similarly, and saw U.S. concerns unsupported by anything other than maintaining the status quo. Back home, Norton Anderson (*Post*) noted that Castro's apparent fondness for Canada had yet to manifest into any real economic advantage apart from what appeared to be a current exemption from nationalization of industry amid a broader reorientation of the economy.[138]

Anderson's discussion of Canada's apparent exemption from nationalization has since grown into a significant theme within Canada-Cuba relations and a point of fascination for scholars. Canada indeed became something of a special case for Cubans but this has not been, as Kirk and McKenna initially observed, indicative of a special relationship. It has proceeded, rather, as Wright argued in *Three Nights in Havana*, from

Canada and Cuba's mutual commitment to dialogue — dialogue which has permitted both agreement and disagreement. Anderson did not position his observation as a celebration of Canadian exemption. Rather, he identified a gap between Castro's apparent fondness for Canada and any real trade advantage, as well as the very real possibility that Canada would have to face a similar seizure of assets as Cuba consolidated its new sensibility.

Debate about Castro's leftward tilt spilled over into June before the rapid deterioration of Cuba-U.S. relations in early July established a seemingly permanent rift. The *Globe* took issue with Khrushchev's decision to accept an invitation to visit Cuba while the *Citizen* and the *Star* each refused to draw conclusions from it or any derivative agreements by invoking Cuba's absolute right to determine its own relations. The unexpected resignation of the Cuban ambassador in Ottawa provoked a similar divide between the *Citizen* and the *Globe*, with the former conceding that it certainly shook confidence (or what remained of it) in Castro's government.[139]

Castro's swift seizure of U.S. refineries (a calculated response, perhaps, to U.S. refusal to refine USSR oil earlier in June) and Eisenhower's mandate to eliminate Cuba's sugar quota in reprisal influenced opinion significantly. Editorialists united in receiving the row as a clear point of no return even if they disagreed over implications and rationale. Where the *Gazette* correctly predicted Castro's sweep as the first step toward appropriation of all U.S. assets the *Citizen* feared Congressional haste "...play[ed] into the revolutionary government's hands" and bolstered Cuba's newfound sense of

independence (a view echoed by the *Sun* and *Le Devoir*). The *Globe* and the *Star* were even more divided, with the former firmly calling for Castro "to go" for the good of Cuba while the latter argued, conversely, that few states have tolerated Cuba's level of foreign interference. While the *Chronicle* and the *Press* had each previously called for Castro to go (largely according to misperceptions) the *Globe* became the first broadsheet of scale to do so in a tone reminiscent of pre-revolutionary calls for the end of Batista's regime.[140]

Editorial attention shifted in mid-July to address Khrushchev's imprudent proclamation that the Monroe Doctrine was dead and his extemporaneous commitment to defend Cuba with USSR missiles. Khrushchev's missile comment was overwhelmingly dismissed as posturing but he did incite a domestic review of U.S. policy. The *Globe* and the *Star* retreated from their previous ventures back to the centre; the former rejected a strict application of the Monroe Doctrine on the basis of Castro's popular legitimacy while the latter concurred but conceded in finding the U.S. within rights to politicize sugar. Other editorialists fell somewhere in between. The *Sun* summarized the debate in late August, when it identified the underlying core of media's increasingly apparent narrative independence, as it observed: "It is possible to sympathize with American anxiety about the Cuban situation without approving the extent of the pressure the [U.S.] is trying to apply to the Castro government." In sum: editorialists, faced with a choice between two opposing views that disturbed them almost equally, found no choice at all and effected opted out of choosing in favour of a home-grown third option.[141]

In early August, editorialists used rumours about Castro's poor health to share mutual distrust for his heir apparent, largely on the basis of Raúl's well-known ideological views. A Cuba under Raúl remained an exclusively Cuban affair, of course, even if it was not expressly *preferred* by media. The lack of a viable alternative to Castro, and the fear that his replacement could be much worse (which had become a common editorial refrain), actually had the affect of curbing criticism and perhaps even checked further calls for him "to go" overall.[142]

Castro's seizure of additional U.S. assets in mid-August provoked less response than earlier. The *Gazette* held the centre when it emphasized Cuban sovereignty while the *Telegram* argued that isolation through the elimination of foreign interests was, in principle, economic folly. In late-August, the *Globe* retreated from their call for Castro "to go" even further by taking the U.S. to task for denouncing Cuba over purported communist ties during the most recent OAS conference in Costa Rica. The U.S., they argued, was entitled to "dislike" communism but not entitled to allow such dislike to lead to "fear" or, more practically, "diplomatic blunders". The *Telegram* said as much in mid-September, on the eve of Castro's trip to the UN in New York, when it warned that such fear-mongering would only push Cuba further into the USSR orbit and dependency.[143]

Editorial evolution was absolutely clear here. Frustration with Castro reached a new height symbolized by the *Globe*'s call for him "to go" only to be tempered with paralleled frustration with the U.S. at the same time. Deliverance for Cuba remained the underlying theme, following from Matthews' prewar victory narrative, which was

primarily articulated as an homage to Cuban sovereignty. American impatience was understood but widely perceived to have run aground of Cuban independence. Increased ties between Cuba and the USSR were not desired but nevertheless recognized as a legitimate expression of Cuba's right to self-determination. This evolution was underscored by a concurrent debate about prospective membership in the OAS. Media achieved consensus over increased Canadian interest in Latin America and supported a broader aid program led by the U.S. despite disagreement on whether or not Canada should actually join. The *Globe* emerged as the primary opponent of OAS membership which overshadowed its peers given the paper's unique national scope.[144]

Gerald Clark produced an exceptional series for the *Citizen* in early September after he returned from a "fact-finding" tour of Cuba. Clark, something of a freelance editor-at-large (originally of the *Montreal Star*), confirmed the popular perception that Cuba was heading toward communism but qualified this as a "nationalistic" project, an important distinction for Latin Americans that was lost on many North Americans. He went on to argue that "short-sighted U.S. policy" had fed this nationalism, not an underlying sympathy for communism, and was pushing Castro into closer collusion with the USSR. This was an early contemporary rejection of the "pushed into communism" thesis that articulated what editorialists implicitly believed but had thus far failed to state clearly, despite many piecemeal approximations and false starts.[145]

Syndicated foreign opinion was understandably preoccupied with Castro's *appropriation without compensation*. American content overwhelmingly took Castro's

actions, beginning with Agrarian Reform almost exactly one year prior, as justification. Apart from Lippmann, who called for a "containment" strategy just shy of intervention over two columns run by five different broadsheets, U.S. content contributed to the atmosphere of fear which many broadsheets found distasteful. The *Guardian* in the *Sun* and the *Press*, generally representative of British opinion, also called out the U.S. tone, while prodding Castro for his failure to offer some form of appropriation *with* compensation.[146]

Having spent much of the year consolidating criticism against Castro, including his appearance at the UN in mid-to-late September, media fixed its attention on the U.S. embargo in mid-October and expressed virtual agreement that it would only push Castro into closer collusion with the USSR. From here, media refused to follow the emboldened postwar victory narrative that ran into Diefenbaker's concurrent refusal to follow the U.S. lead. Diefenbaker's position had the affect of anchoring media's newly independent narrative and augmenting media consciousness of this newly independent narrative.

Andrew MacFarlane eclipsed his peers with a truly comprehensive series beginning in Cuba and concluding in Miami between late November and early December. From Cuba, he positioned rampant disorganization as an argument against any longstanding communist plot. He did, however, qualify that Castro's reforms would ultimately produce the closest thing to communism outside of the USSR. Overall, he found Cuba in a *de facto* state of war with the U.S. following Castro's appropriations. He relayed, through an interview with a Cuban economist, that compensation was not only

unlikely but impossible given that most of Cuba's wealth left with Batista. From Miami (and beyond the reach of Castro's censors), MacFarlane observed that "[t]he only way to run an interim balance sheet on the Cuban [R]evolution is to assess its effect on the Cubans rather than the rest of us." His estimation upheld the general perception that Cubans had traded certain freedoms for unprecedented strides against poverty and disease. He also reinforced the consensus on Cuban sovereignty by concluding his series with the observation that: "If it is possible to disentangle trade from diplomacy, Canada's present relationship with Cuba is a simple one. The question of who governs Cuba, and by what method, is a matter for the Cuban people do decide."[147]

Editorialists were critical of Castro's grandstanding at the UN and flagrant camaraderie with Khrushchev in mid-to-late September. The *Globe* and the *Star*, usually at opposite ends of the spectrum of opinion, called out Castro for downplaying his domestic troubles. There was nearly equal displeasure with Castro from all corners but also marked displeasure with the U.S. for wasting an opportunity for dialogue as well as exhibiting a general lack of good faith. The *Star*, for example, called out the U.S. for failing to provide better security as the assassination of Fidel Castro on American soil would make for a troubling international incident. Reflecting on the UN visit in the following weeks, the *Citizen* observed that Castro's speech had been well-received in many countries.[148]

Eisenhower's decision to level a partial embargo against Cuba in mid-October not only failed to surprise editorialists, it united all editorial boards in opposition against the

measure. This chorus of unified national opinion proceeded from a continued homage to Castro's legitimacy (and Cuban sovereignty as well) and the palpable concern that continued economic marginalization could only make the island more dependent on the USSR. Interestingly, the U.S. position unified editorial support for Diefenbaker's refusal to follow suit — even from the *Press*, which had been highly critical of the prime minister and previously pushed for alignment with U.S. trade policy.[149]

While there was a palpable suggestion that the U.S. was reserving some final verdict in permitting Castro to keep power in the tension between Matthews' *prewar* narrative and the U.S. *postwar* narrative (fed by popular, press, and political in kind), media generally refused to prognosticate about U.S. motives or prospective actions in future. Rumours of U.S. intervention or some plot to oust Castro crept up periodically but were not seriously entertained. Moreover, the implicit collective decision to use the Revolution as a fresh start (and not examine or expressly reference U.S. support for Batista, as discussed earlier) left media slightly adrift of context. In other words, the view from Miami that Castro's victory was some aberrant episode awaiting impending correction was not felt — even if, again, media were aware of an underlying tension in between *prewar* and *postwar* narratives (one of which they favoured).

Debate over Canada's trade policy with Cuba spilled over into November and early December. Uniform opposition to U.S. trade sanctions and its general approach toward Cuba held firm. In mid-December, the debate collided with Diefenbaker's attempt to refine his position amid increasing pressure from the U.S. to fall in line and produced

rare alignment between third and fourth estates. Interestingly, editorialists effectively gave Diefenbaker an "out" when they observed the limits of Canadian trade policy with Cuba (setting up the terms of their later falling-out with him over the same policy) and asserted, as the *Press* put best, that "[a] single offensive or inflammatory act on the part of the Castro regime should be the signal for an immediate, rigidly enforced embargo." By which, of course, media possibly meant the nationalization of Canadian interests in turn but expressly invoked some darker threat to hemispheric security. Such a darker threat to hemispheric security was not especially endemic of the recent turn in Cuba-U.S. relations, despite Khrushchev's so-called "missile gaffe", but was imposed by Cold War tensions nevertheless.[150]

If media extended the benefit of the doubt to the U.S. in the same way they had granted it to Castro throughout 1959, it did not survive the transition to 1961. While media saw little hope for a return to amiable Cuba-U.S. relations (such as they were, under Batista) despite continued entreaties for both parties to abort this untenable course, it collectively gave little credence to rumours of a looming U.S. invasion of Cuba. U.S. disdain for Cuban sovereignty and a rejection of Castro's legitimacy more generally was met with disapproval but an escalation of this into any sort of armed measure was perceived to be unthinkable. Media refused to entertain rumours of a U.S. invasion out of a broad perception that considered such an overt and unprovoked action to be a policy blunder of the highest order. While this was perhaps naive, media nevertheless collectively perceived any U.S. missteps as a reactive attempt to deal with the limits of

patience. This collective orientation by media can be taken as evidence of an implicitly pro-American position, despite noted dissatisfaction with certain decisions. In short, media did not perceive that relations had deteriorated to the point of outward hostility by either country nor did they harbour any suspicion of some nefarious plot on the part of their more immediate neighbour.[151]

Feature reporting between mid-September and the last days of 1960 offered a poor counterpoint to MacFarlane's comprehensive series and command of the issues. The best pieces, an implicitly slanderous profile of Castro from an Argentinian exile living in Canada in the *Globe*, an explicitly slanderous profile of Castro by a New York hotel manager (carried by at least two papers), and a wonky review of Cuban colonial history also in the *Globe*, contributed little insight. Foreign syndicated content was equally marginal, especially with U.S. attention preoccupied by the presidential election, if otherwise critical of Canadian trade with Cuba.[152]

Arthur Blakely (*Gazette*) retraced MacFarlane's recent footsteps with a visit to Cuba in early February 1961 and carried domestic coverage prior to the Bay of Pigs. Blakely upheld MacFarlane's findings by similarly capturing the incongruity of Cuba's unusual dictatorship and Castro's enduring reputation among Cubans as an honest man and earnest social reformer. Unlike MacFarlane, however, Blakely allowed his journalism to wander beyond his immediate context. He prefigured the "unknown" Fidel thesis but rejected the "communist conspiracy" thesis by observing that Castro merely "tolerate[ed]" communism. Perhaps his most useful note was that Canada lagged behind

the U.S. in exports even with the partial embargo. Ultimately, he found "Castroism" permanently ingrained and extremely likely to outlive its namesake, particularly with Cubans open to prospective renewal under JFK. Blakely did not undermine the broader national narrative that remained extremely dissatisfied with Castro. Instead, he merely widened his scope and invoked early coverage of the Revolution in 1959.[153]

The immediate domestic response to the Bay of Pigs was highly critical of the U.S. MacFarlane took the lead and wrote that "....Castro's involvement in the Cold War between East and West was as much a product of American policy as it was of his own irresponsible emotionalism" but upheld Cuban sovereignty against obvious foreign incursion. His colleague, Ronald Collister (*Telegram*), concurred. From Washington, Bain relayed the obvious when he noted that the American opposition to Castro was now completely consolidated. From London, Bain's colleague Robert Duffy (*Globe*) found renewed sympathy for Castro at JFK's expense. At home, Mark Gayn (*Star*) suggested that Castro was now more secure than ever.[154]

Editorialists opened 1961 with a review of Cuba-U.S. relations following Eisenhower's controversial decision to terminate relations with Cuba. While some editorialists used the opportunity to admonish Castro for effectively earning such censure, media were surprised with Eisenhower's decision to affect a major policy shift on the veritable eve of JFK's inauguration, especially since an improvement in Cuba-U.S. relations was thought to be possible under JFK. In turn, Eisenhower's move sparked a new phase in the debate over Canada-Cuba relations, one anxious over any prospective

damage to Canada-U.S. relations in the rift between Diefenbaker's policy and the tightening U.S. position. Ultimately, editorialists upheld their established position, which the *Citizen* captured best when it wrote that "[t]he best way to have fought [c]ommunism in Cuba, and to fight it now, is to accept the Cuban [R]evolution, and to come to terms with it and Premier Castro. To do otherwise is to…defeat the purpose of Western policy."[155]

Apart from emphasis on Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations, editorial attention remained relatively pedestrian between January and up to the first few days of April. Castro's continued insistence on an impending U.S. invasion was entertained with as much interest as the suggestion of a push against counter-revolutionaries. In February, the *Globe* reviewed revolutionary inclinations in Latin America and reiterated the commonly held belief that "Castroism" was attractive because it provided a sense of dignity. This amounted to a critique of one aspect of U.S. foreign policy but also doubled a an endorsement of U.S. attempts to build a competing aid platform. In March, the *Gazette* led with a critique of Castro's ongoing reforms while half-heartedly speculating that the reform effort had been recalibrated to align more closely with the USSR.[156]

Editorial mood shifted suddenly on 5 April in response to the publication of JFK's "revolution betrayed" pamphlet that lauded the original objectives of the Revolution but denounced Castro and his growing association with the USSR. The *Gazette* defined the common reaction early when it argued that the verdict on the Revolution as a communist scheme or a nationalistic front for independence remained to be seen. Discussing the

pamphlet quickly collided with a spike in rumours of an impending U.S. invasion of Cuba led by Szulc's exclusive reports. The *Globe* defined the landscape of the post-Bay of Pigs analysis when it hedged on 9 April that "...military preparations on this scale could not be carried out without the knowledge and connivance of the United States government." Overall, the prospect of a U.S. invasion of Cuba either directly or by whatever nuanced degree of removal did not impress editorialists. Whether or not such a hypothetical invasion succeeded or not certainly did not repair the rift in Cuba-U.S. relations nor did it erase Castro's mythic currency in Latin America or undo Cuba's thirst for independence.[157]

Such an intuitive position going into the Bay of Pigs provided a useful platform for analysis and saved editorialists from an embarrassingly rapid volte-face. On balance, Castro's long repeated fear of a U.S. invasion was justified, and while many editorial boards wrote that he had certainly earned a plot to overthrow him, the violation of Cuban sovereignty was condemned by all — that is, until the *Chronicle* broke rank on 20 April to commend U.S. action against "opportunist" Castro, communist or otherwise. The *Chronicle*'s reversal proved to be curious as it followed what the *Telegram* declared one day prior as overwhelming loss for the U.S. in losing face internationally and risking Latin American paranoia. This argument was echoed widely in the following days and joined by broad agreement for a sentiment best articulated by the *Globe*: "If Dr. Castro was not wholly in the [c]ommunist camp before, these events may well put him there" and that would soon prove correct (at least to North American perceptions). The decision

by the *Chronicle* to break rank proceeded less from an effort to suddenly fall in with the U.S. narrative or the *postwar* victory narrative and more from a long-hedge against Cold War tensions. The paper effectively reasoned that if the U.S. had backed an invasion of Cuba for suspected and long-rumoured ties to communism, it had likely been for good reason.[158]

The *Sun* followed the same thread of logic as the *Globe* in noting that the U.S. had finally committed the one remaining blunder in a long run of blunders from the start of the Revolution. With sympathy for Castro long exhausted and sympathy for the U.S. position similarly exhausted toward the end of 1960, editorialists found themselves formally occupying a gulf between two extremely entrenched sides. To be clear, this neither risked anti-Americanism nor eroded faith in Matthews' prewar victory narrative (or the collective homage to Cuban sovereignty that it inspired). Moreover, the fact that media had long hedged against both Castro (by drawing the line against a clear and present threat to hemispheric security) and the U.S. (by continuing to underscore Cuban sovereignty) afforded them increased confidence to persist in an independent narrative while resisting any urge to take a side.[159]

Clark filed a follow-up series with the *Citizen* in mid-February precisely ten days after Blakely's own series concluded. Clark found Cuba "unquestionably [c]ommunist" but nevertheless continued to dismiss any suggestion of an overt plot, this time relaying an anecdote about the USSR finding the lack of ideological coherency in Cuba to "...appalling to a doctrinaire [c]ommunist" which prefigured Szulc's pithy conclusion

about Castro pressuring the USSR into collusion with *him* and not the inverse. Interestingly, Clark found few Cubans convinced of Castro's repeated suggestion of an impending U.S. invasion. John F. Sokol, a Canadian "manufacturer" with experience in Cuba, concluded as much in the *Globe* in early April. Elsewhere, historian Kenneth McNaught argued for a clearer Canadian policy in *Saturday Night*, suggesting that it could bolster liberal opinion in the U.S. while underscoring the need to accept the "historical justification" of the Revolution. Of course, McNaught's suggestion was well-intentioned but not exactly feasible, given the disparity between media and the international reach of the U.S. press. *Maclean's* Washington editor Ian Sclanders warned after a recent trip to the island that Cubans would become equally disillusioned with Canadians, as Cuba's apparent "love" for Canada was based on the "misunderstanding" that Canadians were just as anti-American.[160]

Syndicated foreign content overwhelmingly focused on the administrative shift from Eisenhower to JFK and the former's 'lame-duck' decision to terminate relations with Cuba. Attention shifted quickly following the publication of Szulc's exclusive in early April carried by the *Globe* (and corroborated by Bert Quint of the *Tribune* in the *Press* and *Gazette*) before pivoting to damage control. British opinion carried by the *Star* and *Sun* mirrored national opinion closely.[161]

The elite Canadian print media construction of the Revolution throughout 1960 and the first third of 1961 was characterized by progressive dissatisfaction with Castro and the U.S. at the same time. Media rescinded the benefit of the doubt it granted to

Castro up until early 1960 only to progressively revoke the same level of patience with the U.S. as the U.S. response became increasingly isolationist and outright hostile with the Bay of Pigs. As reconciliation with the respective perspectives of either neighbour became less possible and more estranged, media retreated to the core theme from Matthews in 1957. This furthered the development of an independent narrative, outlined throughout the previous year, which came to exude more and more confidence. The gradual development of this confidence was particularly important and worth reviewing.

In the first episode, all sectors of coverage from correspondence to syndicated content observed a marked shift in Cuba toward a new sensibility. Editorialists were highly critical of Castro but continued to emphasize Cuban sovereignty and his legitimacy by extension. The reestablishment of formal Cuba-USSR relations was not taken to be proof of a long-rumoured nefarious conspiracy but as the practical execution of that legitimacy and Cuba's entitlement to determine its own relations and trading partners. Castro's apparent flirtation with playing the U.S. and the USSR for whatever he could was contextualized similarly. Most importantly, media registered uniform skepticism with the practicality of any attempt to pressure Cuba through isolation. Media became more critical of Castro but went ahead and ventured criticism with the potential for a looming U.S. policy shift, long rumoured to occur at any point into 1960.

In the second episode, Brehl derided the methods of reform in Cuba but lauded their intent which spoke to the overall perspective of media. Increased criticism following the end of the benefit of the doubt did not incite a call for direct international intervention

in Cuba even if it did provoke the *Globe* to call for Castro "to go" before the paper recanted in favour of the status quo in light of the absence of an heir apparent. Castro's seizure of U.S. refineries and then additional assets was taken as a point of no return on an increasingly untenable course. Here, media demonstrated more fear over prospective U.S. reprisal, with further isolation certain to push Castro into turning to the USSR in order to compensate, than concern for Castro's inelegant exercise of sovereignty in seizing foreign assets. Whether or not media would have reacted the same way had Castro targeted Canadian interests as well (or exclusively, even) remains an interesting if entirely speculative question.[162]

In the third episode, media proved unwilling to grant the U.S. the benefit of the doubt in what would become the first phase of the U.S. embargo. The embargo was received negatively and thought to push Castro into further reliance on the USSR in order to compensate for the absence of the U.S. market. Media refusal to follow this manifestation of the U.S. *postwar* victory narrative in policy terms ran into Diefenbaker's decision against Canadian alignment with the embargo. This anchored media's independent narrative and boosted confidence (and implicit awareness of an alternative narrative). In Cuba, MacFarlane found rampant disorganization but an earnest pursuit of this new sensibility which was likely to produce the closest thing to communism outside the USSR. In this respect for nuance, he argued for grading Cuba on its own merits instead of any North American metric. This, and his insistence that only Cubans

determined who governed Cuba, echoed broad editorial consensus nevertheless arrived at through debate and recalibration.[163]

In the fourth and final episode, editorialists were apprehensive of Eisenhower's decision to terminate relations with Cuba so close to JFK's inauguration. Most papers wrote that Castro certainly earned a plot to overthrow him even if they found the Bay of Pigs to be reprehensible violation of Cuban sovereignty. The suggestion that the Bay of Pigs was organized without the knowledge of the U.S. government was uniformly rejected. As the *Sun* observed, the Bay of Pigs meant that the U.S. had officially committed the final policy blunder against Castro. Media collectively affirmed that the Bay of Pigs solidified the rift in Cuba-U.S. relations as much as Castro's hold on power. Media exhausted patience with the U.S. narrative but this did not translate into any sympathy for Castro at the same time: his longstanding fear of a U.S.-backed invasion was certainly justified but it provided no justification for the provocations that ultimately led to it. Rejection of the respective narratives of Castro and the U.S. was underscored by media's continued rejection of the "communist conspiracy" thesis and the general view, identified by MacFarlane once more, that both were responsible for the untenable course which had led them to this point.

In rejecting the narratives of both neighbours, media came to occupy the void of opinion between them. Where this could have fostered insecurity and led to a revisionist effort to make peace with the less objectionable aspects of U.S. policy, media found an independent position entirely justified. In fact, the pursuit of this mutually untenable

course by Castro and the U.S. justified the underlying basis for the independent narrative media first outlined prior to the Revolution and cultivated more methodically (if implicitly) throughout 1959. More to the point, disdain for Castro's course and U.S. policy in equal measure failed to devalue the currency of Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative from 1957. If anything, it made the U.S. indifference to a fellow revolution in kind all that more curious.

5 — TERMINAL BRINKSMANSHIP (01/05/1961 to 31/12/1962)

Whatever Fidel Castro says now, I do not believe he has always been a Communist or that the whole affair was a deep-laid Communist plot. To accept this John Birchers version is to credit Fidel and the Cuban Communists with a Machiavellian subtlety of which they have elsewhere shown little evidence.

— Alan Anderson, "Communists 'Captured' A Naive Fidel," *Toronto Telegram*, 20 Nov. 1962[164]

Any renewed sympathy for Castro following the Bay of Pigs Invasion was quickly curbed by news of his formal alignment with socialism in May and his Marxist-Leninist pledge in December 1961. Castro and the U.S. entrenched further into their mutually punitive actions during the preceding sixteenth months and into an ominous terminal brinksmanship. Cuba's censure from the OAS in late January and JFK's imposition of a full embargo in late March rounded out the final phase of an isolationist policy which imposed an eerie silence until it became evident that Cuba had compensated for the absence of the U.S. market with even further economic reliance on the USSR, and the sudden revelation that this partnership included a formidable military deployment and, of course, missile bases. Media abided the silence by firmly tending to their independent narrative.

Chapter Five examines the remaining eight months of 1961 and all of 1962 as five episodes: socialism! to communism! (1 May to 31 December 1961), OAS censure, full U.S. embargo (1 January to 31 March 1962), entrenched (1 April to 30 August 1962), Missile Crisis (1 September to 31 October 1962) and aftermath (1 November to 31 December 1962). It finds that elite Canadian print media perpetuated their independent narrative with confidence amid terminal brinksmanship between Castro and the U.S. With reconciliation between either narrative impossible as late as mid-1960, and even more estranged following the failed Bay of Pigs and Castro's formal alignment with the USSR throughout 1961, continued homage to Cuban sovereignty (following from Matthews) was joined by a push for continued dialogue with Castro. Dialogue emerged as a catch-all platform for justifying Canadian trade policy, luring Castro from further alignment with the USSR, and admonishing America's ungraceful attempts to persuade Latin America and NATO to endorse their isolationist policy.

Reportage throughout the remainder of 1961 pooled around Castro's formal endorsement of socialism in May and subsequent Marxist-Leninist pledge in December with little in between. Bryant returned to Cuba in May for a more detailed investigation. He echoed MacFarlane from late 1960 and Bleakly from February, especially over the palpable sense of Cuba's national dignity bolstered by an even stronger relationship with the USSR. Overall, he keenly noted that the U.S. had already lost Cuba but now risked losing the rest of Latin America to ideological "phobia" as well. Coverage in December was best represented by Fernand Beauregard (*La Presse*) and Thomas Sloan (*Globe*): the

former found Castro's new alignment to be a critical blunder at odds with the founding image of the Revolution while the latter sternly argued against any evidence of it being a foregone conclusion.[165]

Editorialists opened May by continuing to express concern over Castro's opportunity to consolidate ties with the USSR while, nevertheless, continuing to uphold Cuba's domain over its own affairs. On 3 May, such post-Bay of Pigs analysis collided with Castro's May Day speech that incited united opposition to Castro's continued refusal to hold elections, particularly, as the *Globe* underscored, given Cuba's historically abused electoral process. Now was the time for Castro, media pushed, to make good on the democratic promise of the Revolution. In mid-May, the *Gazette* observed the obvious but otherwise neglected fact that Castro's emphasis on "socialism" marked the first official ideological alignment of the Revolution. It expanded on this in late July, following Castro's *formal* announcement of one-party rule, when it observed that Cuba had effectively become a "...voluntary member of the Communist [B]loc" — informed by Castro's progressive reliance on certain communists after assuming power despite any clear ideological tilt. This, of course, prefigured Szulc's pithy observation to the same affect.[166]

JFK's call for U.S. media to heed "restraint" on issues of national security in early May and visit to Ottawa in mid-May comprised a concurrent editorial trend. The *Star* and the *Sun* took exception to JFK's comments, while the latter issued a complete retraction of all affected syndicated material. JFK's visit was well-received despite the fact that

media collectively hedged against potential reconciliation between divergent policies. Only the *Press* betrayed insecurity about Canada's failure to take the visit as a hint to fall in line. The visit, along with JFK's push for Canadian inclusion in the OAS, pressured Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green to clarify both Cuba policy and OAS interest. Green's response paralleled elite opinion and was welcomed even as media retreated to their respective opinions about the OAS (with the majority in favour and the *Globe* continuing to dissent).[167]

Disapproval over Castro's willingness to exploit prisoner exchange negotiations (the *Globe* captured the general mood by finding Castro a better Captain Morgan than Karl Marx) merged with analysis of UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson's Latin American tour and subsequent launch of the Alliance for Progress aid platform. Stevenson's tour, of course, only emphasized continued regional sympathy for Castro and communism by extension. Editorialists reiterated their call for Cuba-U.S. dialogue and Cuban sovereignty and collectively observed that U.S. aid was the best alternative to Cuban-style USSR clientship (if ultimately impossible to supervise).[168]

Castro's abrupt Marxist-Leninist pledge surprised editorialists and framed the typical end of year review. The announcement provoked strong but varied reactions. The middle was defined by three broadsheets: the *Globe* found it opportunistic and clearly intended to antagonize the U.S.; the *Gazette* argued that it made even Castro more difficult to take seriously, suggesting that his use of the term was perhaps "seven months late"; while the *Citizen* took a semantic line, suggesting policies and popular support

mattered more than labels. On the more critical end of the spectrum, the *Sun* took Castro's comments literally and called them a deception fitting of Lenin, while the *Chronicle* took a revisionist turn when it embraced the "communist conspiracy" thesis despite the fact that it also echoed the *Citizen* when it suggested that the news made little practical difference.[169]

From surprise and shock to lack thereof media resisted the urge to call Castro out in any absolute terms. Increasing frustration was read into the official record, worry pooled, but no paper called for JFK to send in the marines before daybreak. This was notable given that Castro's first formal ideological announcement could have served as an opportunity to trigger an effort to parse or belatedly endorse the U.S. narrative or even less self-conscious adventures in revisionism. In fact, the *Chronicle* had already betrayed an internal struggle with this issue. The blind but no less collective decision in favour of continued prudence demonstrated the strength of media's independent narrative and the consistency of their tone — which was nevertheless underscored by a depth of varying opinion.

Features generally provided tangential commentary rather than any significant response to either of Castro's statements. The failure of the U.S. press to cover the Bay of Pigs ethically emerged as the primary theme. Earle Beattie, a professor of journalism at the University of Western Ontario, wrote in the *Star* that U.S. coverage qualified as "propaganda". Harry Rasky was similarly critical in *Saturday Night*. He argued that U.S. press adopted a "...he who is not with U.S. must be against U.S. …" which compromised

its integrity. Rasky noted that Matthews, rarely discussed explicitly by media, fell aground of this same ethical issue much earlier. In *La Presse*, M.P. Dean echoed the *Citizen*'s semantic argument and suggested that Castro's official ideology was mostly psychological and argued, eerily, that Castro was not "crazy" enough to actually host USSR missiles.[170]

Syndicated foreign content mirrored the same May and December polarity. In the *Times* run by the *Globe*, Reston struggled to reconcile journalistic ethics with JFK's challenge to little avail. Phillips' reports ended on 20 May with her flight from the island while Szulc struggled to fill the void in her absence. Zell Rabin of the *Tribune* returned to Cuba in June for another series carried by the *Gazette* and *Press* that largely upheld media's existing conclusions. British opinion, represented by Roy Perrot of the *Observer* carried by the *Globe* reflected Rabin in finding Cuba a lighter version of a European dictatorship without including any specific denunciation or call to arms.[171]

The year of 1962 opened with investigative series by Ruth Worth (*Globe*) between January and February and by Roy Shields (*Star*) in March, that chronicled the extent of change in Cuba following Castro's pledge. Both reached similar conclusions about the flight of Western reporters due to censorship, the rise in hostility toward would-be exiles, and the difficulty weighing Cuba's net gains to sacrifices. On balance, nothing they observed contradicted previous correspondence. Change since 1961 was, according to many editorialists, rather underwhelming. Shields, specifically, found the pivot from dependency on one superpower to the other completely futile. This, and an insightful

interview with an everyday Cuban, led him to speculate whether Castro's newly apparent "dependen[cy]" on communists (foreign and domestic) made him something of a hostage. Obviously, Castro's considerable effort to establish a personal myth informed by his unique omnipresence grated against such an argument but it did indicate the array of opinion media were willing to entertain, especially as criticism of Castro became more and more normalized and specific.[172]

While editorialists were primarily concerned with the January OAS meeting in Uruguay and JFK's trade ban, 1962 opened with a broad review. This continued again in March where it turned speculative. For example, the *Gazette* observed that the USSR had not "sponsored" Castro's pledge and were, perhaps, waiting out a more ideologically adherent successor. They also noted that Castro actually lost power in the bureaucratic shuffle despite remaining the top official. The *Star* suggested the shuffle was unlikely to result in a major shift away form the founding ideas of the Revolution and went on to also push for dialogue, as "[a] free, friendly though socialistic Cuba is much to be preferred to a surly, resentful though servile satellite." The push for continued dialogue with Castro proceeded from an homage to Cuban sovereignty but also doubled as an endorsement of Canadian trade policy as well as a critique of America's isolationist policy. The *Star*'s articulation here was generally indicative of the collective position of the media, if slightly more developed than average.[173]

Cuba's censure from the OAS in late January did not inspire confidence in the regional body nor did it sway opinion against elite homage to Cuban sovereignty or

dialogue. In fact, U.S. efforts to use the OAS to further marginalize Cuba were condemned as an extension of futile attempts to isolate Cuba through the embargo. In late January, the *Gazette* underscored the collective line when it wrote that, "[t]he crucial question is not really what to do about Castro, but how to help the orderly development of the rest of Latin America." The *Star* concurrently observed that while Latin America certainly "despised" Castro, fear of U.S. overreach remained a much greater concern.[174]

Editorial reaction to JFK's full embargo was uniformly negative but also defensive. Media reiterated their support for Diefenbaker's Cuba policy as a practical and constructive form of dialogue. The early response to the embargo was definitive. The *Globe* defined the middle when it argued that while most Canadians certainly found Castro's flirtation with Marxist-Leninist ideology "distasteful" they nurtured no "quarrel" with either Cuba nor its *legitimate* government. The *Telegram* went further when it argued that "[m]any people dealing with Russia say they are [c]ommunists; many don't. The next move for Canada, if any, will come only when the results of the American embargo can be seen." The *Post* said as much at the end of March, in response to continued criticism of Canadian trade policy in the U.S. press, when it glibly retorted that "...the annexation of Canada by the U.S. has not yet taken place" — and, indeed, the rest of Latin America and NATO continued trade with Cuba. This collective reproach of U.S. policy was by far the most stern interaction with the U.S. narrative outside of the Bay of Pigs and indicative of the same tone levelled against Castro following his ideological turn.[175]

The most significant feature series came from a Toronto businessman concluding five years in Havana in the *Telegram*. He completely disagreed with Worth and Shields and filed perhaps the most overtly negative domestic portrait of Castro to date — even going as far to reject the widely held belief in the "pushed into communism" thesis. He did, however, concede that the Revolution had provided much needed development. William Eccles' much shorter series for *Maclean's* apprised Canadians of Castro's efforts to export revolution, underreported domestically, but assumed to be true as early as June 1959 in the U.S. press. Back home, Harbron concurred with Shields about the folly of trading one imperial power for another.[176]

Syndicated foreign content was underwhelming and inwardly focused while somewhat defeatist. Marguerite Higgins of the *Tribune* carried by the *Citizen* captured the mood in the U.S. press perfectly when she noted that JFK's embargo included an allowance for food and medicine (and was therefore humanitarian) but likely to fail without Canadian support. Even Lippmann, published across five broadsheets, was dour, and found anything short of a severe condemnation of Castro at the OAS (which did not occur) defeat.[177]

Only Gayn's rumination on the rising influence of internal Communist Bloc politics on Cuba provided any insight between April and August which otherwise comprised the most uneventful period of Cuba coverage prior to the Revolution. Gayn described Cuba's recent governmental shuffle as the result of Castro breaking a tie between factions supporting China and the USSR in a broader ideological debate.

Castro's decision resulted in the flight of the leader of the pro-China faction and preceded a notable resurgence in USSR aid on the eve of the Missile Crisis. This development received general interest (especially since virtually nothing else occurred concurrently) but Gayn's analysis offered Canadians an explicit connection between the two events and a more thorough briefing on the status of Cuban affairs.[178]

Editorial interest in Cuba mirrored the general decline in news. Diefenbaker's attempt to leverage Canadian trade policy by appealing for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners was met with wide approval while Castro's reluctance to take advantage of a perfect opportunity to earn back some goodwill was not. This merged with a general reflection anniversary retrospective of the Bay of Pigs that built to a piecemeal reiteration of Gayn's article. In August, Cuba's move to collectivize all remaining farms was perceived as the direct result of pressure from Moscow by the *Globe* and *Star* and poor economics more generally. The *Citizen* took a broader view, prefiguring the widely accepted "single staple" thesis (understood intuitively and not in the same sense that Eckstein developed in *Back From the Future*) in present historiography, when it observed that Castro's economic trouble stemmed from the complex nature of agricultural reform in general.[179]

Continued editorial interest in the status of Canada-Cuba-U.S. relations remained the only other consistent theme. The *Press*, the most pro-U.S. elite paper, positioned the Revolution as the "only significant friction" in Canada-U.S. relations in April, a view which other broadsheets effectively upheld if not in precisely the same terms. In June, the

Chronicle (the next-most pro-U.S. paper) joined the *Press* in positioning Castro's lack of dollars as a prospective end to Canada-Cuba trade. In August, the *Globe* blamed U.S. policy on the decline in Cuba-U.S. relations but doubted whether the situation would lead either country to war. Continued pressure on JFK by hawkish Congressional factions led the *Citizen* to reiterate the long-established line against intervention — "Until there is evidence of a military buildup in Cuba so great as to go beyond the revolution's needs to defend itself, a hands-off policy appears warranted" — while the *Star*, perhaps short-sightedly observed that the U.S. "...now seems reconciled to an unhappy co-existence with Fidel Castro."[180]

Gerald Clark returned to Cuba in mid-April to examine Canadian trade for a feature in the *Telegram*. He found it worth more to Castro as a symbol but argued that a sudden policy reversal would be a significant blow to Cuban morale. Alan Judge became the latest Canadian everyman to recount his Cuban travels in a short series for the *Citizen*. Judge's real contribution to Canadian perceptions of Cuba was largely unintentional: his series of missteps and repeated encounters with security personnel conveyed more about the dire state of Cuba than any overt analysis could have. Elsewhere, the *Press* ran an unsigned feature about Castro and women that challenged his hyper-masculine image where it highlighted the continued appointment of women to senior positions of leadership. The piece was not only atypical of the *Press*'s editorial position but weirdly indicative of the lack of firm conclusions about either Castro or the Revolution.[181]

Syndicated foreign content also fell with the general decline in news. Szulc's review of U.S. "[s]chadenfreude" over Cuba-USSR problems in the *Globe* spoke for coverage in general. He described Cuba's continued economic crisis as embarrassing for the USSR, which could very well create a permanent rift in Cuba-USSR relations given Khrushchev's lack of options. This view was shared by Higgins and Roscoe Drummond of the *Tribune*, carried by the *Gazette* and *Citizen*, respectively. British opinion, exemplified by the *Guardian* in the *Press* persisted in characterizing Castro as an "incorrigible romantic" and even positioned him as something of a hostage (as media had half-heartedly suggested earlier).[182]

Coverage of the Missile Crisis focused almost exclusively on U.S.-USSR relations and Cold War tensions in general. References to Cuba were limited to setting while references to Castro were even more fleeting. Efforts to contextualize Castro's role occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Crisis through to the new year. Still, wide condemnation for Castro's role in *facilitating* the Crisis (if not actively *conspiring*) went without saying in that he suddenly constituted a threat to hemispheric security, a condition which media had previously defined as the absolute limit of their endorsement of Matthews' narrative. Implicit awareness of a precedent for the violation of Cuban sovereignty did not, however, translate into an active call for it to occur. Resolution of the Crisis not only averted war but cemented a new status quo that appeared to ensure against the prospect of future U.S. intervention in Cuba which media unanimously welcomed.

Whereas coverage between April and August declined considerably, reference to Cuba leading up to and throughout the Crisis was rivalled only by the first months of the Revolution. The mood remained increasingly tense if fragmented prior to mid-October. Charles Lynch (*Citizen*) captured the two primary national anxieties, apart from the threat of certain nuclear death and destruction, early and perfectly. First, Lynch argued that Canada had been spared from significant embarrassment over trade due to Cuba's currency shortage months earlier. Second, he characterized Diefenbaker's apparent delay in joining the U.S. alert status as a personal blunder and a policy failure. Media joined in admonishing Diefenbaker shortly thereafter despite their lack of access or context, as scholars and Diefenbaker's External Affairs liaison H. Basil Robinson have both emphasized. Of Castro in particular, B.T. Richardson described the collective mood best when he observed that this was very much perceived to be the "high water mark" for his international influence.[183]

Editorials were equally tense and fragmented prior to the Crisis due to a combination of runaway rumours and increased pressure on JFK to make a show of force. Editorialists favoured the status quo and continued to emphasize Cuban sovereignty despite increasingly poor signals from the USSR (folding Cuba into Cold War collective security) and the U.S. (with JFK calling up the Reserves and hawks leaning on him to "do something"). This led editorialists to highlight the futility of anything beyond posturing by dismissing the "value" of Cuba as a "rocked base", especially given well-established missiles in Europe let alone submarine and intercontinental missile reach. More to the

point, as the *Star* concluded, there was little the USSR could actually do to back up Cuba short of bombing American cities. Interestingly, what framed editorial opinion going into the Crisis was uniform rejection of the U.S. decision to interdict any and all shipping to Cuba at its own discretion. This was taken as not only a violation of Cuba's sovereignty but a reckless violation of international law in general. It brought the Cuba-U.S. conflict closer to home than ever before and made media's adoption of Cuba as surrogate for exorcising postwar insecurity uncomfortably literal.[184]

Editorial indignation to U.S. actions and the palpable, if abstract, fear that Canada could just as easily be subjected to the same treatment cannot be understated. Initial reaction to JFK's blockade was uniformly critical and taken as a needlessly provocative increase in Cold War hostilities. As noted earlier, this did not amount to a sudden outpouring of abject anti-Americanism; rather, the reaction to the U.S. position was characterized by surprise over the lack of restraint for a country so often associated with prudence or at least calculated reactions. The *Star* captured the rapidly evolving collective mood on 23 October, the day after JFK's quarantine speech, when it called out JFK for "glossing over" U.S. missiles in Turkey but conceded that the Cuba-USSR move was disturbingly provocative. For editorialists, the Crisis was primarily a matter of Cold War posturing between the U.S. and the USSR. Castro's role, while obviously leading given his history of provocation, would not be properly addressed until after the resolution of the Crisis. Mood eventually relaxed to commend JFK for seeking a prudent resolution even if reconciliation with the U.S. narrative and Cuba policy remained

impossible. As the *Globe* observed, the fact that the U.S. continued to approach Cuba as a unique, almost domestic issue, remained unacceptable.[185]

Editorial response to the conclusion of the Crisis was swift and firm. The *Star* poetically chronicled the severity of the Crisis on 29 October when it noted that: "The big news this morning is that we are all still alive." The *Globe* found that Castro had been "virtually ignored" by the JFK-Khrushchev deal with his image and symbolic currency in Latin America damaged considerably. The *Telegram* defined the middle when it observed the return of a status quo in Cuba-U.S. affairs, however much it retained the original rift in relations notwithstanding. On the other side of the middle, *La Presse*, registered righteous indication over the apparent powerlessness of the world to avert war following terminal brinksmanship between superpowers. From here, the paper pivoted and declared the U.S. blockade a clear act of war and an unacceptable violation of Cuban sovereignty, regardless of outcome. In sum, editorialists were content to blame Khrushchev for instigation while levelling something of an accessory charge against Castro. Khrushchev's emphasis on Cuban sovereignty (in securing a concession from the U.S. not to invade or seize it) did not redeem him within the broader Cold War narrative but it was certainly well-received as a positive development.[186]

Diefenbaker's presumed delay set editorialists against him and fed interest in a broader review of Cuba policy that collided with the fact that the Crisis had presented the first real challenge to adherence to Matthews' narrative: media had long collectively established that Cuba had a right to self-determination but not at the express expense of

hemispheric security. The *Telegram* rounded out lingering support for Diefenbaker on 23 October when it commended his response to the Crisis and subsequent call for neutral inspectors as well as opening the possibility of amending policy to shadow the U.S. ban on all trade except food and drugs. The *Globe* commended Diefenbaker for his "statesmanlike attitude" over his comments in the House the following day but nevertheless identified a subtle but significant shift when it conceded that Canada must stand with the U.S. "...to avert a threat to our hemisphere and to the peace of the world" as fence-sitting was "unthinkable". No broadsheet went as far as Lynch in his explicit rebuke of Diefenbaker but it marked the first time since before the Revolution that media found common threads with the U.S. narrative.[187]

Complete or near-complete text of speeches by Diefenbaker, JFK, Khrushchev, and even British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, as well as JFK and Khrushchev's personal letters to one another, comprised the most prominent feature trend. This was likely an effort by media to provide Canadians with a more substantial account of the respective position of each statesman than radio or television could provide (despite the fact that the Missile Crisis was the first truly televised international event). Apart from this, two standalone features augmented editorial commentary. Maxwell Cohen, founder of the McGill law school, argued in the *Gazette* that the U.S. was technically within rights to interdict Cuban shipping through security clauses but only up to a point. This was an interesting counterpoint given the extremely negative editorial reaction. While General Charles Foulkes, first Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, echoed editorial

sentiment in the *Sun* and later the *Star* when he noted that the USSR had long complained of being "surround[ed]" by U.S. missiles and dismissing Cuba's strategic worth as a missile base. He also argued that the real problem with the missiles was not their broader scheme in the Cold War brinksmanship between superpowers but their potential for use (deliberately or otherwise) by an "irresponsible fanatic" like Castro or, more likely, some successor.[188]

Walter Lippmann's commentary was widely carried and served as a baseline for U.S. opinion. He mirrored media in dismissing the "do something" chorus by underscoring the broader consequences of action given Cuba's recent integration into Cold War collective security. He found Castro, largely ignored during the Crisis, more marginalized than before. The *Times* and the *Tribune* carried by the *Globe* and the *Sun* and *Press* respectively, concluded as much despite a detour through reviews of Cuba-U.S. relations following the Revolution and wounded American sensibilities. In the *Star*, William R. Frye of the *Christian Science Monitor* concurred with Lippmann but was more forward about translating the deal between JFK and Khrushchev into de facto acceptance of Castro's regime and continued rule.[189]

British content rose significantly, which began with eyewitness accounts from two correspondents between early September to early October. They found that Cuba had nearly completed a largely voluntary economic reorientation made all the more confusing given Castro's belated pledge of ideological fealty. This echoed established domestic correspondence perfectly. Elsewhere, a *Times* editorial in the *Globe* matched media

anxiety when it asserted Britain's right to ship anything to anyone absolutely. The response to the Crisis itself was best tendered by the *Financial Times* in the *Globe* with an editorial that blamed the USSR for exploiting both Cuba and the U.S. respectively.[190]

Alan Anderson (*Telegram*) filed an exceptional series of articles throughout November after five days in Cuba (28 hours of which he spent in jail) that was indicative of coverage in early 1959. Anderson leveraged the introspective mood following the Crisis to take stock of the state of the Revolution. He rejected the "communist conspiracy" thesis, from which the opening quotation derives, by arguing for a "simpler and more complex" explanation of Castro's ideology and the politics of the Revolution. Prefiguring present scholarly consensus with the benefit of over sixty years of analysis, he suggested that Castro lucked into victory and simply made up the rest as he went along. This, in turn, involved reliance on the only established political party, the 'old' communists in Szulc's parlance, who traded support for concessions. Cubans, in turn, resigned themselves to this status quo because they had never known better. Shortages and continued economic trials, or the "high cost of Fidel Castro" as Anderson had it, were worth the price. As Anderson inferred, this was extremely significant because it validated not only the collective position of media but Canadian policy more generally.[191]

Other domestic reportage varied but followed the same intuitive feeling that the first real verdict on the Revolution had finally been rendered. Bain emphasized that Khrushchev's win for Cuban sovereignty should not be understated, especially given that the situation which produced the Crisis was a direct result of U.S. policies. Bill Fraser

(*Macleans*) found Canada's overall response to the Crisis in-line with NATO, which took the Crisis seriously but remained detached. Richardson found Canadian trade policy (and reportage, by extension) vindicated and expressed hope that the end of brinksmanship would bring about new dialogue and efforts to fulfill the sprit of earlier attempts to raise the standard of living in Latin America. Harold Morrison (*Citizen*) was less hopeful when he suggested that the U.S. would likely "gradually step up harassment" in lieu of invading again. In short, media welcomed this new status quo but found it not all that dissimilar from the old status quo.[192]

Editorial interest divided into a year-end review on Cuba, Castro, and Diefenbaker. The *Telegram* argued for a shift in perspective, away from viewing aggravated Cuba-U.S. relations as a "hysterical" exchange between neighbours, and toward a focus on the peril of brinksmanship. The *Star* found Cuba "badly disillusioned" with the USSR and argued that the U.S. should attempt to build goodwill by loosening the embargo and rein in exile activity. The *Citizen* concurred and also echoed the *Telegram* when it argued that a "reconciliation" was still possible and that returning Cuba to the fold would strengthen hemispheric security. The *Citizen* also suggested that, at worst, Cuba could succeed as a neutral power on the European model. In sum, Cuba's involvement in the Crisis did not provoke censure from media nor did it shake their defence of Cuban sovereignty or faith in deliverance despite the fact that Castro's actions had, technically, provided precedent for U.S. intervention. Again, such intervention was

not advocated and media were relieved with the U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba but a momentary precedent for intervention emerged nevertheless.[193]

Editorialists were not kind to Castro following the Missile Crisis. The same sentiment that a meaningful verdict had been rendered which pervaded domestic reportage was keenly felt by editorialists. Castro was variously described as the "forgotten man" in the Crisis who was desperate to "save face" after being "humiliated" by attempting to play politics with the condition of UN inspections as a condition of JFK's and Khrushchev's resolution. Still, the *Telegram* argued against dismissing either the attractiveness of the Revolution or sympathy for Castro in Latin America. The *Globe* took the last, best word when it blamed Castro and the U.S. for needless provocation and neglecting the underlying cause of the Revolution: poverty in Latin America.[194]

Criticism of Diefenbaker, which began with the *Globe* on 25 October, was similarly conclusive. The *Globe* put it best when it observed that while Diefenbaker may have had a legitimate reason for holding out on Canadian readiness, the impression remained that Canada was "out of step" with the U.S. Any issue with Diefenbaker was, as the *Citizen* put it, clearly distinct from his overall Cuba policy. The paper argued that the U.S. had clearly pushed Castro into collusion with the USSR while Canada held a constructive line for maintaining dialogue. *Macleans* took a more legalistic approach, arguing that regardless of Canadian policy or Diefenbaker's rationale, Canada's role in NATO meant that it was hardly neutral. The magazine granted that trade did not violate

this alignment but the Crisis had revealed Diefenbaker to be more stubborn than prudent.[195]

Media recognized the precedent for U.S. intervention, preferred no intervention occur at all, and then reverted back to Matthews' victory narrative with the elimination of the grounds for that same precedent. This occurred without inconsistency, as support for Matthews' narrative always included the caveat of greater deference to any threat to hemispheric security. As such, media were not forced to reconcile their own independent narrative with the U.S. narrative —which still proceeded from a contempt for Cuban sovereignty, in recognizing the small period of precedent for U.S. intervention in Cuba. In short, media weathered the Crisis with their independent narrative intact. Support for Matthews' victory narrative became more of a preference in light of a hemispheric threat (and, as *Macleans* noted, Canada's non-neutrality as a member of NATO) but it returned following the successful resolution of the Crisis.

Gerald Clark, newly returned from a five week research tour of Latin America, filed a short series with the *Citizen* in early December. Like Anderson, his primary interest was to discern why Castro volunteered for alignment with the Communist Bloc. He similarly found no evidence of any underlying sympathies prior to the Revolution which was why, he concluded, the USSR "made a slow start" due to the regime's uncertainty. Overall, he surmised that the matter was firmly the subject of "academic debate" only to be complicated further by the fact that "...North Americans have yet to accept that it is '[c]ommunism with a difference'." Ralph Allen filed a feature from

Havana in November and from Key West in December for *Macleans* which upheld editorial angst in October about the U.S. predilection for dealing with Cuba as though it were a matter of personal property. While Barry Lando (a lawyer from Vancouver) filed a single article for the *Citizen* in early December after being bounced from Cuba after two days. He expected to find Cubans "dispirited" by the USSR and "scornful" of Castro but found just the opposite: a lack of "bitterness" and a notable "increase" in Castro's "prestige".[196]

The majority of syndicated foreign content was American. This typically focused on a year-end, strategic review of USSR attitudes, behaviours, and capabilities. Castro, ever-villainous and now largely off-stage, was mostly ignored. Lippmann, whom the *Star* anointed the "dean" of newspaper columnists, stood out once again as the core of U.S. opinion. He observed that Castro had succeeded in alienating both superpowers to the detriment of Cuban sovereignty, as the USSR could effectively cut him out of any agreement with the U.S. at their sole discretion. Lippmann's observation was especially important because it completely escaped domestic editorial review, likely out of relief that Cuban sovereignty had survived the Crisis at all. Lippmann went on to observe that the U.S. had finally succeeded in treating Castro properly during the Crisis by ignoring him.[197]

The elite Canadian print media construction of the Revolution from May 1961 right through to the aftermath of the Missile Crisis in 1962 was characterized by the continued survival of the independent narrative amid continued estrangement from the

respective narratives of Castro and the U.S. Media confidence in this narrative swelled following the Bay of Pigs and continued right through to the Missile Crisis. The previously established limit to adhering to Matthews' prewar victory narrative was briefly threatened by Castro's involvement in a direct threat to hemispheric security. However, satisfactory resolution of the Crisis prevented any significant shift away from Matthews or a recalibration of the independent narrative in general. While precedent for U.S. intervention to address a critical security threat was one matter, *preference* for violating Cuban sovereignty remained another entirely. Overall, dialogue emerged as the catch-all platform for justifying Canadian trade policy, providing Castro with an alternative to exclusive reliance on the USSR, and to admonish the U.S. for attempting to isolate Cuba through pressure on Latin America and NATO. As before, the gradual development of this construction is particularly important and worth reviewing.

In the first episode, Castro's formal alignment with "socialism" in May was widely taken to be inconsistent with the original understanding of the Revolution but ultimately less important than advertised. It was a conclusion consistent with Cuba's turn toward a new sensibility that media first observed and otherwise accepted in 1960. Castro's subsequent pledge in December was found to be provocative and rather late in contrast with the U.S. Cuba's "volunteer" membership in the Communist Bloc was concerning but not particularly alarming in principle. Media resisted a clear opportunity to fall in with the U.S. narrative. Instead, media elected to position dialogue as the means of luring Castro away from reliance on the USSR. This could have only proceeded from

continued deference to Matthews and an homage to Cuban sovereignty in general. On balance, correspondents found Cuba proud of robust trade with the USSR despite the fact that it remained a poor substitute for traditional trade with the U.S.[198]

In the second episode, Worth and Shields upheld the established consensus about change in Cuba. This, and particularly Shields' argument that Cuba's pivot from dependency upon one superpower to another was futile, was significant given that they were the first to report from Cuba following Castro's voluntary pledge. Continued emphasis on Cuba's "volunteer" membership in the Communist Bloc, with the *Gazette* noting that the USSR did not sponsor Castro's pledge, spoke to continued emphasis on nuances. While U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba through the OAS and JFK's full embargo provoked collective reproach. Media used any suggestion that Canada follow suit as an opportunity to reiterate Canadian sovereignty as much as Cuban, a comparison which made Canada's use of Cuba as a surrogate for national insecurities especially transparent.

In the third and most uneventful episode, correspondents used the relative lack of news for reflection and continued to underscore media's independent narrative with nuance, from Gayn's effort to brief Canadians on the affect of Communist Bloc politics on Cuba to Clark's emphasis on Canadian trade as a point of pride for Cubans despite serving as a prop for Castro. In a broader examination of Canada-U.S. relations, media found divergent views over Cuba trade policy as the only point of contention or prospective rift. Interestingly, this did not result in a wave of insecurity (as other differences in perspective and opinion certainly have) or a call for media to adjust their

narrative accordingly. This should not to be confused with a sudden indulgence in anti-Americanism but, rather, identification of a difference of opinion with the U.S. and confidence in the validity of media's own position by contrast.

In the fourth episode, rejection of the U.S. blockade as a provocative violation of Cuban sovereignty by a majority of papers and Lynch's instigation of a review of Diefenbaker's policies following his belated formal response to the Crisis tested but failed to fracture media's independent narrative. Cuba's direct involvement in a threat to hemispheric security, blamed partly on Castro, made adherence to Matthews' narrative more vulnerable than any prior event but the relatively quick resolution of the Crisis and the quick emergence of a new status quo (similar to the old one) mitigated any need for a comprehensive review or reorientation. This was underscored by widespread acknowledgment of precedent for U.S. intervention (and NATO intervention, in fact) at the peak of the Crisis and praise for Khrushchev's deference to Cuban sovereignty in securing U.S. assurance against any subsequent invasion of Cuba. Lippmann's observation that the U.S.-USSR deal carried a *de facto* acceptance of Castro was well-received and taken to be indicative of an end to the terminal brinksmanship which provoked the Crisis despite entrenched opposition and mutual distrust.

In the fifth and final episode, media attempted to place the Crisis in a broader context but, again, refrained from any reorientation of the independent narrative and any urge to bring it in line with the U.S. narrative. This occurred despite broad commendation for JFK's overall handing of the Crisis. Media saw room for repaired Cuba-U.S. relations

through dialogue despite wounded pride on both sides. Cuban involvement in the Crisis did not provoke media censure or shake its homage to the island's sovereignty. However, it did produce collective agreement that some verdict on the Revolution and Castro in particular had finally been rendered. Still, media recognized that despite considerable damage to Castro's reputation following the Crisis he nevertheless retained some symbolic currency in Latin America. Castro's methods were perhaps inelegant but the underlying message of social reform against underdevelopment was as significant as relevant.

Overall, Anderson's argument for a "simpler and more complex" take on Castro and the Revolution in general spoke to this ideal of a final verdict emerging in the final episode and, indeed, the entire period of terminal brinksmanship in general. His suggestion that Castro lucked into victory in 1959 only to make the rest up as he went along defined the implicit disposition of media right from the start of the Revolution which, in turn, emphasized pragmatism over conspiracy at all times. Anderson's argument effectively found media's perspective (and Canadian policy more generally) to be validated: media endorsed the underlying spirit of the Revolution, right from Matthews' association between the struggle and deliverance for Cuba in 1957, and expressed patience with the practical manifestation of that sovereignty through Castro to a decreasing but measured extent.

CONCLUSIONS

Castro's greatest danger was — and is — in the cycle that his revolution brought upon itself: that is, widespread economic adjustment, followed by sacrifices imposed upon individual citizens, followed by repressive measures to enforce these sacrifices, followed by further repression against those who resist. Externally, the most depressing aspect of the Cuban situation is its demonstration that the United States, itself an old revolutionary, could not or would not live with the results of a legitimate revolution against a cruel, corrupt and unjustifiable dictatorship. For Castro's involvement in the Cold War between East and West was as much a product of American policy as it was of his own irresponsible emotionalism.

— Andrew MacFarlane, "Whoever Wins Now, Cuban Lives Are Being Squandered," *Toronto Telegram*, 18 Apr. 1961[199]

Jules Dubois' foundational analytical imperative, as to whether Fidel Castro should be classified as a dictator or liberator, or its more common appearance as pragmatist or communist, remains as fruitless and irrelevant as it is popular. Castro defies all labels. Castro wears all labels. Both statements proceed from sound logic and a mountain of flexible empirical evidence that journalists and scholars alike have pored over from the first day of the Revolution in 1959. The answer, as Gerald Clark observed in December 1962, is firmly and permanently within the realm of "academic debate" as it is essentially unresolvable. More than sixty years have passed since this observation and Alan Anderson's appeal for a "simpler and more complex" view of Castro (backed by

Welch's systematic dismissal of the primary Castro myths) and his Revolution remains just about the only true resolution.

Perhaps the best way of exorcizing Dubois' imperative, which has gone on to haunt every study since 1959, is to concede that Castro has kept "two sets of books" — to borrow a personal anecdote from Christopher Hitchens' memoir, *Hitch-22* (2010). In one set, Castro is the relentless force behind Cuba's postcolonial identity, industry, and pride; in the other set, he is an absolute authority whose uncompromising obsession with the imperialist threat (and personal longevity) subjected Cubans to a prolonged era of hardship, isolation, and sacrifice. This is literally true in Castro's case: not only are most studies unable to reconcile the simultaneous accuracy of both realities (and, as a result, generally end up taking a side) a great number of them proceed from a predetermined position. As such, they take no interest in attempting further the discussion and only aim to increase the level of noise and division. This lack of nuance has been a great gift to publishers but discourteous to history and a disservice to the legacy of the Revolution and Cuba's relations with the rest of the world.[200]

While the full breadth and scope of the elite Canadian print media construction of Castro and the Revolution came to fill a full spectrum of perspectives between 1956 and 1962 it was, primarily characterized by respect for nuance. What Castro called himself or what he came to be associated with remained ultimately less interesting and less relevant than what he achieved. He achieved an unprecedented transformation of his country while surviving a statistically unlikely more-than-proverbial thumbing-of-the-nose at the

centre of power in the world. In all ancient parables, no barbarian or provincial insurgent succeeded in taunting empire — let alone wooing its imperial foil into an economically unfeasible and politically compromising partnership — and lived to tell about it (unless the empire had already set the seeds of its own destruction, to be sure). Of course, the terms of that independence for Cuba have been less than endearing or sustainable but it counts for something nevertheless. Media certainly thought so and its collective respect for nuance underscored the story of its independent narrative. This was a narrative media produced despite Canada's cultural identification and military integration with the U.S., immense popular and political pressure from the U.S. to follow their course, and Castro's own pervasive effort to craft an attractive narrative of his own.

The roots of this independent narrative begin with media's implicit adoption of Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative in February 1957 that emphasized the idea of postcolonial deliverance for Cuba suffering under a brutal tyranny. While media did not follow Matthews' emphasis on Castro as the single-means of this deliverance it came to identify Batista as the antagonist and called for his ouster for the good of all Cubans. When Castro suddenly seized power in January 1959, media were taken with his charm but more elated over Cuba's release from tyranny. As Castro blundered into a series of miscalculations over the course of the year, media gave him the benefit of the doubt on his balance of earnest intentions and his massive popularity. Shortly into 1960, media rescinded this benefit over increasing dissatisfaction with Castro's deliberate provocations. At the same time, the U.S. became equally provocative. With any

reconciliation with either narrative impossible, media retreated to the core theme of Matthews' narrative. As Cuba-U.S. relations moved from an untenable course to terminal brinksmanship following the failed Bay of Pigs, media bolstered this with an emphasis on dialogue. Dialogue offered a defence of Canadian trade policy with Cuba, encouraged further Cuban association with the USSR, and provided a critique of America's policy of isolationism.

The unifying factor throughout this evolution was an homage to Cuban sovereignty, the practical and logical manifestation of Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative. At no point, between 1956 and 1962 did media lay any claim to any right to tell Cubans how to govern themselves or with whom they were permitted to maintain relations. Media certainly had opinions and preferences as to how Castro should act or conduct himself but this did not translate into the idea that he and Cubans should benefit from the sort of "uplifting" described by Shoultz. It must be recognized that this did not proceed from any deep-seated anti-Americanism. Endorsement of Matthews' *prewar* victory narrative was an expressly pro-American position, given his conflation between the Revolution and liberal values. Refusal to follow the U.S. narrative was actually informed by the speed with which U.S. opinion turned, the level of hostility expressed, and the general assumption that the United States should be held, and hold itself to, a better standard than bullying a relatively poor, marginal neighbour.

In pursuing this independent narrative, media provided an interesting historical argument for nuance. Attempting to reconcile Castro's opposing sets of books was

irrelevant. Trying to parse the U.S. narrative or settle for its less objectionable tenets was unnecessary. Perhaps neither Castro nor the U.S. were qualified to view their longstanding disagreement objectively. Perhaps the more important matter has always been Cuba's struggle for postcolonial independence. The present historiographical consensus certainly bears this out. Overall, the 'math' on the well-established research into the development of Canadian Cuban policy resolves satisfactorily and is appropriately both "simpler and more complex".

NOTES

[1] Herbert L. Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," *New York Times*, 24 Feb. 1957: 1.

[2] Anthony DePalma, *The Man Who Invented Fidel* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006) 80. There are four opening disclaimers about terminology that must be dispensed with immediately. First, this study observes the formal Canadian convention of referring to the Cuban Revolution as a proper noun, adopted by Robert Wright in *Three Nights in Havana* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007) and other Canadian scholars. Similarly, reference to Fidel Castro as *El Comandante* is preferred but for the sake of brevity is often simply reduced to "Cuban leader" or "Castro" without any intended ideological pretension or intentional informality. Second, this study employs the word "construction" as a basic verb free of theoretical context as a catch all term for the myriad ways in which media represent, alter, change, perpetuate, elevate, deconstruct, tarnish, legislate, destroy, and create images and impressions. It appears here in only the most basic sense and as an operative allusion to methodology (see following section for further details). Third, the unruly and inelegant "elite Canadian print media" is generally truncated to simply "media" and concurrent references to "U.S. press" generally appear as such. Fourth and lastly, the word "populist" is used in selective reference to the general political disposition of M-26-7 prior to the Revolution (which drifted significantly thereafter following increasingly hostile disagreements with the Cuban middle-class).

[3] Wright 50.

[4] Tom Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture* (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995) 10 and 113.

[5] Media were collectively disappointed with the American reaction to Castro as much as they were disappointed with Castro's failure to live up to expectations (after a year of patience in good faith) and his calculated provocations. As such, media's adoption of Castro as a various means of exploring anxiety about American power does not follow the description of a deeply ingrained pathological resentment for the U.S. outlined by J.L. Granatstein in *Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996), which remains a significantly pro-American review of anti-Americanism in Canada. A broader reading of media during this period finds anxiety about America endemic to anxiety about power itself (certainly proximity to that power). Indeed, anxiety about USSR power was entirely similar, if less prevalent according to Canada's considerably underdeveloped relationship which was framed, of course, by distance and a lack of shared history. Overall, none of the paper's examine in this study betrayed anything more than an objection to U.S. policy positions (clearly informed by higher, neighbourly expectations) than anything else. Two papers specifically, the *Halifax Chronicle-Herald* and the *Winnipeg Free Press*, were overwhelmingly pro-American often regardless of context.

[6] Research for this study included a modest review of RG-25 files in order to at least play out the possibility of media influence on inter-governmental calculus as well as governmental accounts in *Hansard*. Vol. 7059, for example, which includes ambassadorial reports from Havana between 1955 and 1963 indeed meets the historiographical perception that Ottawa was using increased interest in Cuba (and a presence despite the termination of U.S. relations) as a platform for developing a broader interest in Latin American affairs; see Don Munton and David Vogt "Inside Castro's Cuba: The Revolution and Canada's Embassy in Havana," in *Our Place in the Sun in the Castro Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

Examination of policy and public reaction, generally focused through Diefenbaker, remain a growing historiographical trend in graduate work particularly, see Collette Caines, "John Diefenbaker, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Canadian press," diss., Canadian History / History (University of New Brunswick, 2005); Melanie Paquette, "Canadian and Quebec public opinion on the Cuban Missile Crisis," diss., Canadian History / International Law, (Royal Military College, 2005); Caralee Daigle Hau, "A Challenge and a Danger: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis," diss., History (Queen's University, 2011).

[7] Ian Milligan, "Illusionary Order: Online Databases, Optical Character Recognition, and Canadian History, 1997-2010," *Canadian Historical Review* 94.4 (2013): 540-569, 542.

[8] The first perhaps self-described conference on "media history" in Canada was held in Toronto in 2006 and went on to inspire a collect on of essays, edited by Gene Allen and Daniel J. Robinson, entitled *Communicating in Canada's Past: Essays in Media History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). It includes important historiographical reflections from Paul Rutherford and Mary Vipond, the most widely published and influential scholars of the history of mass media in Canada.

[9] Perhaps the best, most recent example of studies which take advantage of this is Meera Nair's article, "The Copyright Act of 1889: A Canadian Declaration of Independence," *Canadian Historical Review* 90.1 (2009) which is presently the only detailed examination of domestic copyright and intellectual property by a Canadian historian. Contrast Nair's article with Ryan Edwardson's otherwise exceptional study of Canadian cultural protectionism in *Canadian Content: Culture and the Quest for Nationhood* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) which is part of a more established cultural analysis of media; Paul Rutherford, *When Television Was Young: Primetime Canada, 1952-1967* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), and Valerie Korinek, *Roughing It in the Suburbs* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

[10] These papers also comprise a diverse and representative sample of contemporary media ownership. For example, Southam ownership of the *Citizen* makes inclusion of the *Calgary Herald* and the *Edmonton Journal* ultimately redundant given the former's more prominent location, integration into federal affairs, and greater resources.

[11] See "Encounters with Theory," in *Communicating in Canada's Past*, 273.

[12] The syndication of certain content generally qualifies as a function of the "propaganda model" presented by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002) as it pertains to editorial influence, specifically ownership. See also Jill Lapore, "The Lie Factory," *New Yorker*, 24 Sept. 2012. Additionally, background for this study included an extensive review of the historiography of U.S. media through course work, including James B. Reston,"The Press, The President and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 44.4 (1966): 553-573, Russ Braley, *Bad News: The Foreign Policy of The New York Times* (Chicago: Regenery Gateway, Inc., 1984), Joseph C. Goulden, *Fit to Print: A.M. Rosenthal and His Times* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1988), Nicholas O. Berry, *Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of The New York Times' Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), Brian Buckley, *The News Media and Foreign Policy: An Exploration* (Halifax: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998), Max Frankel, *The Times of My Life and My Life with The Times* (New York: Random House, 1999), Susan E. Tifft and Alex S. Jones., *The Trust: The Private and Powerful Family Behind the New York Times* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1999), Howard Friel and Richard Falk, *The Record of the Paper: How the* New York Times *misrepresents U.S. foreign policy* (London: Verso, 2004). This sources inform conclusions about the editorial role of syndicated content but also provide a general framework for viewing Matthews' interview with Castro and the *Times*' efforts to distance itself from it and him over the proceeding years.

[13] Milligan 542-3. This paragraph is inspired by Milligan's call for increased transparency among historians which access OCR material, particularly as it may aid future researchers.

[14] Tad Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Perennial, 1986) 37.

[15] Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990). The anecdote about Pérez is borrowed from Lars Shoultz in *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic* (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009) 2.

[16] Pérez 54, 40, 107, and 117. Pérez would perhaps hasten to add that this collision was not contingent upon the Revolution and could have potentially been triggered by any number of earlier developments.

[17] Pérez 25, 8, 22, and 43.

[18] Pérez xvi-xvii, 154, and 71-80, and 159.

[19] Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 3, 9, and 12. While Paterson stated that his study extends from the late 1950s through to the early 1990s, he did not provide a substantive analysis of relations beyond 1960. His research imperative, however, aligned his work with a small minority of studies that escape compromising ideological preoccupations. This, and his comprehensive research, left *Contesting Castro* perhaps the most proficient and forthright study of the immediate U.S. response to Castro leading up to, and following, the Revolution.

[20] Paterson 79, 242, 84 and 103, 246, 178, 157, and 178-9.

[21] Paterson 108 and 186, 260-2, and 22.

[22] John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, *The Other Good Neighbour Policy: Canada-Cuba Relations* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1997) 5, 38-9, 9, 3 and 4. Diefenbaker's "aversion" to JFK proceeds from four points according to Kirk and McKenna: JFK's lack of interest in Canada, his tactless efforts to force Canada to follow the U.S. lead, his standing disagreement with Diefenbaker on nuclear weapons, and JFK's amiable relationship with Lester Pearson, see 38-9.

[23] Kirk and McKenna 178 and 177, 64 and 53, 17, and 9.

[24] Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 123, 23, 131, 169, 30, 39, and 78.

[25] Jamie Glazov, *Canadian Policy Toward Khruschev's Soviet Union* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) 106, 117, 121 and 144, 140, xv, and 15. Glazov's stated research imperative was neither Canada-Cuba relations nor Canada-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, his study has been widely cited by Cuba historians as a *de facto* review of Diefenbaker's Cuba policy; see xii-xiii.

[26] William LeoGrande "The United States and Cuba: Strained Engagement," McGillion "Inter-Alliance Conflict," Kirk and McKenna "Sleeping with the Elephant," and Morley "Reconnecting with Cuba," in *Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Morris Morley and Chris McGillion (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2005) x, 1 and 3, 13, 104 and 155, 133 and 155, and 199. Kirk and McKenna go on to note that the EU eventually agreed, in part, to a revised American proposal where Canadian opposition remained firm, see 166-8.

[27] Wright 18 and 19. The broader context of Trudeau's trip to Cuba was a shared conviction among Canadians and Europeans that the U.S. was on the cusp of normalizing relations in the mid-1970s. As Wright noted: "[Trudeau] went to Beijing, and Nixon followed. He went to Moscow and Nixon followed. When he decided to go to Havana in 1976, he had every reason to believe that the U.S. President would follow him there as well", see 132 and 143.

[28] Wright 43 and 58, 64 and 65, 83. In general, Washington was more irked with the blatant opportunism of Canadian businesses than Diefenbaker, see 68. Wright's other historiographical observation, not expressly relevant to this study but important for context, is that Castro did not consult the USSR on Angola. This also underscores the rejection of the theses dismissed by Paterson, see 193.

[29] Dennis Molinaro, "Calculated Diplomacy: John Diefenbaker and the Origins of Canada's Cuba Policy," Don Munton and David Vogt "Inside Castro's Cuba: The Revolution and Canada's Embassy in Havana," and Cynthia Wright "Between Nation and Empire: The Fair Play Committees and the Making of Canada-Cuba Solidarity in the Early 1960s," in Robert Wright and Lana Wylie, *Our Place in the Sun in the Castro Era* 18, 90 and 91, 49 and 58, 98 and 100-1. Molinaro underscored this by observing that Diefenbaker continued to sell arms to Batista (in violation of non-intervention) and generally overstated his relationship with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which other scholars have taken at face value, see 83 and 76. See also: Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, "Did He Fall or was He Pushed?: The Kennedy Administration and the Collapse of the Diefenbaker Government," *International History Review*, 1.2 (1979): 246-270.

[30] Mark Entwhistle "Canada-Cuba Relations: A Multiple-Personality Foreign Policy," Kirk and McKenna "Canada-Cuba Relations: Muddling Through the Special Period," Hal Klepak, "Canada, Cuba, and Latin America: A Paradoxical Relationship," Robert Wright, "'Northern Ice': Jean Chrétien and the Failure of Constructive Engagement in Cuba," and Lana Wylie "Ambassador MD: The Role of Health and Biotechnology in Cuban Foreign Policy," in *Our Place in the Sun* 24 and 287, 22, 217, and 224-7. David Sheinin's "Cuba's Long Shadow: The Progressive Church Movement and Canadian-Latin American Relations," arrived at a similar conclusion to Klepak and Entwhistle in his specific examination of the Progressive Church Movement (PCM) in Cuba, see 121.

[31] Larz Shoultz, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic* (Durham, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009) 4, 6, 5, 7, 8, 9, 553, and 566-7. Shoultz suggested that President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) steered U.S. isolation of Cuba away form wasteful schemes toward opportunistic "nut-pinching" or a low-rent effort to oppose Castro at every opportunity without, necessarily, inventing them, see 10. While he challenged Pérez and Paterson on their respective conclusions, the former's focus on agency and the latter's largely open-ended question as to why the U.S. would tolerate the loss of its client, but upheld their basis of their respective studies. Alex von Tunzleman's *Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2011) has since complimented Shoultz by examining Cuba policy within the broader context of Latin America.

[32] Shoultz's exposition of successive presidential policy toward Cuba is worth annotating. Where "nut-pinching" ultimately won out over JFK's more elaborate state sponsored terrorism, "mutual hostility" under Richard Nixon did not spark any significant break from LBJ (though Shoultz added that a full review of this awaits as-yet declassified documents); Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter both explored détente in their own way, with Carter coming the closest; Ronald Reagan abandoned a firmer policy shift, amid a broader regional outreach, and ignored Cuban invitations to negotiate; George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton were made to politicize Cuba as an appeal to the exile community, despite Congressional interest in reviewing Cuba, and instituted the largest escalation of "nut-punching" with Clinton's Helms-Burton act; Clinton's half-hearted emphasis on democratic reform was pressed into an explicitly hostile terms under George W. Bush amid the institution of a harsher Cuba policy into the 2000s; see 240, 247, 268 and 304, 368 and 384, 435 and 458, 515.

[33] Schoultz 101, 162, and 185.

[34] Lana Wylie, *Canadian and American Policies in Comparative Perspective* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) x, 4, 11, 17-18, 20 and 22, 27, 55, 59, and 93.

[35] Wylie 17 and 115.

[36] See, for example, Don Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, *The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy, Khruschev, Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), and John Graham's *Whose Man in Havana?: Adventures from the Far Side of Diplomacy* (Newcastle, ON: Penumbra Press, 2013).

[37] The term "movie star dictator" comes from Ann Louise Bardach's *Cuba Confidential: Love and Vengeance in Miami and Havana* (New York: Random House, 2002), see 223. Of course, this begrudging indifference holds in a general sense but it is not maintained by the exile community and certain well-known Washington policy shops. It is also occasionally revoked during American presidential campaigns, especially if the Democratic presidential nominee intends to carry Florida. Nevertheless, it does hold: compare Castro's image in American popular culture with Iranian or North Korean leaders or any number of stateless adversaries that occupy the U.S. State Department's most wanted list.

[38] References to the Castro mass market publishing craze, here and in following, refer to the Anglosphere *only*. There were already a number of Spanish-language books about Castro in circulation prior to those earliest accounts discussed in this review.

[39] Jules Dubois, *Fidel Castro: Rebel — Liberator or Dictator?* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959). Dubois' narrative hit shelves at virtually the same time as its namesake had already set a course that would provoke entirely opposite assessments and conclusions less than a year later.

[40] Notwithstanding, of course, more immersive narratives about life in Cuba styled after Ernest Hemingway and his romantic associations with writing and life on the island. A superb example of Dubois' narrative shift into autobiographical detail occurs on page 353, where he pulls Castro into a discussion about his portrayal in the American press.

[41] As one earlier review put it, with direct reference to U.S. military support to Batista, Dubois' "...conclusion that if Castro has failed to understand [America's] behaviour, it is not entirely his fault, and that if [America has] failed to understand him, that, too is not his fault." See Blaine Littell, "Top Commando of the Cuban Coup," *Saturday Review*, 4 Apr. 1959: 21.

[42] Dubois' preface to *Fidel Castro*, written in February 1959, offered a stern caricature of the "Latin-American dictator" form which he specifically exempts Castro. Despite this, and the nuance applied toward the Cuba-U.S. relationship in 1959, Dubois shifted his own position, following *Fidel Castro* just a few years later with, *Operation America: Beyond Cuba — The Inside Story of the Communist Plan to Subvert Latin America* (New York: Walker and Company, 1963).

[43] Herbert L. Matthews, *The Cuban Story* (New York: G. Braziller, 1961) 15. Part of the reason that Matthews struggled to reconcile his internal distinction between Castro in theory and Castro in practice was that he proved unable to explicitly acknowledge it as such. While he draws on comments from Jaime Benitez (Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico) in 1961, that make an early distinction between the "Cuban Revolution" and "Fidelismo" (61-62), he went on to attempt a synthesis in order to produce a single, non-contradictory conclusion. The other part of Matthews' difficulty in this respect derived from the fact that he would not permit his characterizations of Castro and his followers to commit hypocrisy. In short, it could be said that the idea of electing to opt out of Dubois' liberator *or* dictator imperative in favour of nuance escaped Matthews entirely.

[44] Matthews' thoughts on his 'true belief' are most cogent on page 40; they occur within a broader meditation on the Cuban Revolution than spans pages 39-44 of *The Cuban Story*.

[45] Matthews' most notable later works are the poorly-timed follow up to *The Cuban Story*, *Fidel Castro* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969) his more methodical attempt at a comprehensive biography in *Revolution in Cuba: An Essay in Understanding* (New York: Scribner, 1975).

[46] These two examples are taken from 164 and 89, respectively, of *The Cuban Story*. Matthews' sense of embarrassment with his government derived from his values as an American citizen. In not supporting what Matthews perceived the most American of causes — revolution toward deliverance from tyranny — his government committed a far greater error than anything Castro might have intimated against the United States in the service of appealing to the baser, nationalistic or "anti-Yankee" instincts of his countrymen, see 28.

[47] Matthews' observation that no one outside of the United States accepted the "American thesis" about Cuba proceeded from humility. It went hand-in-hand with his counter-critique of his peers and recurrent appeals to future historians; this is what makes Matthews' work so critical to the study of Castro's Cuba, see 115.

[48] Discussion of Raúl and Che communist sympathies and their subsequent impact on Castro occurs on 74.

[49] Ruby Hart Phillips, *The Cuban Dilemma* (New York: Obolensky, 1962). Phillips' articles were published under the byline of "R. Hart Phillips" in order to escape criticism from a reading public unaccustomed to female journalists — or, more specifically, female journalists not only serving as the de facto bureau chief but also writing almost exclusively on matters of foreign affairs. This, and her prolonged dispute with Matthews (beginning with her arrangement of Matthews' exclusive interview with Castro), have been insightfully chronicled by Anthony DePalma in *The Man Who Invented Fidel*.

[50] Phillips' command of these statistics is firm but the statistics themselves are questionable.

[51] *The Cuban Dilemma* 352, 339, and 356. Matthews was often critical of Phillips' lack of "enthusiasm" for Castro and the Cuban Revolution, see 99. Phillips' theory of Castro's efforts to sabotage relations with the U.S. hit its stride in her seventh chapter, see 110. It is less apparent whether Phillips believed that Castro always intended to collude with the Soviets or simply decided to at a later date. Phillips was less adventurous and analytical in this respect than Matthews, despite Matthews' own issues, and was rather cavalier about the fact that she preferred Cuba under Batista.

[52] Robert Taber's *M-26: Biography of Revolution* (New York: L. Stuart, 1961) and C. Wright Mills, *Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960).

[53] Richard E. Welch Jr., *Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985) 3, 14, 16, 18, and 3. In Welch's estimation, the moderate faction was represented by Hubert Matos and Camilo Cienfuegos while the radical faction is represented by Raúl and Che, see 15.

[54] Welch 11 and 9-10.

[55] Welch 11. See, for example, former Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith's *From the Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1962)

[56] Welch 37, 103-115, 116-137, and 160-182. See also: "Herbert L. Matthews and the Cuban Revolution Revolution," *Historian*, 47.1 (1984): 1-18.

[57] See Leychester Coltman's "Select Biography" in *The Real Fidel Castro* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003) 323.

[58] Szulc 11-12, 25, and 39. Essentially, Szulc left it to his readers to prioritize and other profilers and scholars to adjudicate over which reality held the most truth or, again, some combination thereof. A more precise discussion of Castro's "contradiction and paradox" regarding communism occurs on pages 184 and 214.

[59] Szulc 51, 21, and 463.

[60] Szulc 453, 417, and 472.

[61] Szulc 506 and 537-8. Paterson's far more grounded analysis in *Contesting Castro* ultimately bares this out (despite proceeding from a different basis).

[62] See John P. Wallach "Fidel Castro and the United States Press," Daniel Johnson "Castro's Fickle Friends," and Ratliff "The New York Times and the Cuban Revolution," in *The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban Revolution*, ed William E. Ratliff (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc., 1987). John R. Silber's preface described Castro as a "mystery" who was primarily interesting for being both "dangerous" and for having "defied" the U.S. and "lived to tell", see vii and ix.

[63] Ratliff 21, 3 and 5-7, 129-130, 134, 135, 149, 183-184, and 159. Contrast this with the broader conclusions of Morley and McGillion's later collection in the section above.

[64] George Anne Geyer, *Guerrilla Prince: The Untold Story of Fidel Castro* (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1991) x and xvi.

[65] Geyer xv, 36, and 14.

[66] Geyer 224, 393, and 392.

[67] Susan Eva Eckstein *Back From the Future: Cuba under Castro* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) xi, 58, 4, 212, and 15-24.

[68] Seymour Hersh, *The Dark Side of Camelot* (New York: Back Bay, 1998) 3, 178, 24, 283, and 451. Hersh's crossover narrative was a notable departure from the otherwise separate groups of narratives that emphasize Castro and JFK's brief encounter with one another, forcing them to reenact 1960 to 1962 out in redundant perpetuity. The most recent example of this crossover narrative is perhaps Jim Rasenberger's *The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs* (New York: Scribner, 2011).

[69] "Words and Images: Press Coverage of Fidel Castro in *The New York Times*, 1953-1992," and Sonderlund, Ronald H. Wagenberg, and Stuart H. Surlin "The End of the Cold War?: Cuba as Seen on North American TV Network News, 1988-1992," in *Media Definitions of Cold War Reality: The Caribbean Basin, 1953-1992*, ed. Walter C. Sonderlund (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, Inc., 2001) 33, 22-7, and 257.

[70] Louis A. Pérez Jr., "Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34.2 (2002): 227-254 231, 251, 233, 239, and 243.

[71] Julia Sweig, *Inside the Cuban Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) 3-7, 7, and 1. Specifically, Sweig suggested that "the lion's share of decisions...were made by lesser known individuals from the urban underground — not Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, or his brother Raúl Castro." See 29 and 44 for further reference.

[72] Ann Louise Bardach, *Cuba Confidential* 225, 230, 126, and 248.

[73] Coltman 141, 27, 219, 15, 306, and 188.

[74] Don Bohning, *The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965* (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005) x, 1, and 2. Howard Jones' *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) offered a similar review of U.S. covert operations, especially as an extension of the same reconstruction trend as Bohning's earlier narrative.

[75] Bohning 10-11, 116, 4, 129 and 134, and 260.

[76] DePalma 4 and 266.

[77] DePalma 30, 80, 130-131, 136, and 159.

[78] Ann Louise Bardarch, *Without Fidel: A Death Foretold in Miami, Havana, and Washington* (New York: Scribner, 2009) and Michael Casey, *Che's Afterlife: The Legacy of an Image* (New York: Vintage Books, 2009).

[79] Andrew MacFarlane, "Sweet Cuba Smell Is Sugar Sabotage," *Toronto Telegram*, 19 Feb. 1958: 1, 4.

[80] The most detailed of these AP reports published prior to Castro's landing appeared under three different headlines in as many papers and with fairly prominent placement: "Crush Revolt in Cuba After Two-Hour Battle," *Globe and Mail*, 1 Dec. 1956: 2; "Les troupes de Batista écrasent un soulèvement civil à Cuba," *Le Devoir*, 1 Dec. 1956: 9; and "Cuban Forces Crush Revolt Attempt," *Montreal Gazette*, 1 Dec. 1956: 2. Wire reports following Castro's landing appeared as "Cuban Rebels Making Way in From Coast," *Globe and Mail*, 4 Dec. 1956: 9, and "Cuba Army in Clashes with Rebels," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 Dec. 1956: 1 (from which the second quotation derives). While the handful of sporadic reports of engagement between insurgent and military forces are perhaps best represented by "Kill 8 Cuba Rebels," *Toronto Star*, 18 Jan. 1957: 52 and "La Havane : sanglant engagement entre armée et rebelles," *Le Devoir*, 19 Jan. 1957: 9. The former report perpetuates the description of Castro as a "...a former student university leader" while the latter describes him similarly. Neither, of course, purport to verify his involvement or whereabouts.

[81] "Rebel Chief Alive in Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 25 Feb. 1957: 2, and "Lift Censorship," *Toronto Star*, 27 Feb. 1957: 12. Whereas editorial staff were willing to run Matthews' series without comment, one R.W. Becker of Willowdale wrote to find Matthews' estimation of rebel influence over Santiago, Holguin, and Manzanillo, and the prevalence of bombings in those cities to be "in error" (having flown out of Santiago on 16 February for Havana). Becker, nevertheless, went on to suggest that prospective Canadian tourists would be wise visit Havana instead. Interestingly, Becker's critique not only predated the publication of any explicitly *Canadian* estimation of Castro but also eerily prefigured much of the main thrust of criticism directed toward Matthews beginning in early 1959; see "Events in Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Feb. 1957: 6.

[82] "Cuban Rebels Fight Back Against Batista's Regime," *Globe and Mail*, 25 Feb. 1957: 1-2 (originally published as "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," *New York Times*, 24 Feb. 1957: 1, 34); "Batista Has Backing of Army and Police in Fight with Rebels," *Globe and Mail*, 25 Feb. 1957: 11 (originally published as "Rebel Strength Gaining in Cuba, But Batista Has the Upper Hand," *New York Times*, 25 February 1957: 1, 11); and "Old Order in Cuba Threatened for First Time," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Feb. 27: 12 (originally published as "Old Order in Cuba is Threatened by Forces of an Internal Revolt," *New York Times*, 26 Feb. 1957: 13).

[83] Media constructions of individuals and events all occurred in a similar manner; however, passing on the opportunity to co-opt or parse Matthews for Canadians made their respective piecemeal decisions to opine on Cuban affairs, from March 1957 to December 1958, all that more interesting. Of course, at this time, there was little reason to suspect Castro would survive let alone run the island for well-over half a century.

[84] See, for example, in order of reference: "40 Die, 60 Hurt, Tanks Crush Students in Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 14 Mar. 1957: 23; "Anti-Batista Forces Boycott Big Cuba Rally," *Globe and Mail*, 1 Jul. 1957: 8; "Garanties Suspendues à Cuba," *La Presse*, 1 Aug. 1957: 1, "Cuba Rebel is Fighting Nerve War," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Aug. 1957: 1 (concurrently published as "Cuban Rebels Launch War of Nerves Against Batista," *Montreal Gazette*, 6 Aug. 1957: 9, and "Nerve War on Batista," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 Aug. 1957: 1); "Cuban Troops Claim Revolt Suppressed," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Sept. 1957: 1; "La bataille fait rage á Cienfuegos," *Le Devoir*, 6 Sept. 1957: 1; "Fire Attacks Increase on Cuba Sugar Crop," *Globe and Mail*, 29 Nov. 1957: 9 (concurrently published as "Cuba Rebels Fire Sugar Crop Again," *Montreal Gazette*, 29 Nov. 1957: 9); and, Larry Allen, "Cuba Seethes With Rumors of Revolt Despite Prosperity," *Globe and Mail*, 22 Apr. 1957: 3. *Globe* sportswriter Al Nickelson's brief comments about the potential impact of political tensions on visiting athletes and a non-political interview with the family of Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, Hector Allard, were just about the only other items of interest; see "Cuban Unrest Gives Leafs the Jitters," *Globe and Mail*," 27 Jul. 1957: 1, and "Ambassador's Family Holiday on Farm Here," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 Jul. 1957: 14, 18.

[85] "Nationalism Growing in Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 16 Mar. 1957: 6; "Politics Over the Sun," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 Mar. 1957: 9; "A Sensitive Dictator," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 7 Aug. 1957: 9; "Curtains For Another Dictator?," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Sept. 1957: 6. The *Free Press* editorial regarding the state of tourism in Cuba was a direct response to an interview with a Canadian couple regarding their harassment by the Cuban military amid a search for insurgent forces during their recent vacation, see Maggie Grant, "Canadians in Cuba Forcibly Reminded of Threat of Civil War," *Globe and Mail*, 8 Mar. 1957: 1. Elsewhere, the first of Phillips' pieces addressed the aftermath of Matthews' interview in Cuba, see R. Hart Phillips, "N.Y. Times Interview Becomes Cuban Issue," *Globe and Mail*, 02 Mar. 1957: 21.

[86] See, for example, the most important articles (grouped by month): "Cuba Rebels Kidnap Auto Racer," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Feb. 1958: 1; "Fangio Released by Cuban Rebels," *Montreal Gazette*, 25 Feb. 1958: 20; "Cuba: raid audacieux des rebelles sur la Banque nationale," *Le Devoir*, 27 Feb. 1958: 5; "Fidel Castro Rebels Burn Bus in Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 27 Feb. 1958: 23 (February); "Cuban Leader Tries to Form New Cabinet," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Mar. 1958: 9; "Call Up 7,700 To Avert Strike By Cuban Rebels," *Globe and Mail*, 10 Mar. 1958: 21; "Garanties de droit suspendues à Cuba," *La Presse*, 12 Mar. 1958: 1; "Thousands Ask Batista Quit, Avoid Bloodshed," *Globe and Mail*, 18 Mar. 1958: 8 (run concurrently as "Cuba Manifesto: 'Resign Batista'," *Montreal Gazette*, 18 Mar. 1958: 1); "Cuba Defers General Election," *Globe and Mail*, 21 Mar. 1958: 8; "Rebels Poised For Major Drive Against Batista," *Globe and Mail*, 25 Mar. 1958: 2; "Un soulèvement général paraît imminent à Cuba," *Le Devoir*, 31 Mar. 1958: 1 (March); "Cuban Rebels Open 'Total War' Phase," *Toronto Star*, 1 Apr. 1958: 14 (run concurrently as "'Total War' Launched in Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 2 Apr. 1958: 43); "Cuba Communists Back Rebels' Call for Strike: Good Friday Walkout Expected," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Apr. 1958: 1; "Castro: lutte à finir contre le régime Batista - Le président proclame l'état d'urgence et mobilize 38,000 hommes," *Le Devoir*, 5 Apr. 1958: 1; "Castro's Columns Pull Back Into Mountains," *Montreal Gazette*, 7 Apr. 1958: 2; "Cuba Rebel Bid Fails," *Montreal Gazette*, 10 Apr. 1958: 1; "Les rebelles sont écrasés à Santiago," *Le Devoir*, 11 Apr. 1958: 1; "2 Straight Flops For Cuba Rebel," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 Apr. 1958: 1; "Rebels Regroup as 'Total War' Fades in Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 14 Apr. 1958: 7; "Rebel Organization Tightened by Castro," *Globe and Mail*, 18 Apr. 1958: 1 (April).

[87] Larry Allen, "Batista: A Dictator on a Powder Keg," *Montreal Gazette*, 31 Mar. 1958: 25 (from which the quotes derive), "Castro Gains Reds," *Montreal Gazette*, 3 Apr. 1958: 1, "Cuban Rebel Columns March on City," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Apr. 1958: 4, "Cuba Acts to Curb Strike," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 Apr. 1958: 1, "Cuba Rebel Declares State of Total War," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Apr. 1958: 1, 2, "Rebels Said Fading Into Hills," *Globe and Mail*, 8 Apr. 1958: 1, 2, and "Cuba Revolt Fizzling Out Under Blows," *Globe and Mail*, 14 Apr. 1958: 1. The last report was essentially a hedge against the looming end of the rebellion and capture or death of Castro: "As the situation is now, Castro stands little chance of ousting Gen. Batista unless he wins the armed forces to his side or stirs up a popular uprising. Neither seems likely at the moment."

[88] Andrew MacFarlane, "Cubans Arrest, Quiz Tely Writer," *Toronto Telegram*, 10 Feb. 1958: 1, 2; "Edgy Cuban Police Admit Tely Writer Not Rebel," *Toronto Telegram*, 11 Feb. 1958: 1, 5; "Sweet Cuba Smell Is Sugar Sabotage," *Toronto Telegram*, 19 Feb. 1958: 1, 4; "Cuban Rebel Women Who Flirt With Death," *Toronto Telegram*, 21 Feb. 1958: 5; "Pepe Was Quite A Card," *Toronto Telegram*, 26 Feb. 1958: 44; "Cuba — An Economy Spinning On A Roulette Wheel," *Toronto Telegram*, 28 Feb. 1958: 14.

[89] Lloyd Lockhart, "'I'm No Dictator': Batista Says Nature on Side of Rebels," *Toronto Star*, 10 Feb. 1958: 3, and John D. Harbron, "The Men and Issues in Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Apr. 1958: 7. Lockhart's interview passed on opportunities to contextualize. For example, he let Batista's description of Castro as a "trouble-maker" and a "nuisance" stand without comment. As such, the *Star* effectively passed on the opportunity to editorialize on Cuban politics and Castro.

[90] Cuba Versus Its Dictator," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 Mar. 1958: 6, Tough but Shaky," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 Mar. 1958: 21, and "The showdown in Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 7 Apr. 1958: 21. The *Toronto Telegram* ran a safe editorial summary of Castro the same day as the *Free Press*' outspoken endorsement of Castro's strike, which remained an interesting point of contrast; see "Fidel Castro," *Toronto Telegram*, 7 Apr. 1958: 7.

[91] J. Halcro Ferguson, "What the Cuban Struggle Means," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 Apr. 1958: 13 (originally run in the *Observer*). The most significant examples from the *Times* were as follows: Homer Bigart, "Rebels Plot Sabotage in Cuban Industry," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Feb. 1958: 4, "Rebel offers Cuba Plan to End Civil War," *Globe and Mail*, 26 Feb. 1958: 1, 2, "Cuban Rebel Chief Boasts of Victory in Few Months," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Feb. 1958: 29, and "Castro Begins 'Total War'," *Montreal Gazette*, 3 Apr. 1958: 1; R. Hart Phillips, "Citizens' Guarantees Suspended in Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 13 Mar. 1958: 3, and "Cuba Rebels Distribute Weapons to Civilians," *Globe and Mail*, 31 Mar. 1958: 21. Apart from these, the *Star* ran wire pictorials of Castro in late January and early February that amounted to a form of foreign editorial content without accompanying domestic commentary, see "Guerilla Leader Holds Execution in Cuban Jungle," *Toronto Star*, 21 Jan. 1958: 7, "Cuban Rebel Castro Keeps Shooting Eye Sharp in Hideout," *Toronto Star*, 8 Feb. 1958: 7. The former set, taken by *Time* reporter Andrew St.George featured a picture of Castro trying and then executing a man for murder from his mountain hideout.

[92] See, for example, the most important articles (grouped by month): "Cuban Rebels Kidnap Eleven One Canadian," *Toronto Star*, 27 Jun. 1958: 1; "Cuban Rebels Promise to Release Canadians," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 Jun. 1958: 1, 21; "Treat With Rebels To Free Canadians," *Toronto Star*, 28 Jun. 1958: 1, 2; "Toronto Man Seized; Castro Now Holds 41," *Globe and Mail*, 30 Jun. 1958: 1, 2; "Third Canuck Nabbed By Rebels In Cuba Unharmed, Wife Says," *Toronto Star*, 30 Jun. 1958: 1, 3; and, "Cuban Rebels Now Hold 3 Canadians, 41 Yanks," *Toronto Telegram*, 30 Jun. 1958: 1, 2 (June); "Voices Deep Concern At Fate of Canadians," *Globe and Mail*, 1 Jul. 1958: 1, 2; "Freed Canadian Praises Captors," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Jul. 1958: 1; "U.S. Navy Halts Freedom Airlift," *Toronto Star*, 3 Jul. 1958: 1; "Cuban Rebels Delay Freeing Kidnap Victims," *Globe and Mail*, 4 Jul. 1958: 1, 2; "To Renew Parley With Cuban Rebels," *Toronto Star*, 5 Jul. 1958: 8; "Libération de 11 autres prisonniers," *La Presse*, 7 Jul. 1958: 1; "Cuban Rebels Keep Man From Toronto," *Toronto Star*, 10 Jul. 1958: 33; and, "Canadien libéré par les rebelles," *La Presse*, 10 Jul. 1958: 1.

[93] James Y. Nicol, "Rebels May Win Cuba by Kindness Canadian's View," *Toronto Star*, 3 Jul. 1958: 1, 14, "Another Canadian Freed, But Rebels Hold Toronto Man," *Toronto Star*, 7 Jul. 1958: 1, 7, and "Cuban Kidnapping One of Those Things Canadian Declares," *Toronto Star*, 12 Jul. 1958: 1, 2. Cannon's story left no doubt as to the orchestration of his capture and release: Batista was blamed for the group's abduction (ostensibly a protective measure by the rebels to safeguard foreigners), Castro was described as "pretty reasonable" who refused to let his men drink (designed to reinforce the professionalism of his forces), where Cannon failed to see any "Communists" and ended his post-release debrief with Nicol by joking that he might be a rebel, too. Raúl Castro's apology, which only ran in the *Gazette*, confirmed the abductions as a publicity stunt, see: "Raul Castro To Send Apology," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 Jul. 1958: 1.

[94] James Y. Nicol, "Seniorita Ines New Cuban Weapon," *Toronto Star*, 9 Jul. 1958: 36; "Yankee Sailor Likes Cuba Rebels," *Toronto Star*, 11 Jul. 1958: 28; and, "Cuba Fighter Pilot Annoys Uncle Sam," *Toronto Star*, 14 Jul. 1958: 46.

[95] "A Message to Castro?," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Jul. 1958: 5; "Castro Blunders," *Toronto Telegram*, 3 Jul. 1958: 5; and, "La Canada soudain touché par le régime de violence cubain," *La Presse*, 3 Jul. 1958: 4. If the *Globe* editorial was some circuitous means of suggesting that Washington might consult with Castro directly, it was too subtle to register, nor was it direct enough to rank as an endorsement of Castro via the historical parallel.

[96] See, for example, the most important articles (grouped by event): "Rebel Castro Starts Campaign To Kill Election," *Globe and Mail*, 28 Oct. 1958: 2; "Election précédée de violences; un Viscount s'écrase," *La Presse*, 3 Nov. 1958: 1, 10; "Batista's Candidate Takes Lead In Cuba: Violence Curbs Vote," *Globe and Mail*, 4 Nov. 1958: 1; "Seulement de 30 à 45 p.c. des Cubains ont voté," *Le Devoir*, 4 Nov. 1958: 1, 10; "Batista's Choice Scores 4-1 Victory In Cuba Vote," *Toronto Star*, 4 Nov. 1958: 3; "Cuba: vote contre les rebelles," *Le Devoir*, 5 Nov. 1958: 1; and, "Rivero Bids for Peace in Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Nov. 1958: 1 (election); "Cuban Army Thrust Aimed At Insurgents," *Globe and Mail*, 20 Dec. 1958: 3 (also run as: "Drive On Castro's Rebels Boosted By Cuban Army," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 Dec. 1958: 1); "Rebels Soon In Havana, Leader Says," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Dec. 1958: 1; "Civil War in Cuba On March," *Montreal Gazette*, 29 Dec. 1958: 1; "Climax In Cuban War Seen Near," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 29 Dec. 1958: 6; "Cuban Army And Rebels Fighting House to House: Batista May Go To Front," *Globe and Mail*, 30 Dec. 1958: 1, 2; "'At Triumph Door' Rebels Claim Havana Just About Cut Off," *Toronto Star*, 30 Dec. 1958: 2; "Cuban Casualties In Thousands; Rebels Predict Government's Fall: Both Sides Claiming Victory," *Globe and Mail*, 31 Dec. 1958: 1, 2; and, "Cuba Rebels Defeated In Bid For Santa Clara," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 31 Dec. 1958: 1, 2.

[97] Larry Allen, "Voters of Cuba In Search of Peace," *Montreal Gazette*, 3 Nov. 1958: 12, "Furious Battle in Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 Dec. 1958: 1, "Batista Doomed, Foes Say," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 Dec. 1958: 1, and "Santa Clara Saved In Savage Battle," *Toronto Telegram*, 31 Dec. 1958: 1, 2; Bill Bantey, "Agent In Flowered Shirt Checks Passengers For Guns At Airport," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 Dec. 1958: 27, "Cuba Dictator Lives in Armory," *Montreal Gazette*, 13 Dec. 1958: 5, and "Cubans Wonder What Is Happening," *Montreal Gazette*, 15 Dec. 1958: 14.

[98] "War on the Public," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Oct. 1958: 6, "Hollow Victory," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 4 Nov. 1958: 17, and "Successor To Cuba's Dictator," *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 Nov. 1958: 6; "Batista Vs. Castro," *Toronto Telegram*, 31 Dec. 1958: 6. Interestingly, the *Star* ran a wire pictorial profile of a few of Castro's rebels, by way of observing their diversity, on the same day but offered no further commentary, see "Cubans From Many Walks of Life Follow Castro," *Toronto Star*, 31 Dec. 1958: 7.

[99] John D. Harbron, "Economy Weakening Under Castro Revolt," *Globe and Mail*, 15 Dec. 1958: 7, and H. Reginald Hardy, "Castro Rebellion Inspired By Reds Visiting Cuban Senator Declares," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 Dec. 1958: 7.

[100] Russell Baker, "U.S. Doubts Batista Government Can Survive Rising Rebel Power," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Dec. 1958: 3; William L. Ryan, "Rebels Ruin Christmas for Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 22 Dec. 1958: 17, "Havana's Defeat Near Says Rebel," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 Dec. 1958: 2, and "Cuban Civil War Reaches Full Fury," *Montreal Gazette*, 30 Dec. 1958: 1; David Rowntree, "Castro Aims Closer To Realization," *Montreal Gazette*, 31 Dec. 1958: 1; R. Hart Phillips, "Gunfights, Sabotage," *Globe and Mail*, 4 Nov. 1958: 1, and "Rivero Aguero Wins; Losers Charge Fraud in Cuban Balloting," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Nov. 1958: 1.

[101] "'Stay, Fidel!'," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Jul. 1959: 6.

[102] Andrew MacFarlane, "Complete Victory," *Toronto Telegram*, 2 Jan. 1959: 1, 17; "Castro Puts Havana Under Martial Law," *Toronto Telegram*, 5 Jan. 1959: 1, 4; "Shaggy Heroes 'Own' Cuba Today," *Toronto Telegram*, 5 Jan. 1959: 4; "Terrible Blood Bath Threatened Havana," *Toronto Telegram*, 6 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "10 Batista Men Executed," *Toronto Telegram*, 7 Jan. 1959: 1 (former quote); "Salute for Canada, Advice for Trujillo," *Toronto Telegram*, 8 Jan. 1959: 1, 10; "Dove Flutters Down On Rebel Leader's Shoulder," *Toronto Telegram*, 9 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Firing Squad Barks Justice In Havana," *Toronto Telegram*, 10 Jan. 1959: 1, 4; "War Trials Halted In Cuban Province," *Toronto Telegram*, 13 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Stop All Executions Edict by Castro," *Toronto Telegram*, 14 Jan. 1959: 1, 4; "'Stop' Order Too Late to Save 72 Batista Men," *Toronto Telegram*, 14 Jan. 1959: 4; "Fight World To Punish Traitors Says Angry Castro," *Toronto Telegram*, 15 Jan. 1959: 1; "Protest Cuba Killings, MP Asks," *Toronto Telegram*, 16 Jan. 1959: 1; "'May Lose Friends With Executions'," *Toronto Telegram*, 17 Jan. 1959: 1, 2 (latter quotes); and, "'Resigned To Halt Further Killings'," *Toronto Telegram*, 22 Jan. 1959: 1, 2.

[103] Philip Deane, "Castro Men Hunt Down Batista Police," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Castro Personifies Hope In Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Jan. 1959: 3; "Quiet Havana Awaits Castro," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "New Master of Havana Impressive, Resolute," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Jan. 1959: 3; "Castro Aide Foils Rivals' Challenge," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Govern Cuba By Decree, No Vote For 18 Months," *Globe and Mail*, 7 Jan. 1959: 1; "Colorful Conference in Havana," *Globe and Mail*, 8 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Leaves Medicine To Be Guerrilla," *Globe and Mail*, 8 Jan. 1959: 3; "Victory Cavalcade Enters Havana, Delirious City Greets Fidel Castro," *Globe and Mail*, 9 Jan. 1959: 1, 2 (sixth quote); "Castro Locates Arms of Rivals," *Globe and Mail*, 10 Jan. 1959: 1, 2 (fourth and fifth quotes); "Castro Wins Back Arms In Rendezvous With Rebel Rival," *Globe and Mail*, 12 Jan. 1959: 1 (third quote); "Chilling Doubts," *Globe and Mail*, 14 Jan. 1959: 1 (first quote); and, "U.S. Told By Castro No Meddling in Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 16 Jan. 1959: 8.

[104] William Kinmond, "Star Writer Shown Results Of Torture By Batista's Police," *Toronto Star*, 5 Jan. 1959: 3; "Shut Casinos Call Elections Castro Pledge," *Toronto Star*, 6 Jan. 1959: 16; "Private Estates Get Castro Axe Farms For Poor," *Toronto Star*, 7 Jan. 1959: 1, 23 (second and third quotes); "Cuba Revolt 'Comic Opera' For Winners Might Serious And Costly For Losers," *Toronto Star*, 8 Jan. 1959: 33 (first quote); "Castro Cracks Down On Rivals, Fires 126 Mayors," *Toronto Star*, 9 Jan. 1959: 27; "$100,000 For Castro Plot," *Toronto Star*, 10 Jan. 1959: 3; and, "Seized Cuban Arms Hijackers' Victim Tries To End Own Life," *Toronto Star*, 12 Jan. 1959: 25. Kinmond dismissed rumours of Castro's interest in communism on the basis of his Catholic roots, a detail concurrently overlooked by his peers.

[105] Bruce West, "How Will Beardless Rebel Look?," *Globe and Mail*, 8 Jan. 1959: 19; "Havana Rouses Emotions," *Globe and Mail*, 16 Feb. 1959: 17; "Here's a 3-D Picture Of Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 17 Feb. 1959: 15; "In Havana, Revolution Looks Big," *Globe and Mail*, 18 Feb. 1959: 13; "Bucking Swashes With Flynn," *Globe and Mail*, 19 Feb. 1959: 23; "Castro May Eye New Fields," *Globe and Mail*, 20 Feb. 1959: 13; "Castro Stands By His Beard," *Globe and Mail*, 23 Feb. 1959: 17; "E. Flynn, Fellow Reporter," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Feb. 1959: 13; "These 4 Will No Longer Enjoy Beautiful Havana," *Globe and Mail*, 25 Feb. 1959: 15; "Cuba Gets Soldiers of Fortune," *Globe and Mail*, 26 Feb. 1959: 23; and, "Tourist Arrivals Brisk Again," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Feb. 1959: 3.

[106] Marie Moreau, "Sun Writer Visits Cuba's House of Death," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Cubans Cry For Blood of Batista Men," *Vancouver Sun*, 27 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Marie Watches As Cubans Demand Death For A Death," *Vancouver Sun*, 28 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "A Wild, Grim, Laughing Deadly Land," *Vancouver Sun*, 30 Jan. 1959: 3 (first two quotes); and, "'Big Pools of Blood Shone On The Sand'," *Vancouver Sun*, 2 Feb. 1959: 1; and, "'I Talked With Castro — Wonderful Man!," *Vancouver Sun*, 5 Feb. 1959: 1 (latter quotes). Georges-René Côté also arrived just before Moreau but his dispatches were general; see, for example: "Castro fustige l'ingérence étrangère," *La Presse*, 22 Jan. 1959: 1, 6

[107] Larry Allen, "Castro Always Sure He Would Topple Batista," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 Jan. 1959: 21; "Castro 'Betrayed'; Havana Battlefield," *Montreal Gazette*, 3 Jan. 1959: 1; "Havana Awaits Castro," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Jan. 1959: 1; "Gamblers Not Happy On Island," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Jan. 1959: 2 (also *Star*); "Rule By Decree In Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 Jan. 1959: 1; "New Constitution Charted For Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Jan. 1959: 14; "15 Officers Die In Castro Purge," *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 Jan. 1959: 7; "Tumultuous Welcome In Havana For Castro," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 Jan. 1959: 1; "Fresh Blood Flows in Cuba With 71 Persons Executed," *Montreal Gazette*, 13 Jan. 1959: 1; "Execution Tolls Mount In Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 Jan. 1959: 1; "No Halt to Cuba Killings," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 Jan. 1959: 1; "Castro Executes 185, Defies World's Opinion," *Globe and Mail*, 15 Jan. 1959: 1, 2 (also *Gazette*); "Castro Jumps on U.S.," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 Jan. 1959: 7; and, "Castro Calls Press To Rally," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 Jan. 1959: 1. Not all wire correspondents fit the same mould but they all shared in the same 'Ruby Hart Phillips affect'. William L. Ryan, for example, filed a late profile of Castro that included the following and remarkably candid assessment: "For many Cubans the revolution will be secure only when Castro and his aides demonstrate that the nation has not traded one dictatorship for another. They were acutely aware of Cuba's history in that respect," see "Castro: 'A Robin Hood Of Antilles," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 Jan. 1959: 2.

[108] The first wave: "Cuba — Time for Decision," *Globe and Mail*, 2 Jan. 1959: 6; "Castro Won The Slow Way," *Montreal Gazette*, 2 Jan. 1959: 6; "Cuba's Ordeal Ends," *Toronto Star*, 2 Jan. 1959: 6; "Hope for Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 2 Jan. 1959: 17; "Change of Dictators?," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 3 Jan. 1959: 4; "Cuba Connaĵlra-T-Elle Enfin Une Vie Plus Calme?," *La Presse*, 3 Jan. 1959: 4; "They Come and They Go," *Montreal Gazette*, 3 Jan. 1959: 6; "Chance For Cuban Democracy," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Jan. 1959: 6; "Cuba's Struggle For Freedom," *Toronto Telegram*, 3 Jan. 1959: 6; and, "What Next in Cuba?," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 Jan. 1959: 4. The second wave: "The Foxhole vs. The Barracks," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Jan. 1959: 6; "Young Man With A Mission," *Ottawa Citizen,* 6 Jan. 1959: 6; and, "Castro and 'Cuba For the Cubans'," *Montreal Gazette*, 7 Jan. 1959: 6.

[109] "Recognizing the Inevitable," *Globe and Mail*, 9 Jan. 1959: 6; "Purge in Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 9 Jan. 1959: 6; "Le nouveau gouvernement cubain inspire confiance," *La Presse*, 10 Jan. 1959: 4; "Cuba's New Peril," *Toronto Star*, 14 Jan. 1959: 6; "The Cuban Executions," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 Jan. 1959: 25 (run by the Sun a week later); "*Blood-Letting In Cuba*," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 Jan. 1959: 6; "What Are the Rules?," *Globe and Mail*, 19 Jan. 1959: 6; "Castro Invokes 'Law of Victor'," *Toronto Star*, 20 Jan. 1959: 6; "Must Liberty Be Nourished In Blood?," *Toronto Star*, 23 Jan. 1959: 6; "On Rule By Terror?," *Financial Post*, 24 Jan. 1959: 6; and, "'Trials' In A Cuban Arena," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 Jan. 1959: 6. A minority of editorial boards took exception to the extra-judicial nature of the executions and rejected any justification but remained deferential to the legitimacy of the government, see "'Democracy' In Cuba," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 14 Jan. 1959: 4; "Cuba's Hour of Trial," *Toronto Telegram*, 14 Jan. 1959: 6; and, "It's Cuba's Business, But —," *Vancouver Sun*, 16 Jan. 1959: 4.

Correspondents were generally unable to grasp anything more than a cursory understanding of the true role of the executions in both M-26-7's consolidation on power and as a broader social response to the collapse of Batista's violent and repressive regime (through no fault of their own, of course). Moreau's correspondence came the closest, however. Overall, media registered between 300 and 800 executions and a posited a general uneasiness before following the shift in topic away form violence to international optics. Michelle Chase has chronicled the broader social role of the executions (then generally inaccessible to media) in "The Trials: Violence and Justice in the Aftermath of the Cuban Revolution," in *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence During Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010).

[110] "Castro As Premier On Canada Model?," *Toronto Star*, 17 Feb. 1959: 6; "Business As Usual," *Globe and Mail*, 21 Feb. 1959: 6; and, "'He Would be Crowned'," *Montreal Gazette*, 21 Feb. 1959: 6. What little they did say was confined to exploring any apparent anti-Americanism in the purported confession of would-be assassin Robert Nye, formerly of the U.S. Navy, see "Soldier of Misfortune," *Montreal Gazette*, 6 Feb. 1958: 6; the suggestion that the Revolution was responsible for stirring political sensibilities in Latin America with a surge in revolts, see "Revolution Spreads," *Toronto Star*, 12 Feb. 1959: 6.

[111] Andrew R. L. McNaughton, "Canadian Tells Why He Helped Cuba's Castro," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 8 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Canadian Tried To Buy Arms For Cuba," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 9 Jan. 1959: 1, 6; "Canada Wouldn't Sell Arms To Batista," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 10 Jan. 1959: 1, 2; "Urrutia: Scholar, Man Of Action," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 12 Jan. 1959: 1, 6; John D. Harbron, "Can Castro Keep Cuban Politics Clean?," *Saturday Night*, 31 Jan. 1959: 8-9, 30; Phyllis Wilson, "Brings Priceless Film From Guerrilla Camp," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 Jan. 1959: 21. See also: J.A. Hume, "Cuban U Of O Student Says Castro Revolt Not Communist Move," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Jan. 1959: 7, and Tom Patterson, "How I Got Mixed Up In The Cuban Revolution," *Macleans*, 14 Feb. 1959: 20, 60. Retired banker and 20 year resident of Cuba, A.J. Knowles, filed a series in the *Telegram* in mid-January of mostly routine observations similar to Harbron but more general.

[112] Max Freedman, "Is Castro Bringing A New Tyranny To Cuba?," *Toronto Star*, 19 Jan. 1959: 7. Freedman was, of course, a Canadian national but worked as a syndicated columnists for U.S. paper. Frank Kelley's dispatches, occasionally featured up by the *Gazette* and *Free Press*, charted the same tension Freedman discussed on a circumstantial basis; for example, see "Breath of Fresh Air After Batista Terror," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 Feb. 1959: 27, and "Castro Settles Into Long, Uphill Climb," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 Feb. 1959: 31. Matthews' first report was the best example, particularly in contrast to MacFarlane's first piece which ran on the same day, see "Cuba Rebels Victorious," *Globe and Mail*, 2 Jan. 1959: 1, 2.

[113] Paul Saunders, "Unemployment Tops Staggering Problems Still Facing Castro," *Toronto Star*, 2 Apr. 1959: 14 (a truncated version ran a few days prior as, "Cuba Begins Economic Comeback Under Castro," *Montreal Gazette*, 31 Mar. 1959: 16), and Bruce West, "Near-God Is Falling Off Throne," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Apr. 1959: 19.

[114] Monroe Johnston, "Washington Deciding It Likes Fidel Castro," *Toronto Star*, 23 Apr. 1959: 7; Philip Deane, "Castro Defeats Davy Crockett As Idol Of Youngsters," *Globe and Mail*, 23 Apr. 1959: 23; Jean-Marc Leger, "Castro : Éliminer La Misère Et L'Ignorance Et Créer Une Démocratie Humaniste," *Le Devoir*, 27 Apr. 1959: 1, 8; Marie Bourbonnais, "Foule Rallée Au Panache De La Gloire," *La Presse*, 27 Apr. 1959: 18; and, Bill Bantey, "Fidel Defies Guards To Meet People," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 Apr. 1959: 1, 2.

[115] "The Fidel Castro Fan Club," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 Apr. 1959: 6; "Castro's New Fight," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 Apr. 1959: 27; "Democracy In Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 21 Apr. 1959: 6; "Un Latin en visite chez d'autres Latins," *La Presse*, 25 Apr. 1959: 4; "The Visit of Castro," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 Apr. 1959: 27; and, "Premier Castro's Visit," *Ottawa Citizen*, 28 Apr. 1959: 6. In *Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), H. Basil Robinson described the effort to give Castro the cold shoulder during his visit but also leave the door open to a future official visit: "For the moment, [Diefenbaker's] uneasiness about the Castro regime and his unwillingness to risk offending Eisenhower had prevailed. This would not prevent the Canadian government from maintaining, in the future, an independent policy towards Cuba, one that would soon cause misunderstanding and resentment in Washington" see 92. There was no indication that media were aware of a such a plan even if they correctly intuited something of a chill from Ottawa.

[116] Knowlton Nash, "'Ooo Fidel!' — He Goes Over Big With U.S. Girls, Editors," *Vancouver Sun*, 18 Apr. 1959: 3; Andrew MacFarlane, "Castro: good guy, or bad guy? Judge him by the FACTS," *Toronto Telegram*, 25 Apr. 1959: 4; Mac Reynolds, "Castro 'A Sincere Opportunist'," *Vancouver Sun*, 25 Apr. 1959: 5; Elmore Philpott, "Castro Book," *Vancouver Sun*, 27 Apr. 1959: 4.

[117] Max Freedman, "Castro Speech Melts 'Grim" U.S. Editors," *Toronto Star*, 18 Apr. 1959: 7; Earl Mazo, "'Keep U.S. Arms From Caribbean'," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 Apr. 1959: 1; John B. McDermott, "Million Unemployed In Cuba, Fear Red Move," *Toronto Star*, 8 Apr. 1959: 58; and, F. Pares, "La Bataille Du Sucre Poussera-T-Elle Fidel Castro Dans Le Camp Du Neutralisme?," *Le Devoir*, 2 Apr. 1959: 4.

[118] Bill Bantey, "Castro Back As PM As A Million Cheer," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 Jul. 1959: 1; "The Poor of Cuba Put Firm Faith In Fidel Castro," *Montreal Gazette*, 29 Jul. 1959: 1; Bruce Phillips, "'Frightening' Demonstration Of Power In Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 Jul. 1959: 7; Jean-Marc Leger, "Amérique Latine: Derrière L'Agitation Politique, Un Révolution Et En Cours," *Le Devoir*, 17 Aug. 1959: 11; Philip Deane, "Castro's Accusations Against U.S. Officials Annoy Washington," *Globe and Mail*, 17 Aug. 1959: 1; Andrew MacFarlane, "Castro NEEDED His Vanishing Major," *Toronto Telegram*, 13 Nov. 1959: 7; and, J.R. Walker, "Nationalism In Latin America," *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 Nov. 1959: 6.

[119] "Castro Loses First Round," *Toronto Star*, 4 Jun. 1959: 6; "Treat Softly, Uncle Sam," *Toronto Star*, 15 Jun. 1959: 6; "The Good Earth Needs Large Amounts," *Montreal Gazette*, 29 June 1959: 8; and, "Enthusiasm Not Enough," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 14 Jul. 1959: 4.

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[156] "Guns Or Butter?," *Globe and Mail*, 6 Jan. 1961: 6; "'Gitmo' — U.S. Bastion," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 10 Jan. 1961: 4; "U.S. Behind Guerrilla War On Cuba?," *Toronto Star*, 11 Jan. 1961: 6; "Castro's Shadow In Central America," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 Jan. 1961: 6; "Growing Opposition Worries Castro," *Montreal Gazette*, 17 Jan. 1961: 6; "Cuban Tumbrils," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 19 Jan. 1961: 4; "Handouts Are Not Enough," *Globe and Mail*, 15 Feb. 1961: 6; "Cuba Et L'Occident," *Le Devoir*, 16 Feb. 1961: 4; "Trade With Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 Mar. 1961: 6; "Cuba Builds Its Communist Structure," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 Mar. 1961: 6; "Anti-Castro Unity Is Unlikely," *Montreal Gazette*, 10 Mar. 1961: 6; "Revolutionary Double-Talk," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Mar. 1961: 6.

[157] "A Revolution Betrayed," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Apr. 1960: 6; "A Clear And Present Danger," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 5 Apr. 1961: 25; "Cubans Opposed To Castro," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 Apr. 1961: 6; "Kennedy Versus Castro," *Toronto Star*, 6 Apr. 1961: 6; "Undeclared War," *Globe and Mail*, 8 Apr. 1961: 6; "Raiders For Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 8 Apr. 1961: 6; "Counter-Revolution In Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 Apr. 1961: 17; "If Castro Falls, What Next?," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 Apr. 1961: 6; "Wrong Way To Fight Castro," *Toronto Star*, 14 Apr. 1961: 6.

[158] "Bombed With His Own Bombers," *Montreal Gazette*, 17 Apr. 1961: 6; "Cuba: Can U.S. Escape Criticism?," *Toronto Star*, 17 Apr. 1961: 6; "Counting Chickens...," *Globe and Mail*, 18 Apr. 1961: 6; "The Deciding Hour," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 18 Apr. 1961: 4; "Invasion In Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 18 Apr. 1961: 6; "Uprising In Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 Apr. 1961: 6; "A Primer For Revolution," *Toronto Star*, 18 Apr. 1961: 6; "Civil War Is Cuba's Tragedy," *Toronto Telegram*, 18 Apr. 1961: 6; "Contre-Révolution À Cuba," *La Presse*, 18 Apr. 1961: 4; "U.S. Involvement In Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 18 Apr. 1961: 17; "U.S. Gambles In Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 19 Apr. 1961: 6; "Whoever Wins Cuba, U.S. Loses," *Toronto Telegram*, 19 Apr. 1961: 6; "Dangerous Gamble," *Vancouver Sun*, 19 Apr. 1961: 4; "Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 Apr. 1961: 29; "Un Modèle De Non-Intervention," *Le Devoir*, 19 Apr. 1961: 4; "A Difficult Restraint," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 20 Apr. 1961: 4; "Saying Too Much Too Soon," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 Apr. 1961: 6; "For Cubans To Decide," *Ottawa Citizen*, 20 Apr. 1961: 6; "Somebody Blundered," *Vancouver Sun*, 20 Apr. 1961: 4; "The Cuban Tragedy," *Globe and Mail*, 21 Apr. 1961: 6; "Mr. Kennedy Makes A Bad Case," *Toronto Star*, 21 Apr. 1961: 6; "U.S. Needs Good Neighbor Policy," *Toronto Telegram*, 21 Apr. 1961: 6; "Washington Et La Révolte Cubaine," *Le Devoir*, 21 Apr. 1961: 4; "Monroe Doctrine Re-affirmed," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 21 Apr. 1961: 43; "Does Latin America Want Liberty?," *Toronto Star*, 22 Apr. 1961: 6; "Canada's Relations With Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 22 Apr. 1961: 6; "Washington Et Cuba," *Le Devoir*, 22 Apr. 1961: 4; "A Kennedy Doctrine?," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Apr. 1961: 6; "The Invasion That Failed," *Montreal Gazette*, 24 Apr. 1961: 6; "Moral Credit Of West At Stake In Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 24 Apr. 1961: 1; "Kennedy Faces Latin Crisis," *Toronto Telegram*, 25 Apr. 1961: 6; "Good News On The Cuban Affair," *Vancouver Sun*, 25 Apr. 1961: 4; "De Cuba À L'Algérie," *Le Devoir*, 25 Apr. 1961: 4; "Canada And Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 Apr. 1961: 27; Elmore Philpott, "Cuba Lessons," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 Apr. 1961: 4; "Force Won't Beat Castroism," *Toronto Star*, 27 Apr. 1961: 6; "Cuban Guinea Pig," *Vancouver Sun*, 28 Apr. 1961: 4.

[159] Elmore Philpott, "If Ike Had Flattered Fidel...," *Vancouver Sun*, 22 Apr. 1961: 4.

[160] Gerald Clark, "Cuba Strategist Great Optimist," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 Feb. 1961: 15; "Trigger-Happy Cuba Now Turned Communist," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 Feb. 1961: 13; "Russians Now Rushing Aid," *Ottawa Citizen*, 17 Feb. 1961: 25; "'Honest Broker' For Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 Feb. 1961: 17; John F. Sokol, "Impending Showdown In Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Apr. 1961: 6; Kenneth McNaught, "Castro's Cuba, Ottawa And Washington," *Saturday Night*, 21 Jan. 1961: 7-11; Ian Sclanders, "Why Castro's Cuba Is Wrong About Canada," *Maclean's*, 28 Jan. 1961: 13, 43-45; "Latin America The Revolution Has Begun," *Maclean's*, 11 Feb. 1961: 9, 38, 40.

[161] James Reston, "Slamming The Door On Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 7 Jan. 1961: 6; Tad Szulc, "U.S Helps Train Anti-Castro Army On Louisiana Soil," *Globe and Mail*, 7 Apr. 1961: 1; "Anti-Castro Rebels Abandon Invasion Plan For Guerrilla Landings," *Globe and Mail*, 10 Apr. 1961: 9; "Land In Florida, 3 Cuban Fliers Given Asylum," *Globe and Mail*, 17 Apr. 1961: 19; "Communications Cut," *Globe and Mail*, 18 Apr. 1961: 1, 9; "Castro Opponents Indicate New Military Attacks On Cuba To Follow Soon," *Globe and Mail*, 21 Apr. 1961: 8; "Rebels Say Monumental Mismanagement By CIA Wrecked Invasion," *Globe and Mail*, 22 Apr. 1961: 9; Bert Quint, "Rebels Plan Cuba Landing," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 Apr. 1961: 1, 4; "U.S. Position In Cuba Invasion Ominously Like U.K.'s In Egypt," *Vancouver Sun*, 18 Apr. 1961: 5; "As Others See It: U.S. Looks Guilty In Cuba Assault," *Toronto Star*, 20 Apr. 1961: 6.; "Bright Young Kennedy Up To His Neck In Cuba," *Vancouver Sun*, 29 Apr. 1961: 5; "U.S. Seems To Be Blind To Appearances In Cuba," *Vancouver Sun*, 21 Apr. 1961: 5.

[162] It was unlikely that Canada-Cuba relations would have fractured to the same extent as Cuba-US relations did had Cuba exercised *appropriation without compensation* over Canadian assets (obviously given the role of distance in Canada-Cuba relations) but it certainly would have fractured media consensus. Nevertheless, the progressive divestment of certain areas of Canadian interests in Cuba (banking, specifically) spoke to the role of dialogue in mediating Cuban desire for independence and Canadian expectation for some measure of compensation.

[163] It is necessary to state that the U.S. *prewar* victory narrative would have found great difficulty in perceiving any "communist" country as being truly independent of the USSR. While the broader point about elite Canadian print media here should be qualified by this fact it is also worth observing that the media were generally more accepting of nuance than their U.S. counterparts.

[164] Alan Anderson, "Communists 'Captured' A Naive Fidel," *Toronto Telegram*, 20 Nov. 1962: 22. Not to be confused with Allen Anderson, concurrent Ambassador to Cuba and Haiti, 1959-1961.

[165] George Bryant, "No Elections — Castro," *Toronto Star*, 2 May 1961: 1, 2; "Strike Again And 'All Die'," *Toronto Star*, 4 May 1961: 1, 4; "Castro Set To Launch Red-Style Industry Drive," Toronto Star, 6 May 1961: 1, 2; "Ready To Fly Priests, Nuns From Cuba To Montreal," *Toronto Star*, 8 May 1961: 3; "Priests Nuns Leave," *Toronto Star*, 10 May 1961: 1; "Waiters, Bus Boys In Castro's Army," *Toronto Star*, 11 May 1961: 3; "Does The U.S. Embargo Hurt Cuba? Yes, But It Hurts The U.S. Even More," *Toronto Star*, 11 May 1961: 7; "Let Canada Priests Remain In Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 13 May 1961: 3; "Prisoners For Bulldozers — Fidel," *Toronto Star*, 18 May 1961: 8; "Castro To Send Captives To Trade For Bulldozers," *Toronto Star*, 20 May 1961: 3; George Bryant, "Americans Treated Cubans As 'Fools'," *Toronto Star*, 24 May 1961: 7; "Will Latin America Follow Cuba Or U.S.?," *Toronto Star*, 25 May 1961: 7. Bryant's series was run concurrently in the *Sun*. Fernand Beauregard, "Le Rideau De Fer Tombe Sur Cuba," *La Presse*, 4 Dec. 1961: 7; Thomas Sloan, "Challenge To Washington, Embarrassment To Moscow," *Globe and Mail*, 9 Dec. 1961: 8.

[166] "Making No Secret Of It," *Montreal Gazette*, 2 May 1961: 6; "A Though Policy With Castro?," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 May 1961: 6; "Cuban Olive Branch Scorned," *Toronto Star*, 2 May 1961: 6.; "Cuba And Communism," *Toronto Telegram*, 2 May 1961: 6; "Doctrine Of Disaster," *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1961: 6; "Castro's Communism," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 3 May 1961: 4; "Castro A Choisi Le Communisme," *La Presse*, 4 May 1961: 4; "The Results In Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 May 1961: 6; "It Was A Counter-Revolution," *Toronto Star*, 4 May 1961: 6; "Blind Spot For Latin America," *Toronto Telegram*, 4 May 1961: 6; "The Vanished Ballot," *Globe and Mail*, 5 May 1961: 6; "Now A Merchant Of Communism," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 May 1961: 6; "Very Sober Second Thoughts," *Vancouver Sun*, 20 May 1961: 4; "Pecksniff To The Rescue," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 May 1961: 46; "Castro Faces Many Shortages," *Montreal Gazette*, 22 Jun. 1961: 6; "Castro Proclaims One Party — His Own," *Montreal Gazette*, 29 Jul. 1961: 6; "One-Party Rule In Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 Jul. 1961: 6.

[167] "Cuba Picture Distorted," *Toronto Star*, 5 May 1961: 6; "The Restrained Press," *Vancouver Sun*, 8 May 1961: 4 (JFK to media); "President Kennedy's Visit," *Ottawa Citizen*, 16 May 1961: 6; "Canada Greets The Kennedys," *Toronto Star*, 16 May 1961: 6; "Canada's Place Is In The OAS," *Toronto Telegram*, 17 May 1961: 6; "Let U.S. Accept JFK Challenge," *Toronto Star*, 18 May 1961: 6; "Behind The Smiles," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 18 May 1961: 31; "Forthrightness From Mr. Kennedy," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 18 May 1961: 31; "A 'Bad Moment' To Talk Of OAS," *Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1961: 6; "Néo-Neutralisme Du Canada," *La Presse*, 27 May 1961: 4; "Canada And The OAS," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 3 Jun. 1961: 44; "A Time To Say No," *Vancouver Sun*, 10 Jul. 1961: 4. (JFK in Ottawa); "Canada And Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 10 May 1961: 6; "Prise De Position Du Canada," *La Presse*, 10 May 1961: 4; "Negotiating With Castro," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 May 1961: 6; "Sound Advice From Mr. Green," *Toronto Star*, 10 May 1961: 6; "Bi-partisan On Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 10 May 1961: 27; "Le Canada Et Les Amériques," *Le Devoir*, 16 May 1961: 4 (Green).

[168] "The Cuban Prisoners," *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 May 1961: 6; "Tractors For Prisoners," *Montreal Gazette*, 26 May 1961: 6; "Latin Americans And The Cuban Prisoners," *Ottawa Citizen*, 30 May 1961: 6; "Generosity Versus Cynicism," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Jun. 1961: 6; "Swords Into Tractors...," *Toronto Star*, 8 Jun. 1961: 6; "A Limit To Cubanism," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Jun. 1961: 6; "Premier Castro and The Prisoners," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 Jun. 1961: 6; "Castro's Buccaneering," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 26 Jul. 1961: 4; "Communist Or Cut-Up?," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Jul. 1961: 6 (quoted); "End Piracy In The Air," *Toronto Star*, 11 Aug. 1961: 6 (prisoners); "Ripe For Revolution," *Vancouver Sun*, 23 Jun. 1961: 4; "Mr. Stevenson's Unsentimental Journey," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 Jun. 1961: 6 (Stevenson); "They Won't Forget Castro," *Vancouver Sun*, 4 Aug. 1961: 4; "How To Make A Revolution," *Toronto Telegram*, 9 Aug. 1961: 6; "The Time Is Growing Short," *Globe and Mail*, 10 Aug. 1961: 6; "Castroism On Display," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 10 Aug. 1961: 4; "Alliance For Progress," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 10 Aug. 1961: 23; "Credits For Latin America," *Ottawa Citizen*, 11 Aug. 1961: 6; "One Victory, Two Defeats," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 Aug. 1961: 22; "The Choices Before Latin America," *Montreal Gazette*, 19 Aug. 1961: 6; "It Must Not Fail," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 21 Aug. 1961: 4; "Signing Up At Punta Del Este," *Toronto Telegram*, 21 Aug. 1961: 6; "Cuba And The United States," *Globe and Mail*, 22 Aug. 1961: 6; "Cuba Seeks Better U.S. Relations," *Montreal Gazette*, 11 Sept. 1961: 6; "Canada And Latin America," *Ottawa Citizen*, 19 Sept. 1961: 6; "Export Trade With Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 Nov. 1961: 6; "In Restive Latin America," *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 Nov. 1961: 6 (aid).

[169] "Clever Castro!," *Vancouver Sun*, 4 Dec. 1961: 4; "Marx, Lenin... And Castro," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Dec. 1961: 6; "Disturbing Faith," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 5 Dec. 1961: 4; "Communist In Word As Well As Deed," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Dec. 1961: 6; "Castro's Road To Communism," *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 Dec. 1961: 6; "Terres De Contrastes Et De Violence," *Le Devoir*, 6 Dec. 1961: 4; "Castro's Opportunity," *Vancouver Sun*, 11 Dec. 1961: 4; "Which Course?," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 12 Dec. 1961: 4.

[170] Earle Beattie, "Does The U.S. Press Slant The News?," *Toronto Star*, 13 May 1961: 7; Harry Rasky, "The Failure Of U.S. News Media," *Saturday Night*, 19 Aug. 1961: 27-29; M.P. Dean, "L'Aveu De Castro Va Servir Washington," *La Presse*, 7 Dec. 1961: 5.

[171] James Reston, "'The Truth What Makes Men Free'," *Globe and Mail*, 11 May 1961: 6; "Mr. Kennedy's Sense Of History," *Globe and Mail*, 13 May 1961: 6; R. Hart Phillips, "Terrorized Cubans Facing Mass Mobilization," *Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1961: 1, 2; "Castro Redder Than Reds: U.S.," *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1961: 1; "The Leaders Were Restrained," *Globe and Mail*, 3 May 1961: 6; "Deny Kennedy Asked Tractors Committee," *Globe and Mail*, 24 May 1961: 2; "Castro Regime Speeds Drive To Set Up Communism," *Globe and Mail*, 19 Jun. 1961: 1; Zell Rabin, "PoW Barter Fidel's Hoax, Cubans Say," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 May 1961: 12; "Fear Of Invasion Still With Cubans," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Jun. 1961: 21; "Castro Controls Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 5 Jun. 1961: 5; "Reds Hold Main Lines Of Power," *Ottawa Citizen*, 6 Jun. 1961: 9; "Humiliation, Terror Face Cuban Priests," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Jun. 1961: 17; "Envoys Serving In Fidel's Cuba Face Frustrating Role," *Ottawa Citizen*, 8 Jun. 1961: 13; "Reds No Longer Monsters To Cubans," *Ottawa Citizen*, 9 Jun. 1961: 13; Roy Perrott, "The Strange Contradictions In Cuba Today," *Globe and Mail*, 18 May 1961: 7; "Cuba's Children Get Chance To Learn In Drive On Illiteracy," *Globe and Mail*, 19 May 1961: 7; "A Minority Tragedy For Wealth Cubans," *Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1961: 7. Szulc's reports here contradicted his established understanding of Cuba and Castro in particular. Whether this was a momentary change of heart or more indicative of editorial oversight (given the sensational title of the articles) is difficult to assess.

[172] Ruth Worth, "U.S. Blamed By Castro For Cuba Arms Buildup," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Jan. 1962: 1, 2; "Cuban Version Of Censorship Frustrating To Correspondents," *Globe and Mail*, 12 Jan. 1962: 3; "Cuba, Three Years Later," *Globe and Mail*, 19 Jan. 1962: 7; "Two Bathrooms Four Bedrooms, But No Furniture," *Globe and Mail*, 26 Jan. 1962: 7; "Tighter Belts In Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 30 Jan. 1962: 7; "Castro's Goldfish Bowl For Cuban Refugees," *Globe and Mail*, 22 Feb. 1962: 7; "Rumours Fly Fast Along The Malycon," *Globe and Mail*, 26 Feb. 1962: 7; Roy Shields, "Castro's Communist Revolution Goes Sour," *Toronto Star*, 14 Mar. 1962: 1, 3; "300,000 Armed Men Keep Castro In Power," *Toronto Star*, 15 Mar. 1962: 1, 4; "Press Censorship Is Strict Under Castro," *Toronto Star*, 16 Mar. 1962: 1, 4; "250,000 Fled Isle, 71,000 Trying," *Toronto Star*, 17 Mar. 1962: 1, 9; "Castro's Pain In The Neck," *Toronto Star*, 19 Mar. 1962: 7; "They'd Rather See Marching Than The Girls!," *Toronto Star*, 20 Mar. 1962: 7; "Revolt Gave Them One Thing — An ABC," *Toronto Star*, 21 Mar. 1962: 7; "Canada — The Trader That Baffles The Cubans," *Toronto Star*, 22 Mar. 1962: 7; "How Long Can They Eat An Idea?," *Toronto Star*, 23 Mar. 1962: 7; "Somebody Is Going to Get The Boot," *Toronto Star*, 24 Mar. 1962: 8. Shields' series was also carried by the *Sun*.

[173] "Basic Difference," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 3 Jan. 1962: 4; "Castro — Three Years Later," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Jan. 1962: 6; "Clumsy And Unconvincing Criticism," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 5 Jan. 1962: 19; "Cuba And Spain Maintain Contact," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 Jan. 1962: 44; "Cuban Trade," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 30 Jan. 1962: 17; "The Mystery Of Castro's Disappearance," *Montreal Gazette*, 7 Mar. 1962: 6; "Cuba's New Communist Directorate," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 Mar. 1962: 6; "Cuba After Three Castro Years," *Toronto Star*, 19 Mar. 1962: 6; "New Crisis In Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 29 Mar. 1962: 6.

[174] "The OAS And Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 15 Jan. 1962; "Sanctions Folly," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 24 Jan. 1962: 4; "The Castro Infection In Latin America," *Montreal Gazette*, 24 Jan. 1962: 6; "U.S. Errs In Anti-Fidel Crusade," *Toronto Star*, 25 Jan. 1962: 6; "Education Drive In Latin America," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 Jan. 1962: 6; "Washington Tirera-T-Il Les Leçons De Son Demi-Échec À Punta Del Este?," *Le Devoir*, 29 Jan. 1962: 4; "Fiasco At Punta Del Este," *Globe and Mail*, 31 Jan. 1962: 6; "The Price Is Too High," *Toronto Star*, 31 Jan. 1962: 6; "Split At Punta Del Este," *Toronto Telegram*, 31 Jan. 1962: 6; "Hard Or Soft On Cuba?," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 Feb. 1962: 6; "Thoughts About Cuba," *Vancouver Sun*, 1 Feb. 1962: 4; "An Urgent Duty," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 2 Feb. 1962: 4; "Cuba Is Excluded From O.A.S.," *Montreal Gazette*, 2 Feb. 1962: 6.

[175] "Why Should We Shun Cuba?," *Toronto Star*, 2 Feb. 1962: 6; "Trade With Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 3 Feb. 1962: 6; "Canada's Trade With Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Feb. 1962: 6; "Diefenbaker's Sensible Voice," *Vancouver Sun*, 3 Feb. 1962: 4; "Anti-Cuba Embargo Unlikely," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Feb. 1962: 6; "Dean Rusk's Poor Case On Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 5 Feb. 1962: 6; "U.S. Cuts Off Trade With Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 5 Feb. 1962: 6; "Three Questions," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 6 Feb. 1962: 4; "Ottawa Dit 'Non' À Washington," *Le Devoir*, 6 Feb. 1962: 4; "Cuba's Economic Position Weakens," *Montreal Gazette*, 16 Feb. 1962: 6; "U.S. Policy In Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 19 Feb. 1962: 19; "U.S. Seeks Extension Of Cuba Boycott," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 Feb. 1962: 6; "Hypocrisy," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 20 Feb. 1962: 15; "NATO And Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 21 Feb. 1962: 6; "NATO And Cuba," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 Feb. 1962: 4; "Chip On Shoulder," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 27 Feb. 1962: 15; "Trouble Ahead?," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 1 Mar. 1962: 4; "Why We Won't Join The Blockade To Starve Castro Out Of Cuba," *Macleans*, 1 Mar. 1962: 2; "Cuba Trade Helps Farmer," *Toronto Star*, 6 Mar. 1962: 6; "Communism And Fescue," *Vancouver Sun*, 6 Mar. 1962: 4; "How NATO Views Cuba," *Financial Post*, 17 Mar. 1962: 6; "No Slackening," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 19 Mar. 1962: 4; "Cubans On The Bread Line," *Toronto Telegram*, 19 Mar. 1962: 6; "Don't Tell U.S. What To Do," *Financial Post*, 31 Mar. 1962: 6.

[176] Douglas Robbins, "Castro's Hell Is His Own Making," *Toronto Telegram*, 17 Mar. 1962: 3; "Cuba A Land Of Forced Volunteers," *Toronto Telegram*, 20 Mar. 1962: 5; "Castro's Guns On Own People," *Toronto Telegram*, 21 Mar. 1962: 24; "Cuba Cactus Curtain Like Berlin Wall," *Toronto Telegram*, 22 Mar. 1962: 22; "Hated Castro Fears For Life," *Toronto Telegram*, 23 Mar. 1962: 12; William Eccles, "Cuba's Program To Export Revolution," *Macleans*, 10 Mar. 1962: 23-24, 44; "Ladies Day In Cuba," *Macleans*, 10 Mar. 1962: 24-25; John D. Harbron, "Le Jeu De Cuba Avec L'URSS est Périlleux," *La Presse*, 15 Feb. 1962: 1, 2.

[177] Marguerite Higgins, "Kennedy Puts Ban On Cuban Imports," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Feb. 1962: 1; Walter Lippmann, "On Dealing With Castro," *Montreal Gazette*, 26 Jan. 1962: 6 (also LP, HCH, TS); "Castro And Castroism," *Montreal Gazette*, 31 Jan. 1962: 6 (also LP, WFP, TS)

[178] Mark Gayn, "Kuba's Kastro — He's Russia's Hero No.1," *Toronto Star*, 6 Apr. 1962: 6.

[179] "Mr. Diefenbaker's Appeal To Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 3 Apr. 1962: 6; "Mercy In Havana?," *Toronto Star*, 3 Apr. 1962: 6; "An Appeal To Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 3 Apr. 1962: 6; "Castro's 'Business Deal'," *Montreal Gazette*, 10 Apr. 1962: 6; "Premier Castro's Trade In Lives," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 Apr. 1962: 6; "Castro Demands Ransom," *Toronto Star*, 14 Apr. 1962: 6 (prisoners); "Castro's Internal Fight For Power," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Apr. 1962: 6; "The Cost Of An Outpost," *Globe and Mail*, 16 May 1962: 6; "Cuba Can't Meet Its Commitments," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Jul. 1962: 6; "Sabotage In Cuba But Not Enough," *Montreal Gazette*, 6 Aug. 1962: 6; "And Now, Collective Farms," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Aug. 1962: 6; "Cuba's Lament," *Toronto Star*, 24 Aug. 1962: 6; "Castro's Farm Troubles," *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 Aug. 1962: 6 (review).

[180] "La Révolution 'Volée'," *Le Devoir*, 6 Apr. 1962: 4; "Canada's Blind Spot," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 11 Apr. 1962: 27; "Canada And Latin America," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 Apr. 1962: 46; "Anniversary Of An Invasion," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 17 Apr. 1962: 23; "Canada And Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 12 May 1962: 48; "A Dying Issue," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 15 Jun. 1962: 4; "Burst Balloon," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 16 Jul. 1962: 15; "Aiding Dr. Castro," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Aug. 1962: 6; "Let U.S. Leash Cuban Exiles," *Toronto Star*, 27 Aug. 1962: 6; "The United States And Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 31 Aug. 1962: 6; "'I Am Not For Invading Cuba'," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 Aug. 1962: 6; "No Cuban Invasion," *Toronto Star*, 31 Aug. 1962: 6.

[181] Gerald Clark, "This Could Happen To U.S.!," *Toronto Telegram*, 17 Apr. 1962: 7; Alan Judge, "I Was A Prisoner In Castro's Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen Weekend Magazine*, 21 Apr. 1962: 10-12, 43; "How G-2 Breaks Down Its Captives," *Ottawa Citizen Weekend Magazine*, 27 Apr. 1962: 37-39, 52; "The Women Behind Castro," Winnipeg Free Press, 14 Apr. 1962: 21-22.

[182] Tad Szulc, "Cuba: Moscow's Unhealthy Parasite," *Globe and Mail*, 21 Aug. 1962: 6; Marguerite Higgins, "Mr. K. And The Cuban 'Tiger'," *Montreal Gazette*, 21 Aug. 1962: 6; Roscoe Drummond, "The Well Entrenched Castro Dictatorship," *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 Aug. 1962: 6; David Holden, "Romantic's Failure," Winnipeg Free Press, 26 May 1962: 12.

[183] Specifically, Robinson said that Canadian reaction was *calculated* not delayed; however, the level of assistance rendered to Washington was overlooked and not expressly shared with the media, see *Diefenbaker's World* 283-95. This is upheld by both Denis Smith in *Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker* (Toronto: MacFarlane Walter & Ross, 1995) and *Three Nights in Havana*.

Charles Lynch, "Canada's Performance As A Committed Nation," *Ottawa Citizen*, 24 Oct. 1962: 6; "Statesmanship (Or Was It Sluggishness?)," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 Oct. 1962: 7; "Diefenbaker Moves To Sooth Ruffled U.S. Feelings," *Ottawa Citizen*, 24 Oct. 1962: 58; "The Hesitant Response to NORAD 'alert'," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; B.T. Richardson, "JFK's Big Gamble Paid Off," *Toronto Telegram*, 29 Oct. 1962: 7. George Bryant started an infrequent series from Cuba in mid-September and was fortunate enough to stay through until late October. He found Cuba disorganized amid an influx of USSR aid and personnel but nevertheless concluded that Castro had, indeed, beat the embargo and won the war of "attrition" against the U.S. See George Bryant, "'Civilian Shortage, Military Plenty'," *Toronto Star*, 17 Sept. 1962: 1, 3; "Life Was Never Grimmer For Castro's Cuba But Worst Is Over," *Toronto Star*, 18 Sept. 1962: 3; "Havana Is City Of Plot, Sabotage, Spies, Guns," *Toronto Star*, 19 Sept. 1962: 11; "K. Too Knows What It's Like To Be Under Nuclear Gun," *Toronto Star*, 24 Sept. 1962: 7; "Blockade Of Cuba: Is It Legal Under International Law?," *Toronto Star*, 26 Oct. 1962: 7.

[184] "Cuba: Another Spain?," *Globe and Mail*, 4 Sept. 1962: 6; "Kennedy's Puzzle In Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 4 Sept. 1962: 6; "Let U.S. Keep Hands Off Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 4 Sept. 1962: 6; "War Whoops On The Potomac," *Toronto Star*, 7 Sept. 1962: 6; "Flirting With Danger," *Vancouver Sun*, 7 Sept. 1962: 4; "Must U.S. Call Up Reserves?," *Toronto Star*, 8 Sept. 1962: 6; "The Problem Of Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 10 Sept. 1962: 6; "Harsh Voices," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 11 Sept. 1962: 4; "The Cuban Heebiejeebies," *Vancouver Sun*, 11 Sept. 1962: 4 (quoted); "Russia's Threats Over Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 12 Sept. 1962: 6; "The Cuban Dilemma," *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 Sept. 1962: 6; "More Soviet Sound Than Fury," *Toronto Star*, 12 Sept. 1962: 6; "Trojan Horse In Havana," *Toronto Telegram*, 12 Sept. 1962: 6; "Republican Party Forgets History," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 13 Sept. 1962: 36; "Les Etats-Unis Et Cuba," *Le Devoir*, 17 Sept. 1962: 4; "A Blind Eye," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 18 Sept. 1962: 4.; "Cuba And U.S. Politics," *Globe and Mail*, 19 Sept. 1962: 6; "Risk Extremism," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 19 Sept. 1962: 4; "Centre Stage, Cuba," *Vancouver Sun*, 21 Sept. 1962: 4; "Oil On The Flames," *Toronto Star*, 24 Oct. 1962: 6; "Congress Resentful Of NATO Indifference," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 25 Sept. 1962: 17; "Une Nouvelle Menace Sur La Paix : Cuba," *Le Devoir*, 25 Sept. 1962: 4; "The Challenge," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 26 Sept. 1962: 4; "The Monroe Doctrine," *Globe and Mail*, 29 Sept. 1962: 6 (also published by the *Chronicle*); "Monroe Doctrine Is Obsolete," *Toronto Star*, 29 Sept. 1962: 6; "Slaying Castro On Capital Hill," *Globe and Mail*, 2 Oct. 1962: 6; "United States Tries To Isolate Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 5 Oct. 1962: 6; "A Futile U.S. Ban," *Toronto Star*, 5 Oct. 1962: 6; "U.S. Warhawks In Full Cry," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 Oct. 1962: 6; "Putting On The Pressure," *Vancouver Sun*, 10 Oct. 1962: 4; "La Question Cubaine À L'O.N.U.," *Le Devoir*, 10 Oct. 1962: 4; "Fidel's Shadow On U.S. Election," *Toronto Star*, 13 Oct. 1962: 6; "...And As For Cuba," *Vancouver Sun*, 15 Oct. 1962: 4; "False Analogy," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 17 Oct. 1962: 4; "Peaceful Act," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 18 Oct. 1962: 4; "New Danger In Cuban Waters," *Toronto Star*, 19 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Kaleidoscopic Doctrine," *Vancouver Sun*, 19 Oct. 1962: 4.

[185] "The Blockade Of Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 Oct. 1962: 6; "Kennedy Plays With Fire," *Toronto Star*, 23 Oct. 1962: 6; "An Ominous Decision...," *Vancouver Sun*, 23 Oct. 1962: 4; "Ce N'est Pas La Guerre Mais...," *La Presse*, 23 Oct. 1962: 4; "Only Choice," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 24 Oct. 1962: 4; "Neither The First Nor The Last," *Montreal Gazette*, 24 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Double Standard," *Toronto Star*, 24 Oct. 1962: 6; "Quels Sont Les Motifs Secrets De Washington?," *Le Devoir*, 24 Oct. 1962: 4; "The Crisis Continues," *Globe and Mail*, 25 Oct. 1962: 6; "Negotiation?," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 25 Oct. 1962: 4; "A Plan For Negotiations," *Ottawa Citizen*, 25 Oct. 1962: 6; "A Reasonable U.N. Proposal," *Toronto Star*, 25 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Lesser Danger," *Toronto Telegram*, 25 Oct. 1962: 6; "De Nouveau La Menace Mortelle," *Le Devoir*, 25 Oct. 1962: 4.

[186] "There Is Still Room For Diplomacy," *Montreal Gazette*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Cuban Crisis And Negotiations," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Test Is Yet To Come," *Toronto Star*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Hand On The Button," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 Oct. 1962: 4; "Three Courses On Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; "Cuban Pause," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 27 Oct. 1962: 4; "They May Deny The Missiles Exist," *Montreal Gazette*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Invasion Threat Grows," *Toronto Star*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Reckless Ones," *Toronto Telegram*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; "Cuba And Turkey," *Vancouver Sun*, 27 Oct. 1962: 4; "Cuba — And After," *Globe and Mail*, 29 Oct. 1962: 6; "Two Lessons," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 29 Oct. 1962: 4; "The Easing Crisis," *Montreal Gazette*, 29 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Cuban Crisis Begins To Ease," *Ottawa Citizen*, 29 Oct. 1962: 6; "Victory In Cuba," *Toronto Star*, 29 Oct. 1962: 6; "Checkmate — Or Is It?," *Toronto Telegram*, 29 Oct. 1962: 6; "Something For Nothing?," *Vancouver Sun*, 29 Oct. 1962: 4; "The Big Loser," *Globe and Mail*, 30 Oct. 1962: 6; "Consultation Over Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 30 Oct. 1962: 6; "It Happened In Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 30 Oct. 1962: 6; "En Revenant De Notre Peur," *La Presse*, 30 Oct. 1962: 4.

[187] "Stern Reappraisal," *Toronto Telegram*, 23 Oct. 1962: 6; "Testing Time," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 Oct. 1962: 21; "Canada And The Crisis," *Globe and Mail*, 24 Oct. 1962: 6; "Firm Support," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 24 Oct. 1962: 27; "Modern Nero," *Toronto Star*, 25 Oct. 1962: 6; "Criticism Can Wait," *Vancouver Sun*, 25 Oct. 1962: 4; "Prudent Precautions," *Globe and Mail*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; "Canada — The Fourth Day," *Toronto Telegram*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; "Better Late," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 Oct. 1962: 23; "The Reason Why," *Toronto Star*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; "The Impatient Ones" *Toronto Telegram*, 27 Oct. 1962: 6; "La Canada À La Remorque De L'Impérialisme Amérian," *Le Devoir*, 27 Oct. 1962: 4; "Canada's Cuba Role," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 31 Oct. 1962: 49.

[188] Theses features range from 23-26 October and are far too numerous to cite in total but they do feature prominently in virtually every paper; Maxwell Cohen, "Cuba In Quarantine," *Montreal Gazette*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; Charles Foulkes, "Russia Has Placed Nuclear Weapons In Fanatical Hands," *Vancouver Sun*, 26 Oct. 1962: 4 (also run by the *Star*).

[189] Walter Lippmann, "The U.S. Invade Cuba? Its Allies Would Laugh," *Toronto Star*, 19 Sept. 1962: 7 (also run by the *Press*, *La Presse*, *Chronicle*, *Sun*, and *Gazette*); "Cuba: 'Castro Blackmailing Khrushchov," *Toronto Star*, 10 Oct. 1962: 7 (also run by the *Press*, *Chronicle*, and *Gazette*); "Turkish Bases Hostages For Cuba," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 23 Oct. 1962: 6 (also run by the *Sun*); "Is Diplomacy Dead As Cuba Crisis Mounts?," *Toronto Star*, 25 Oct. 1962: 7 (also run by the *Sun*); "Neither Side Lost, Both Were Winners In That Khrushchov-Kennedy Settlement," *Toronto Star*, 30 Oct. 1962: 7 (also run by the *Press*); James Reston, "The Missing Element," *Globe and Mail*, 15 Oct. 1962: 6; "NATO Allies Helping Cuba To Arm Against America," *Vancouver Sun*, 15 Sept. 1962: 5; Robert J. Donovan, "U.S. Blockade Deflates Castro," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 26 Oct. 1962: 6; William R. Frye, "Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchov Play A Deadly Game," *Toronto Star*, 17 Sept. 1962: 7; "Castro, The Man Who Killed The Monroe Doctrine," *Toronto Star*, 6 Oct. 1962: 8; "'Blockade Is Not Enough, U.S. Is Still Sworn To Get Those Russian Rockets Out Of Cuba'," *Toronto Star*, 27 Oct. 1962: 7; "Khrushchov's Surrender 'Not Unconditional'," *Toronto Star*, 29 Oct. 1962: 1, 9; "U.N. Chief's Big Job — Deal With Castro," *Toronto Star*, 30 Oct. 1962: 1, 2; "Split Castro And K New U.S. Cuba Plan," *Toronto Star*, 31 Oct. 1962: 1, 4.

[190] Keith Morfett, "Russian 'Army' In Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 5 Sept. 1962: 1, 2; "For Cubans, Revolution Is NOW!," *Toronto Telegram*, 6 Sept. 1962: 1, 2; Alfred Sherman, "Hard Times And Communism," Globe and Mail, 13 Sept. 1962: 7; "A Circus Of Hate In Breadless Cuba," Globe and Mail, 14 Sept. 1962: 7; "Cuba: Communism Plus Caudillismo Equals Castroism," Globe and Mail, 4 Oct. 1962: 7; "Why Cuba Turned To Communism," *Globe and Mail*, 5 Oct. 1962: 7; "How Castro Turned To Communism," Globe and Mail, 26 Oct. 1962: 7; "Trading With Cuba," Globe and Mail, 28 Sept. 1962: 6.

[191] Alan Anderson, "'I Escaped From Cuba'," *Toronto Telegram*, 2 Nov. 1962: 1, 2; "Cuba Now Far Outside World," *Toronto Telegram*, 17 Nov. 1962: 1, 18; "$2 A Meal Minimum In Castro's Hotels," *Toronto Telegram*, 18 Nov. 1962: 12; "Communists 'Captured' A Naive Fidel," *Toronto Telegram*, 20 Nov. 1962: 25; "Cubans Still Support Castro," *Toronto Telegram*, 21 Nov. 1962: 26; "Castro Isn't Whistling Dixie," *Toronto Telegram*, 22 Nov. 1962: 5. Anderson's specific comment about Batista is worth considering at length: "We may dislike what Castro's government does now. But it does not go about chopping the arms off its political opponents. That is the difference between the present government of Cuban government it displaced. That is why Fidel Castro still retains the support of many Cubans; he is better than Batista."

[192] George Bain, "Could The U.S. Have Avoided The Cuban Crisis," *Globe and Mail*, 2 Nov. 1962: 7; Bill Fraser, "The View Of Cuba From The Other Side," *Macleans*, 17 Nov. 1962: 1, 2; B.T. Richardson, "Canada Was RIGHT!," *Toronto Telegram*, 15 Nov. 1962: 7; Harold Morrison, "Best Of Hard Bargain," *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 Dec. 1962: 7.

[193] "Possibility Of A Neutral Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 13 Nov. 1962: 6; "Why They Put Missiles On Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 13 Nov. 1962: 6; "It's Not A Game," *Toronto Telegram*, 19 Nov. 1962: 6; "Settlement In Cuba?," *Toronto Star*, 22 Nov. 1962: 6; "Cuba And The Kremlin," *Globe and Mail*, 15 Dec. 1962: 6; "Negotiations With Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 26 Dec. 1962: 6.

[194] "Unpredictable Middleman," *Montreal Gazette*, 1 Nov. 1962: 6 (first quote); "Castro's 'Image' Marred," *Toronto Star*, 1 Nov. 1962: 6; "Castro And Kennedy," *Globe and Mail*, 2 Nov. 1962: 6; "A Lonely Man," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 2 Nov. 1962: 4; "The Monkey-Wrench," *Toronto Star*, 2 Nov. 1962: 6; "First Things First," *Toronto Telegram*, 3 Nov. 1962: 6 (second and third quotes); "Cuba's Demands," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 15 Nov. 1962: 4; "Open Skies...," *Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 16 Nov. 1962: 4; "The Bombers Go From Cuba," *Montreal Gazette*, 21 Nov. 1962: 6; "Castro Without The Missiles," *Montreal Gazette*, 14 Dec. 1962: 6; "New Approach To Cuba," *Globe and Mail*, 27 Dec. 1962: 6; "Exodus From Cuba," *Toronto Telegram*, 27 Dec. 1962: 6; "Reason For The Rift," *Toronto Telegram*, 29 Dec. 1962: 6. It is worth noting that a final column by the *Telegram* revised the paper's position from two days prior by disagreeing with Anderson and blaming Castro for the overall decline in Cuba-U.S. relations. Editorials operate on a spectrum and can reflect a variety of opinion, even outright contradictory, but this is curiously revisionist. The *Telegram*'s first 'verdict' (as it were) was a much more balanced reflection on their overall position, however.

[195] "When Canada Failed," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 1 Nov. 1962: 45; "NORAD And The Crisis," *Globe and Mail*, 7 Nov. 1962: 6; "A Lesson From The Crisis," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Nov. 1962: 6; "Canada's Policy Toward Cuba," *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 Nov. 1962: 6; "It's Time We Gave Up The Dangerous Fiction Of Canadian Neutrality," *Macleans*, 17 Nov. 1962: 4.

[196] Ralph Allen, "A Calm Report From Inside Cuba," *Macleans*, 17 Nov. 1962: 15-17, 78; Cuba: The Ominous Legacy," *Macleans*, 17 Dec. 1962: 16-17, 62; Gerald Clark, "Why Castro Turned To Communism," *Ottawa Citizen Weekend Magazine*, 2 Dec. 1962: 2-4, 20, 32-33; "Why Soviet Aid Failed To Stave Off Chaos," *Ottawa Citizen Weekend Magazine*, 8 Dec. 1962: 30, 32-33, 52-53, 62-63, 64 (run concurrently by the *Sun*); Barry Lando, "Faithful To Fidel," *Ottawa Citizen*, 7 Dec. 1962: 7. (also VS and WFP).

[197] Walter Lippmann, "In Russia's Interests To Turn West," *Winnipeg Free Press*, 6 Nov. 1962: 6 (also run by the *Star*); "Cuba And After," *Montreal Gazette*, 14 Nov. 1962: 6 (also run by the *Star*); "'Military Dictatorship Would Boss A-War Survivors'," *Toronto Star*, 3 Dec. 1962: 7.

[198] In *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), John Lewis Gaddis corroborates the view that the USSR was surprised with FC's pledge; he is worth quoting at length: "[Khrushchev] and his advisors had been surprised, but then excited, and finally exhilarated when a Marxist-Leninist insurgency seized power in Cuba on its own, without all the pushing and prodding the Soviets had had to do to install communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Never mind that Marx himself would never had predicted this — there being few proletarians in Cuba — or that Fidel Castro and his unruly followers hardly fit Lenin's model of a disciplined revolutionary 'vanguard.' It was enough that Cuba had gone communist *spontaneously*, without assistance from Moscow, in a way that seemed to confirm Marx's prophesy about the direction in which history was going", see 75-76.

[199] Andrew MacFarlane, "Whoever Wins Now, Cuban Lives Are Being Squandered," *Toronto Telegram*, 18 Apr. 1961: 7.

[200] Christopher Hitchens, *Hitch-22* (London: Atlantic Books, 2010).

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